



2009 CHIEFS OF TRANSFORMATION CONFERENCE

FINAL ANALYSIS REPORT

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FOREWORD

I am pleased to present the 2009 Chiefs of Transformation Conference Final Analysis Report to the Transformation Network Coordination Centre (TNCC) as a record of the discussions, conclusions and recommendations, and to serve as an historic document of the event. It was produced from the diligent efforts of the Analysis Team listed below and I thank them for their dedicated service. I would also like to express my appreciation to the Sheraton Norfolk Waterside Hotel staff and the NATO Communication & Information Systems (CIS) Services Agency (NCSA) technical staff for their support.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

The theme for the 2009 Chiefs of Transformation Conference was “*One Transformation, Many Solutions.*” The conference was held in Norfolk, Virginia, USA, from 15-16 December 2009, and consisted of 175 attendees representing 26 NATO nations and 11 partner nations.

PLENARY SESSIONS

The plenary session allowed for rapid dissemination of information and provided the opportunity for discussions that spanned a broad agenda. In the keynote address, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) described his vision for transformation:

“In a time of tightened defence budgets, increased threats and current combat operations, it is important that transformation focus on building upon what already exists, and especially what already exists within member nations.”

Presenters from the USA, Ukraine, Netherlands and the United Kingdom delivered national perspectives on NATO transformation.

In the final plenary session of the conference, the leaders of each breakout session presented findings and took questions from the audience. ACT Deputy Chief of Staff Transformation (DCOS-T) closed COTC 09 with summary impressions.

MODELLING THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

Participants concluded that the long-term implementation of a Comprehensive Approach (CA) should focus on education, changing the traditional military mindset, and engaging senior leaders. Important recommendations included setting up and maintaining a CA information database, and promoting CA in military-to-military engagements. Participants came to the realisation that in order for a CA to succeed, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) must be comfortable in working with NATO. Ideas for improvement included supporting and expanding the ACT Fusion Centre and developing a CA-based headquarters exercise. Significant activities were identified to help sustain a CA effort, including sharing national results on whole-of-government efforts with other nations, developing the role of the Civilian Advisor (CIVAD), and developing an exchange program between NGOs and the military.

COUNTERING HYBRID THREATS

Syndicate leaders set the expectation that this breakout session would focus on the scope of ACT’s draft Countering Hybrid Threats concept paper and its key implications for NATO militaries. The central question presented to the participants was: “Have we adequately defined the problem?” While most attendees accepted that ACT’s draft Countering Hybrid Threats concept adequately defines the problem and establishes an

intellectual framework for addressing it, the concept remained somewhat controversial. One alternative model was proposed and several participants questioned the validity or the value of the Hybrid Threats concept. Members opined that the sharing of information continues to be the Achilles Heel of Countering Hybrid Threats. ACT agreed to request support from the nations for the Joint Analysis Lessons Learned Centre to coordinate a relevant multi-national, international and inter-agency matrix of best practices.

ENABLING ROBUST STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

In this breakout session, ACT sought feedback from the participants in the COTC regarding the draft concept for Strategic Communications (StratCom) and opportunities for collaboration and cooperation with other national or multinational efforts to address StratCom. The contents of the draft concept were agreed to and accepted by syndicate members. They noted that Strategic Communication is critical to NATO's success and must be properly resourced, with top-down education required for all leaders. Members agreed that it is often important to determine the best messenger for a target audience and to maintain that messenger to allow them to connect the story with a trusted face. They concluded that three currently independent efforts (US-specific StratCom development, Multi-National Experiment Six (MNE-6), and the NATO StratCom project), are complimentary and each has potential to inform the others.

DEFINING EDUCATION AND INDIVIDUAL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

This breakout session focused on defining education and individual training requirements as related to counter-insurgency (COIN) training. The expected outcome was for nations to make recommendations for the way ahead to support commanders in the field in the areas of doctrine, standards and training. Participants noted the lack of a common understanding within NATO on the definition of COIN and the implications of COIN for their armed forces' training programs. There was concern that the time it will take to ratify NATO COIN doctrine is a serious impediment to progress. Some offered standardisation of COIN training and procedures via a Standardisation Agreement (STANAG) as an initial step to focus training efforts. Participants suggested involving Defence Planners early in the analysis of emerging issues to ensure new capabilities are formally recognised and brought into the Defence Planning Process.

DEFINING CAPABILITIES

An overview of the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and the detailed development method for the 2009 Priority Shortfalls Areas (PSAs) was followed by a significant discussion on the need to transition from a Cold War-based quantitative approach to a more flexible attribute-based approach. The session concluded with a discussion on the development of planning situations, clarifying planning time horizons, and accounting for Non-Military capabilities. There was general agreement that opportunities for engagement in the development of NDPP scenarios would be appropriate for nations with a desire to participate to a greater degree. Multiple Planning Horizons were generally acceptable as proposed. Participants noted that nations' subject matter expertise in non-military capability requirements will affect their ability to contribute to this aspect of capability definition.

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MODELLING COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

MCA-1	Develop a high-level Comprehensive Approach (CA) tabletop exercise similar to a Crisis Management Exercise (CMX).
MCA-2	Develop written guidance or instructions for implementing the Comprehensive Approach (CA) at the operational level.
MCA-3	Examine Multi-National Experiments (MNEs) and other documents for reference in developing guidance or written instructions for implementing CA at the operational level.
MCA-4	Develop Whole-of-Government resource justifications for interagency cooperation.
MCA-5	Promote, via vision and a leadership effort, the changing of the military mindset to a Comprehensive Approach (CA) view of operations.
MCA-6	Establish ACT as a CA clearing house supported by the Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence (CIMIC COE).
MCA-7	Support academic efforts to develop CA guidelines and principles.
MCA-8	Use the Civil Military Information Centre of Excellence (CIMIC COE) to contribute to the development of guidelines and principles in concert with academics.
MCA-9	Plan and conduct exercises that reflect a CA to include participation from: Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), International Organisations (IOs) and Other Governmental Organisation (OGOs).
MCA-10	Develop senior leader CA activities to further support engagement.
MCA-11	Promote a Comprehensive Approach (CA) in military-to-military engagements.
MCA-12	Support and expand the Allied Command Transformation Fusion Centre.
MCA-13	Examine the utility and feasibility of developing an NGO database.
MCA-14	Develop a CA based HQ exercise that supports Non-Governmental Organisation aims as well as NATO aims based on Sweden's Viking series of exercises.
MCA-15	Share national results of governmental Comprehensive Approach efforts with other nations.

MCA-16	Request that the nations provide details on their contacts, experiments, organisations, documents and capabilities related to their progress on a Comprehensive Approach.
MCA-17	Include maritime and other non-traditional examples when developing Comprehensive Approach best practices.
MCA-18	Develop the role of the Civilian Advisor (CIVAD) prior to a response operation.
MCA-19	Consider development of an exchange program for advisors between Non-Governmental Organisations and the military.
MCA-20	Collect, analyse and utilise lessons learned from relevant events and political and doctrinal publications.

COUNTERING HYBRID THREATS

CHT-1	Agree to a common Countering Hybrid Threats terminology and understanding throughout NATO.
CHT-2	Focus on synthesising information from human and technological intelligence sources in order to identify and counter Hybrid Threats.
CHT-3	Develop more adaptable NATO leaders at all levels, from strategic through tactical.
CHT-4	Integrate hybrid threat-based scenarios into the NATO Defence Planning Process.
CHT-5	Work with the United States Joint Forces Command and its Joint Irregular Warfare Center to document relevant data on what is occurring throughout NATO's Area of Responsibility to inform the development of the Countering Hybrid Threats concept.
CHT-6	Request subject-matter expert support from the nations for the Joint Analysis Lessons Learned Centre to coordinate a multi-national, international, inter-agency matrix of lessons learned and best practices.

ENABLING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

ESC-1	Use the definition of Strategic Communication (StratCom) contained in the NATO Communications Policy when developing the concept for StratCom.
ESC-2	Act quickly on the need to develop concepts, procedures, training, education and other tools necessary for NATO to effectively employ StratCom.
ESC-3	Address the identified deficiencies at both the NATO and national level.
ESC-4	Provide training in StratCom to personnel at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.
ESC-5	Provide, from the leadership level, a cogent strategy for Communications.
ESC-6	Proceed with drafting the StratCom Concept as proposed.
ESC-7	Incorporate the identified best practices into StratCom plans, strategies, and actions for NATO and, where appropriate, the nations.
ESC-8	Establish an extensive information sharing campaign that provides opportunities for feedback, shared analysis, and synergy among the three StratCom efforts (US-specific StratCom development, Multi-National Experiment Six (MNE-6), and the NATO StratCom project).

DEFINING EDUCATION AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS


ETR-1	Write up the requirements that SHAPE issued on education and training.
ETR-2	Define mandatory and desired training by billet.
ETR-3	Track training accomplished by individuals in a system shared and accessible by all.
ETR-4	Develop one integrated NATO training system for use across all facilities.
ETR-5	Integrate exercise participation into training requirements and training management system.
ETR-6	Support establishment of Education and Individual Training (E&IT) database for deploying personnel training requirements.
ETR-7	Accept the priorities as defined by ACT Education and Individual Training (E&IT).
ETR-8	Address the lack of training doctrine with first draft guidance on education, individual training and exercises based on information received from SHAPE.
ETR-9	Document Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) promulgated requirements on education and training.
ETR-10	Develop one integrated NATO training system for use across all facilities to track training required and accomplished by individuals.
ETR-11	Integrate exercise participation into training requirements and a training management system.
ETR-12	Initiate parallel development of NATO COIN doctrine and a COIN Standardisation Agreement (STANAG), based on what has already been developed from the nations and other troop contributing nations and through Allied Command Operations (ACO) best practice and deficiencies.
ETR-13	Ensure that COIN publications are available for a common understanding and for use as standards for training.
ETR-14	Solicit nations' input for a COIN Task Force (TF), to include by name COIN Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to serve as participants.

ETR-15	Focus limited resources beyond the establishment of new facilities; rather focus on connecting those with training requirements with those who have training assets.
ETR-16	Compile information on individual nation's training needs and capabilities to share among nations in order to pool COIN training resources.
ETR-17	Use existing investments, enhance existing exercises and courses wherever possible, and modify existing training and exercises to include NATO COIN training standard requirements when defined.
ETR-18	Advertise COIN distance learning capabilities available through NATO as well as national capabilities if they are willing to share.
ETR-19	Encourage incorporation of Commander International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF) COIN training guidance into national training regimen as a pragmatic method of achieving standardisation in the short term.
ETR-20	Develop a NATO COIN Academy to train the trainers to get sufficient Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to train operators down to the corporal level.
ETR-21	Make training transportable, or at least the trainers transportable, and use re-deploying troops to provide pre-deployment training.
ETR-22	Capitalise on NATO assets for support and access to Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) assets to deliver training and train the trainer programs that include ANSF.
ETR-23	Integrate COIN into existing training and exercises such as how to engage an enemy who is not in uniform, including women, children and the elderly.
ETR-24	Ensure every unit has at least one higher skilled Pashtu/Dari speaker.
ETR-25	Leverage, enhance and publicise NATO and Nations' Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL) for language training.
ETR-26	Send nations' trainers to ISAF COIN Academy in Kabul as students and observers.
ETR-27	Fill billets at the Kabul Centre and ensure that training at the facility is consistent.
ETR-28	Network and integrate training with NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A) and Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A).

ETR-29	Use Mobile Advisory Teams (MATs) to train the trainers in and outside the theatre.
ETR-30	Utilise social networking type systems to expand the reach and impact of SMEs.
ETR-31	Invite non-military organisations to participate in training and exercises.

DEFINING CAPABILITIES

DC-1	Organise a workshop that gives nations the opportunity to be engaged in the development of the NATO Defence Planning Process's (NDPP) generic planning situations.
DC-2	Support Alliance nations in addressing emerging needs to account for non-military capability requirements.
DC-3	Track and fully leverage results of Military Capabilities Surveys going to nations in the spring of 2010, to be returned to NATO in the summer of 2010.



BACKGROUND

The Chiefs of Transformation Conference (COTC) is a unique annual event for Alliance nations and their partners¹ to discuss the key issues that pertain to comprehensive military transformation. The conference was held in Norfolk, Virginia, USA, from 15-16 December 2009, and the conference consisted of 175 attendees representing 26 NATO nations and 11 partner nations.

THEME

The theme for COTC 2009 was ***“One Transformation, Many Solutions.”***

PURPOSE OF REPORT

This report captures the content of the conference’s presentations and deliberations, and identifies the corresponding conclusions and

recommendations. It is intended to contribute to ongoing efforts to transform in ways that will make the Alliance more able to navigate the threats and challenges of the 21st Century. This report’s findings can serve collectively as a means to foster alignment amongst the often varied and disparate work that takes place throughout the trans-Atlantic community.

METHODOLOGY

Analysis Plan

ACT’s Strategic Analysis Branch directed both the definition of analysis objectives and execution of the analysis plan. It organised the Strategic Analysis Team cadre from within its own organisation and supplemented it with reserve members from the United States Armed Services.

Data Collection and Analysis

Analysts examined all briefing materials presented during the conference and took extensive notes throughout all plenary and breakout discussions. From this information, they derived both conclusions and recommendations.

¹ In this context, ‘partner’ refers to Partnership for Peace (PfP), Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), Contact Country (CC) nations, as well as the NATO Centres of Excellence (COEs.)

Event Reconstruction Analysis

Analysts sorted information into the relevant syndicate discussion areas from which they developed relevant conclusions and recommendations. Findings were subject to peer review. The Tables of Recommendation consist of the analysis team's core findings.

LIMITATIONS

This report does not contain cost benefit analysis. The nature of analysis for discussion groups, such as this seminar, is more subjective than what would be expected from an experiment or an exercise with empirical training objectives. As such, the report's findings should be tempered with executive judgment.

PLENARY SESSIONS

In a time of tightened defence budgets, increased threats, and current combat operations, it is important that transformation efforts focus on building upon what already exists.



PLENARY INTRODUCTION

The conference's plenary sessions allowed for the rapid dissemination of information and provided the opportunity for informed participants' discussions. In his remarks, Deputy Chief of Staff - Transformation (DCOS-T) discussed the themes from the previous conferences:

- 2006 – “Moving Forward Together”
- 2007 – “Leveraging Nations Best Practices”
- 2008 – “Multiple Futures”

DCOS-T then described the effect that the input generated from the “*Multiple Futures*” conference had achieved throughout NATO. The final Multiple Futures report has been used in many venues, most notably:

- The nations
- NATO Headquarters, to inform the Defence Planning Process capability recommendations
- The conference on capabilities in February 2009.

For 2009, the theme of “One Transformation, Many Solutions” served as an umbrella for discussion on the renewed need for transformation in light of significant financial constraints, continued combat and counter-insurgency operations, and increased emphasis on the Comprehensive Approach.

Keynote Address

SACT stated his vision for transformation:

“In a time of tightened defence budgets, increased threats and current combat operations, it is important that transformation efforts focus on building upon what already exists, and especially what already exists within member nations.”

He described five areas in which he saw immediate application for this vision:

- Achieving the Comprehensive Approach
- Developing cooperation with partners
- Improved networking with national transformational efforts
- Establishing ACT as NATO's ‘think tank’
- Developing capabilities via the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP)



An American Defence Perspective: Transformation of Transformation

A presenter from the National Defence University in Washington, DC, USA, shared thoughts on transforming the process of NATO Transformation. Over the past five years, transformation has shifted from its initial focus of shaping the transformation to gain enduring competitive advantage over adversaries, to one that requires an ability to address wicked problems (hard to solve due to requirements that are contradictory, incomplete and changing, and often hard to recognise). Solitary government solutions and unchanging courses of action are not likely to work; the Alliance needs the help of public and private sectors and to use a whole-of-government trans-national approach.

The future NATO mission focus will be based on the broad insights of the Multiple Futures Project:

- Evolving threats will challenge efforts to reach consensus on Article 5 responses
- The Alliance must act outside traditional areas
- Future technologies will enable attacks in new and unexpected ways
- NATO will need agile and enhanced communications and increased interactions with international partners

A key enabler of this transformation is the International Transformation Chairs

Network. The research of the Chairs Network approaches transformation as a process that shapes the changing nature of competition and cooperation through concept development and innovation management across people, processes, organisations and technology. Another key enabler to this transformation is STAR-TIDES (Sustainable Technologies, Accelerated Research - Transformative Innovation for Development and Emergency Support), a 2000-member international, information sharing research project.

In summary, future transformation must shift from a focus on building enduring capabilities to one of agility and flexibility to address wicked problems. Success will depend on leaders that have a tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity and a life-long individual and organisational learning commitment in order to out-learn their adversaries.



Partners Transformation: Ukrainian Experience and Challenges

A representative from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence (MoD) spoke about his nation's ongoing process of transforming its armed forces from Warsaw Pact-era planning and organisation to a modern force able to integrate and operate within the Alliance. This transformation effort is based on principles developed by the Alliance and is partly enabled by the assistance of neighbouring nations.

The greatest challenges facing the Ukraine are:

- The development of long- and medium-term threats to both global and regional security
- Determining a methodology and strategy of transformation under conditions of limited resources
- The lack of qualified personnel to lead the transformation process throughout the armed forces

- Securing support and investment from Parliament and a Cabinet of Ministers.

The Ukraine intends to harmonise main objectives, programs, resources and structures as follows:

- Review existing doctrines, concepts and total force requirements in accordance with NATO standards, including strategic and defence planning.
- Define force and operational capabilities that are relevant to include combined and joint operations.
- Acquire/modernise armaments according to future requirements;
- Improve force professionalism through a transition from conscript to an all-volunteer force.
- Establish a fully operational Special Operations force.
- Create effective modelling, simulation and defence experimentation capabilities.
- Concentrate efforts on military education and training in accordance with new standards and within the scope of perspective armed forces missions and tasks.
- Develop strong expeditionary capabilities to be used for national missions and when participating in NATO, EU and UN-led crisis response operations.



The Netherlands Armed Forces in 2020 and Beyond

A representative from the Netherlands MoD discussed his nation's analysis of future capability requirements. The aim is to establish what capabilities will be

required in the short, mid, and long-term. The resulting Netherlands Future Policy Survey focuses on the affordability of high-quality armed forces based on the results of an extensive evaluation of future capabilities required across a range of foreign policy options to secure the Dutch people and national interests and fulfil commitments to NATO and other coalitions.

The conclusion of the Netherlands Future Policy Survey is that the future is fundamentally uncertain. Possible scenarios have been developed to provide the best possible framework upon which defence planning can be carried out.



Soft Power & Prevention: The Military Contribution

A representative of the MoD of the United Kingdom presented initial work

on the Prevent concept. In a prevention environment, the weight of effort will lean towards the use of soft power, while the deterrence value of the potential use of hard power lends credibility to the effort. Prevention is going to become more critical as we move into a future of uncertainty and continued fiscal constraints.

Although prevention often produces intangible results, investment in strategy, concept development and prevention will be less costly over the long term than maintaining the *status quo*. Information and intelligence sharing with multiple non-military partners will be important; however, more essential than information and intelligence is a shared level of understanding attained through long-term engagement.

MODELLING COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

Implementation of a Comprehensive Approach requires a mindset change that uses education, training and exercises to institutionalise best practices.



INTRODUCTION

The long-term implementation of a Comprehensive Approach (CA) should focus on education, changing the traditional military mindset and engaging senior leaders. Important recommendations include setting up and maintaining a CA information database and promoting a CA in military-to-military engagements.

Participants came to the realisation that in order for a CA to succeed, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) must feel comfortable in approaching NATO. Ideas for improvement included supporting and expanding the ACT Fusion Centre and developing a CA-based HQ exercise.

Several significant activities were identified that would help sustain a CA effort: results of national, Whole-of-Government efforts should be shared with Alliance partners; the role of the Civilian Advisor (CIVAD) needs to be

developed; and consideration should be given to development of exchange programs between NGOs and the military.

The discussion evolved around four main points:

- Necessary change in the mindset of all players
- The identification of education as the key driver of a CA
- The recognition of challenges and expectations concerning civil-military cooperation
- Documentation of indications and proposals for the sustainment of a CA.

Implementing a Comprehensive Approach at the Operational Level

DISCUSSION

The focus of the breakout session was to identify practical steps for implementing and moving a CA forward at the operational level. While a CA was usually working at the tactical level, it was agreed that further efforts needed to be made at the national, strategic and operational levels. Further examination of methods of implementation led to discussion on the major themes below.

Tabletop CA exercise

Participants felt that there could be significant benefit in implementing a high-level NATO C2 exercise such as a Crisis Management Exercise (CMX) with the nations (both military and other agencies) and NGOs. Such an exercise

would have significant benefits for senior commanders and their staffs in understanding the complexities, inter-relationships and dynamics of executing a CA. It was also suggested that this sort of exercise would be a valuable source of data for modelling a CA.

Creation of a CA Guiding Document

Breakout session participants felt that there needed to be instructions or guidelines to support a CA at the operational level. However, there was concern about exactly what form those instructions should take. It was recognised that doctrine requiring significant consent would not be practicable, although delivering consistent CA guidelines and practices was important to ensuring coherence in evolving concepts and capability development. The idea of a NATO CA handbook, similar to the Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) Handbook, seemed promising, but participants were wary of oversight issues during its development. The inter-relationship between a CA and other documents that have / are being developed was noted.

Resource Justifications for CA

Participants felt that there may be significant resource justifications that could encourage CA participation by military and other agency actors at the national level. Coherence of effort leading to a lower demand on resources was postulated to be attractive to national governments. Nations that now engage in Whole-of-Government approaches were generally very supportive of this approach.

CONCLUSIONS:

- A high level CA tabletop exercise would benefit NATO nations and NGOs.

- Data collected from a CA tabletop exercise could form the framework for successfully modelling a CA and developing a menu of potential services.
- Written instructions or guidelines are needed to develop a CA at the operational level.
- Ensuring consistency between a CA and other documents requires a written CA document (at the operational level).
- MNE, COIN, Strategic Communications, EBAO and other documents may be good references for developing CA guidelines and instructions.
- Developing resource justifications for implementing a CA might foster military and other agency support.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Develop a high-level CA tabletop exercise similar to a Crisis Management Exercise (CMX).
- Develop written guidance or instructions for implementing the Comprehensive Approach (CA) at the operational level.
- Examine Multi-National Experiments (MNEs) and other documents for reference in developing guidance or written instructions for implementing CA at the operational level.
- Develop Whole-of-Government resource justifications for interagency cooperation.

Education as the facilitator of military mindset change

DISCUSSION

There was significant agreement that implementing a CA was not about having new or different hardware for the military, but changing mindsets in order to support a CA. Below are the major ideas for implementing the military mindset change.



Developing a Common Philosophy

- Mindset: Participants strongly agreed that the military as a whole has to accommodate a mindset which embraces and facilitates the philosophy of a CA. It is a long term process, somewhat comparable to the adoption of the idea of 'jointness,' but even more complex and extensive in its scope. The traditional military culture must be expanded to include the requirements of civil-military cooperation, sensitised to different perspectives and visions and trained to recognise the overall strategic and societal effects of military operations.
- CA development in Capitols: CA is already practised at the tactical level. However, some participants felt that the impetus for change must come from the national capitols. That is where the lasting and enduring bridges to civil partners should be built. The "strategic corporal" is a fact and has to be considered in the education and training process, but the responsibility to shape a CA commences at the higher echelons. As in Strategic Communications, messages and actions have to be consistent with objectives.
- UN as 'Top-Down' Agent: It was suggested that the UN is well-suited for coordinating a CA as a top-down, coherent process to include International Organisations (IOs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Other Governmental Organisations (OGO). On the military side, this would translate into guidance and oversight from the top.
- Maintaining the Effort: Overall, participants agreed that partners have to

be mutually supported and recognised in their efforts to implement a CA. Consent is a guiding and valuable principle in the Alliance, but it can lead, from time-to-time, to paralysis which must be overcome by individual initiatives and progress. The resulting achievements can then be a starting point for communication and consolidation.



Education

- Education as a facilitator: Participants agreed that education is the key facilitator for the advance and long-term sustainment of a CA. The goal of reaching a common understanding of CA is valid from the "strategic corporal" up to the North Atlantic Council (NAC).
- Room for academic development: CA is not specific. Dependent on the political and social environment and the perceptions of the involved stake holders, a CA can look very different. There is a definitive need for a guideline which explains the philosophy of military / civil cooperation and also expands on how military forces operate in the theatre according to the idea of a CA.
- ACT as CA Clearinghouse: Some participants believed that ACT could serve as a clearing house for different concepts and a repository for data and info distribution, both military and civilian. With this information, the Bi-SC needs to devise a curriculum which would function as the bedrock for CA education, training, and cooperation. The NATO Civil-Military Centre of Excellence (CIMIC COE) could support this effort. As a platform for civil / military interaction and owner of an

established CIMIC doctrine, the CIMIC COE offers extensive experience and knowledge, even if the focus is mainly at the tactical level.

- Standardised Training Approach: It was noted that the US uses another educational approach in which partner nations are required to join the training centre and pass an evaluation before they join US forces. The training is scenario-driven starting from a strategic level and involves NGOs.



Military-to-Military Support for CA

Participants agreed that CA was not limited to NATO or coalition forces. Host nation or indigenous force acceptance of a CA solution can often lead to significant advancement of common goals in a theatre. NATO leader encouragement of indigenous or host nation acceptance of a CA should be part of any NATO military-to-military engagement opportunity.

CONCLUSIONS:

- Education, not equipment or organisational measures, is the key facilitator for the advance and long-term sustainment of a CA.
- A CA demands a mindset which acknowledges that there is no military-only solution for today's complex challenges, focuses on effects and end states.
- A CA has been proven several times at the tactical level. A coherent solution however, will likely need a top-down process.

- A CA clearinghouse needs to be established.
- Partners need to be mutually supportive.
- Senior Leader engagement in CA is a key to changing the military mindset.
- Military to Military engagements offer the opportunity to promote CA to host nation and indigenous forces.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Promote, via vision and a leadership effort, the changing of the military mindset to a Comprehensive Approach (CA) view of operations.
- Establish ACT as a CA clearing house supported by the Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence (CIMIC COE).
- Support academic efforts to develop CA guidelines and principles.
- Use the Civil-Military Information Centre of Excellence (CIMIC COE) to contribute to the development of guidelines and principles in concert with academics.
- Plan and conduct exercises that reflect a CA to include participation from: Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), International Organisations (IOs) and Other Governmental Organisation (OGOs).
- Develop senior leader CA activities to further support engagement.
- Promote CA in military to military engagements.



Improving NATO Approachability for NGOs

DISCUSSION

“It is not just talking, it is about listening too.” Participants came to the

realisation that in order for CA to succeed, NGOs must feel comfortable in approaching NATO.

Involving Civil Cooperation

The establishment of a CA needs to include cooperation among military as well as civilian partners. It was generally agreed that the UN and EU are required for the process, with NATO assuming a supporting role.

Development of a CA must be cooperative by definition and cannot be devised by NATO alone. The sharing of knowledge bases and experiences are prerequisites for building a CA. Different organisational cultures and perceptions will make that a more difficult process.

Harvesting Synergies from Existing Projects

There are several initiatives at NATO HQ that offer synergies for the further development of a CA: Stabilisation and Reconstruction (S&R) efforts and counterinsurgency (COIN) are both areas that have implications for a CA. NATO could leverage to reinforce in a CA.

In the area of Civil Emergency Planning, experts work on the development of a database for reconstruction which is part of a CA Action Plan. Nations now need to populate it. There was additional discussion on whether it should be supported by a Conference of National Armaments Directors' program.

For the last four years NATO HQ has been creating a Knowledge Management Organisation. The established portal is operational and can be utilised by NGOs and IGOs. It provides information that is useful for the civil and the military side in creating

mutual awareness and enhancing secure and safe conduct of operations. NATO needs to actively advertise that this kind of information exists, and that it is ready to use for operations (such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams) and training.

Trust issues and Civilian Leadership

A major problem is the lack of trust and commitment by NGOs, leading to hesitancy to share information. In the last two years, there has been some progress in rectifying this issue. One lesson learned is to have civilian actors lead consortiums rather than the military.



Fusion Centre Development and Expansion

Making information available to others was identified as central to improving approachability. The current Civil-Military Fusion Centre run by ACT was cited as an excellent tool for this. Members felt that an open knowledge management approach, shared freely with all participants, had significantly improved NATO's standing with NGOs. Dissemination of simple information such as weather reports was cited as fostering a favourable atmosphere for NGOs to approach NATO. Expansion of the Fusion Centre was suggested as an opportunity for further development of a CA.

NGO Database

There was discussion about the utility of developing an NGO database. It was felt that identifying methods that did and did not work while interacting with NGOs could be helpful. Rating NGOs was also mentioned; however, there was concern

that ratings could send a negative message. Further examination of these concepts seemed warranted.



Realistic Exercise Focused on CA (Viking Exercise)

A realistic operational level headquarters exercise, which would be of benefit to NGOs as well as NATO, was seen as an excellent opportunity to improve approachability. Sweden's Viking exercises series was cited as a good example. Merit was also seen in having such an exercise balance the NATO-Afghanistan CA experience, since there was concern that NATO's CA model should not be based on Afghanistan alone.

CONCLUSIONS

- In order to stimulate dialogue with NGOs and allow a CA to succeed, NGOs must feel comfortable working with NATO.
- The current ACT Fusion Centre facilitates NGO dialogue and improves NATO approachability; further expansion should be considered.
- There may be utility in developing an NGO database.
- A large HQ exercise, similar to Sweden's Viking exercise, would be beneficial to improving NGO / NATO understanding and make NGOs more comfortable with working alongside the Alliance.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Support and expand the Allied Command Transformation Civil-Military Fusion Centre.
- Examine the utility and feasibility of developing an NGO database.
- Develop a CA based HQ exercise that supports Non-Governmental Organisation aims as well as NATO aims based on Sweden's Viking series of exercises.



Methods for Sustainment of CA

DISCUSSION

It is fair to say that NATO is still in the early stages of the establishment of a viable CA; however, there are indications that the nations are making progress despite complicated political realities.

National CA Efforts

The syndicate discussed examples of new and successful national CA efforts, namely:

- The EU's OPERATION ATALANTA off the coast of Somalia
- Germany's operational requirement for parliamentary consent for the deployment of both military and civilian governmental support forces
- The Netherlands' creation of a steering group for cooperation between different ministries
- Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Teams' (PRTs) formation of a dual civil and military command structure

- Denmark's development of a concept for the military contribution to S&R.

It was felt that the experience and knowledge that the nations have accumulated in their individual CA development projects should be harnessed for the benefit of NATO's CA development.

Learning from the Maritime Arena and Other Examples

The maritime arena has its own functioning CA operations such as disaster relief and humanitarian aid. Other good examples of where CA processes have been successfully utilised should be researched and disseminated among organisations.

Civil Advisor (CIVAD)

Proposals were discussed for the establishment and sustainment of a CA with a civil adviser (CIVAD) to the operational commander. The CIVAD would need to be a highly placed individual with extensive contacts with NGOs and IGOs and should be established before a deployment.

Embedding Advisors

On a very practical level, the embedding of NGO members into an operation was recommended to improve mutual understanding and enhance coordination of efforts.

CONCLUSIONS

- Many nations are taking steps to develop a robust 'Whole-of-Government' processes and procedures as part of a CA. Sharing of the results of these efforts would be beneficial to other nations.
- The maritime arena and other non-traditional venues should be examined to identify practices and procedures that sustain a CA.
- The role of the CIVAD to the commander was identified as a useful CA enabler. Embedding / exchanging advisors with NGOs may provide a better understanding for NGOs and the military.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Share national results of governmental Comprehensive Approach efforts with other nations.
- Request that the nations provide details on their contacts, experiments, organisations, documents and capabilities related to their progress on a Comprehensive Approach.
- Include maritime and other non-traditional examples when developing Comprehensive Approach best practices.
- Develop the role of the Civilian Advisor (CIVAD) prior to a response operation.
- Consider development of an exchange program for advisors between Non-Governmental Organisations and the military.
- Collect, analyse and utilise lessons learned from relevant events and political / doctrinal publications.

COUNTERING HYBRID THREATS

While most attendees provisionally accepted that ACT's draft Countering Hybrid Threats concept defines the problem adequately and establishes an intellectual framework for addressing it, the concept remains controversial.



INTRODUCTION

ACT was tasked in July 2009 by the International Military Staff (IMS) to deliver a Bi-Strategic Command (Bi-SC) concept paper on Countering Hybrid Threats. The COTC 2009 breakout session on Countering Hybrid Threats served as part of the staffing effort for that new concept. Syndicate leaders established that the expectation from the breakout session was not to replicate November 2009's Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) Conference in Italy, which concentrated on describing and identifying the key challenges of Countering Hybrid Threats. The expectation, rather, was that the syndicate would focus on the scope of the draft concept paper and its key implications for NATO militaries. The central question presented to the participants was: "Have we defined the problem adequately?"

DISCUSSION

Development of the Countering Hybrid Threats Concept

Since receiving the tasking in July 2009, ACT concept developers have conducted a literature search and produced an initial draft of the Countering Hybrid Threats concept paper. The final version of this paper, incorporating the results of staffing and consultation throughout NATO is due by July 2010.

Breakout session leaders told the participants that the current draft is relatively complete and robust. Different nations, including France, the United States, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Spain, have produced relevant papers. The concept was circulated and discussed in a series of meetings throughout 2009, including a workshop in Austria, the Defence Requirements Review 12 (DRR12) Workshop, the CD&E Conference in Rome, and the Military Committee Workgroup Brief (Strategy, Policy, and Concepts). The NATO Centres of Excellence (CoEs) have also been involved in its development and two war games are planned in 2010.

Some participants questioned whether a new concept was necessary, pointing out overlaps with other transformational

concept development work, including Comprehensive Approach (CA), counter insurgency (COIN), NATO Contribution to Countering Asymmetric Threats (NCCAT), Defence against Terrorism (DAT), Strategic Communication (SC), and Deterring Non-State Actors (NSAs). There was also concern that some nations have issued new national military strategies recently and would not want to change them so soon as a result of the new concept; however, a consensus emerged that the Countering Hybrid Threats concept was necessary as a capstone document to draw together the disparate elements of previous concept development work and promote a common understanding of hybrid threats throughout NATO.



Defining 'Hybrid Threat'

Participants acknowledged that hybrid threats do not constitute a new problem. 'Hybrid Threat' is defined as:

The ability of one or more state or Non-State Actors to employ a blend of actions (both conventional and non-conventional) across, and beyond, the battle space, adversely affecting an opponent's decision cycle in order to achieve their aims.

A 'true' hybrid threat includes the fusion of conventional weaponry, Weapons of Mass Destruction, terrorism, cyber attack and criminality, supported by maliciously-designed information operations. It was generally agreed that

current hybrid threats are far more potent due to their increased tempo of operations, complexity, diversity, wider orchestration and trans-nationality; this is exacerbated by the ease with which actors can now communicate, gain access to international resources (including funding) and acquire lethal weaponry.

While most attendees provisionally accepted the Countering Hybrid Threats draft concept, it remained controversial. Some participants felt it was entirely too broad, describing both everything and nothing at the same time. Others mentioned that the defining characteristics posited for identifying hybrid threats might simply reflect how all warfare will be conducted in the future. Several expressed doubt that it was possible to impose a logical analysis framework on groups and individuals whose motivations and behaviour NATO members find profoundly illogical and chaotic.

Key Challenges of Countering Hybrid Threats

Session leaders briefed that the key challenges of Countering Hybrid Threats can be grouped into four categories.

- First, there must be an environmental understanding; that is, an awareness of the complex ethnic, social and cultural contexts within which NATO will operate.
- Second, failing and failed states will likely harbour opponents of NATO and contain populations sympathetic to a cause of its opponents; this creates a need for winning the battle of the narrative.
- Third, NSAs have increasing access to high-end technologies, enhancing their ability to leverage cyberspace, finance criminality, corrupt local governments, employ conventional military operations

and threaten the use of Weapons of Mass Effect.

- Fourth, NATO's opponents are increasingly adaptable and agile, which requires increasing NATO's level of awareness.

Participants acknowledged that many disruptive technologies are becoming cheap and ubiquitous, and that denying non-state actors access to these technologies will be impossible.

Conceptual Framework of the Draft Countering Hybrid Threats Concept

Session leaders presented the draft conceptual framework for Countering Hybrid Threats, broken down into four elements: build, deter, engage, and stabilise. The intent of the *build* element is to reduce the potential for conflict with early identification of problematic regions and actors that present a threat. The likely military contribution would be in the form of intelligence assessments and regional cooperation programs. The *deter* element is aimed at dissuading aggression with the threat of a balanced and unified Alliance military response. Potential military contributions could include large-scale military exercises and posturing. The intent of the *engage* element would be to use a NATO military component to compel a solution. The military contribution includes the full spectrum of kinetic and non-kinetic means. Finally, the *stabilise* element aims to firm up the conflict area and build peace. The military contribution would emphasise reconstruction and infrastructure support along with increased partnering with regional or local authorities.

An Alternative Framework: the “Cycle of Justice” Paradigm

In response to the session leaders' request for national perspectives, an

alternative framework for analysing Hybrid Threats was presented. Under this paradigm, a hybrid threat is an organisation within, but separate from, a state that has established its own “Cycle of Justice.” This Cycle of Justice includes the following:

- A perception of justice
- A system of credible governance
- A system of security
- ‘Acceptance’ by the indigenous population (may be coerced)
- A working financial system

To be successful, a hybrid threat is dependent upon popular perceptions; the battlefield is now the hearts and minds of the people. To neutralise a hybrid threat, NATO would have to replace the hybrid threat's cycle of justice with one of its own. The crucial factors for doing so are reaction speed, defining an exit strategy clearly, grasping the political issues driving the enemy and strategic patience.



Military Implications of Countering Hybrid Threats

Session leaders presented an initial list of the military implications identified in the draft Countering Hybrid Threats concept. It was generally agreed that the NATO Command Structure would have to integrate the Countering Hybrid Threats concept into the NATO Defence Planning Process, and that NATO leaders would have to be trained to

delegate authority to the 'point of discomfort' to match hybrid adversaries' decision speed.

There was wide agreement that NATO must use a Comprehensive Approach in order to counter hybrid threats; military action alone will not be enough. Strategic Communications (StratCom) was seen as a key enabler; it is critical that NATO have a robust communication process that gets NATO's messages to the public both in theatre and on the home front.

Participants pointed out a significant StratCom challenge: free press can report one incident in different ways, but usually the enemy will get out a single message. Finally, participants agreed that NATO must be able to deploy troops to a crisis area with two boxes of tools, conventional war fighting and a capacity to counter hybrid threats.

CONCLUSIONS

- ACT's draft Countering Hybrid Threats paper adequately defines the problem and establishes an intellectual framework for addressing it, which could provide a context from which each nation can then adapt their strategy for hybrid threats.
- Hybrid threats display unprecedented potency due to increased tempo, complexity, diversity, wider orchestration and trans-nationality.
- Our opponents are adapting faster than we can respond. They are unconstrained by doctrine, quickly finding ways to work around operational and tactical issues.

- Information sharing continues to be the Achilles Heel of countering hybrid threats. Rapid, coherent messages are taking longer to communicate and our opponents are not waiting for us to figure it out.
- The danger from hybrid threats is exacerbated by the ease with which actors can now communicate, access freely international resources (including funding), and acquire disruptive technology.
- Military forces alone are insufficient to counter Hybrid Threats successfully; the Comprehensive Approach is necessary to address the problem fully.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Agree to a common Countering Hybrid Threats terminology and understanding throughout NATO.
- Focus on synthesising information from human and technological intelligence sources in order to identify and counter Hybrid Threats.
- Develop more adaptable NATO leaders at all levels, from strategic through tactical.
- Integrate hybrid threat-based scenarios into the NATO Defence Planning Process.
- Work with the United States' Joint Forces Command and its Joint Irregular Warfare Center to document relevant data on what is occurring throughout NATO's Area of Responsibility to inform the development of the Countering Hybrid Threats concept.
- Request subject-matter expert support from the nations for the Joint Analysis Lessons Learned Centre to coordinate a multi-national, international, inter-agency matrix of lessons learned and best practices.

ENABLING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

Enabling and enhancing the Alliance's ability to conduct Strategic Communications is critical for NATO to achieve both current and future goals.



DISCUSSION

In response to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) began an effort to improve the Strategic Communication (StratCom) capability of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In February 2009, SACT created the ACT StratCom Capability Development Working Group (WG). The WG established close ties with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) and NATO HQ, co-sponsored conferences, and collaborated on directives and guidance. Where previously there was no formal definition, the recently completed NATO Policy on Strategic Communication provided one. ACT is developing a concept for StratCom, which is due in January 2010 to the Director, International Military Staff (IMS). A Capability Implementation Plan will be developed from the concept document.

In developing the concept, ACT is using the DOTMLPFI² framework, a capability implementation plan, defence planning relevant tie-ins, experimentation opportunities, and collaboration with nations.

ACT sought feedback for the participants in the COTC regarding the draft concept for StratCom and opportunities for collaboration and cooperation with other national or multinational efforts to address StratCom.

Defining Strategic Communication

Syndicate members were presented with the NATO-approved definition for the term "StratCom," drawn from the November 2009 draft of the NATO Policy on Strategic Communication:

"The coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities—Public Diplomacy, Military Public Affairs, Information Operations and Psychological Operations, as appropriate – in support of alliance policies, operations, and activities in order to advance NATO's aims."

It was noted that in a coalition of democratic states, there will always be a lively debate on the use of the media. Syndicate members believed that the duplicate use of the word 'appropriate' in the definition indicated intent to

² DOTMLPFI is an acronym for Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Interoperability.

incorporate diverse points of view. StratCom is not about technical communications, satellites, networks, and microwaves. Rather, it is about human communications, cognitive interaction in human networks, and influencing and persuading the audience to see values and benefits of activities by one organisation to another. Syndicate members agreed that it is valuable to have a common definition upon which to build the NATO concept on StratCom.

CONCLUSION

- The definition for the term “StratCom” is appropriate and useful for the purposes of developing NATO’s StratCom Concept.

RECOMMENDATION

- Use the definition of StratCom contained in the NATO Communications Policy when developing the concept for StratCom.



The Importance of ‘StratCom’

Syndicate members agreed that StratCom is important in current threat environments. StratCom has been identified in the Priority Shortfalls Areas (PSAs) list as needing attention. Earlier this year, SACEUR requested specific assistance from ACT in the areas of training, tactics and procedures for StratCom to support of the work of ISAF in Afghanistan. Later, when ACT sent letters to Chiefs of Defence requesting support for this effort, the responding

nations were unanimous in their agreement on the importance of improving StratCom capabilities. Subsequently, several nations provided personnel to assist with concept development. Some nations are also making training facilities available trans-nationally. The civilian press has noted the importance of winning the information war in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

CONCLUSIONS

- Employing StratCom is important both now and into the future.
- Improving and enhancing NATO’s ability to employ StratCom is critical for NATO to win in Afghanistan.

RECOMMENDATION

- Act quickly on the need to develop concepts, procedures, training, education and other tools necessary for NATO to effectively employ StratCom.



Priority Shortfall Areas Regarding StratCom

ACT has identified several Priority Shortfall Areas (PSAs) for ISAF StratCom. Generally, Information Operations (IO) and Public Affairs (PA) capability should be enhanced through improvement in the areas of training, particularly for inbound staff, doctrine, organisation, news media, and

interoperability standards. Other acknowledged deficiencies in NATO's ability to effectively employ StratCom that were discussed in the syndicate included:

- There is no NATO-approved Concept addressing StratCom.
- NATO's Peacetime Establishment (PE) and Crisis Establishment (CE) organisation do not adequately address StratCom.
- Nations' capacity to meet requirements is in doubt.
- The current Strategic Communication PE/CE positions are filled by nations with personnel who lack training and skills necessary to competently execute assigned missions as the nations assume that training would be provided by the NATO School or other venues.
- NATO generally fails to employ both sophisticated and basic forms of communications technology in its employment of StratCom.
- NATO lacks a capacity to assess the information environment adequately.
- NATO is slower at releasing information than the adversary, if information is released at all.
- NATO fails to break into the adversary's communications/information loop to disrupt intentionally the adversary's damaging and inaccurate propaganda.
- Communications considerations are not adequately addressed in the operational planning process.
- There is inadequate volume, pace, capacity and coherence in NATO communication processes, leading to a lack of clarity for forces in theatre.

Syndicate members agreed with the listing of deficiencies, noting that the same deficiencies identified in NATO are deficiencies that also exist, to varying degrees, at the national level. It was noted that StratCom should not become a separate discipline, but rather must be infused in everything the Commander and lower echelons do in terms of consequences, outcomes, and

effects, beginning in the planning phases.

CONCLUSIONS

- NATO has significant deficiencies in the area of StratCom.
- There remains no unified concept to address the NATO's shortfalls in StratCom.
- The same deficiencies that hamper NATO's efforts at StratCom also exist, to varying degrees, at the national level.
- There will never be enough professional communicators, meaning that NATO needs to train personnel in StratCom who operate at strategic, operational and tactical levels.
- StratCom responsibility resides at the Commander's level.
- StratCom occurring at the lower levels must be nested within the Commander's Intent.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Address the identified deficiencies at both the NATO and national level.
- Provide training in StratCom to personnel at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.
- Provide, from the leadership level, a cogent strategy for Communications.



Principles in the Draft Concept for StratCom

The concept for StratCom will incorporate ten key principles, which are summarised below:

- Collaboration: StratCom must be a consistent and collaborative process that is integrated both vertically and horizontally.
- Comprehensiveness: There are no boundaries in communication. Every event can have StratCom consequences, every action sends a message, and everyone is a messenger.
- Credibility: NATO must be the most reliable source of information about its own actions. Nobody should be able to explain our actions/intentions better than NATO.
- Agility: NATO must have ability to rapidly and accurately communicate. StratCom can be required both in advance of, and during an evolving event.
- Deliberation: StratCom must focus on achieving desired effects. It must be derived from policy and must match message, delivery means, messengers, and audience.
- Leadership: NATO's leaders must drive StratCom. This requires clear leadership intent, guidance, and resources to be provided in the operational planning process.

- Continuity: StratCom requires continuous and diligent analysis and assessment. To do this, there must be feedback into operational planning process.
- Understanding: The StratCom effort requires an analysis and an understanding of NATO's varied relationships. It also requires active listening, engagement, and mutual understanding.
- Creativity: The 'touchstone' of StratCom is to communicate NATO's own narrative. The Alliance needs a 'Strategic Narrative,' where the ending is written first and the actions required to achieve this ending identified thereafter.
- Empowerment: Communication authority must be shared and delegated. This principle affects all other aspects, particularly agility. If information must advance up and down the chain of command before it can be released, NATO will never be able to respond within the necessary timeframe – typically minutes – to beat the adversary's message.

Regarding the ten listed elements, syndicate members discussed how different aspects of StratCom can be at odds with each other. Agility – getting the information out quickly – is difficult to accomplish if the message must also be fully vetted for accuracy. It remains unclear whether NATO is willing to put out an early, but possibly not fully accurate message and then revise it over time.

Also discussed was the challenge faced by StratCom efforts; they are based on Western views of credibility, which include preciseness and accuracy. These views can be inconsistent with non-western expectations. It was noted that as a matter of long-standing policy, NATO's communications, including its practice of Psychological Operations, are all to be truth-based. Whereas there may be some measure of efficacy in

using exaggeration techniques, a consideration of possible second- and third-order effects has led NATO to confirm the policy of truth-based communications.

Syndicate members generally agreed with the contents of the draft concept for StratCom. A concern raised was the danger of releasing a product that was more focused on describing the aspects and attributes of “communications” generally rather than “StratCom.” Key to avoiding this, as expressed by one member of the syndicate, will be to ensure the concept and associated policies appropriately link StratCom with Strategic Concepts, Strategic Plans, Strategic Narratives, and desired strategic effects.

Participants talked about the challenges of limiting communications to a specific audience. Once a message is released, control of its dissemination is lost and it can become available worldwide. This does not mean that NATO should not create a tailored message and use one or more deliberate methods to deliver it to a specific target audience. However, in the arena of StratCom, one must consider the second- and third-order effects. That is, how will the message be received by those who are not part of the targeted audience?

CONCLUSIONS

- The contents of the concept being prepared by ACT for StratCom were agreed to and accepted by syndicate members.
- StratCom must be properly resourced.
- StratCom involves considering not only primary effects of a tailored message delivered to a target audience, but also requires a consideration of second- and third-order effects when messages reach non-target audiences.

- Continue delivering tailored messages to target audiences.

RECOMMENDATION

- Proceed with drafting the StratCom Concept as proposed.



Areas of Focus and Best Practices of StratCom

Syndicate participants were given a quote published in the May 2009 *Council on Foreign Relations Blog*, where Greg Bruno described the new strategy for the Afghan War in terms of the new communications battle and the latest tactics, techniques and procedures being used to counter those threats. Bruno writes:

“Taliban operating from the border region of Pakistan and Afghanistan have proven effective at either cowering citizens or winning them over to message of jihad. These militants have a simple chain of command, ready access to leadership, a clear and consistent mission command and natural networks.”

The Pentagon’s 2008 National Defence Strategy acknowledges the weaknesses, saying “A coordinated effort must be made to improve the joint planning and implementation of StratCom.” One place to start is by considering best practices learned through operational processes. Primary among these are having a clear vision and guidance from senior leadership in the form of a Strategic Narrative,

embedding that Strategic Narrative into the Commander's Intent and operational planning process, and empowering people at all levels to carry and send that message. Once developed, the Strategic Narrative can be used as a reference point and embedded into derived operational narratives and policy, which are then carried vertically, horizontally, and across national boundaries. SHAPE has assumed the job to create NATO's strategic narrative.

When developing the Strategic Narrative, consideration should be given to best practices to deal with current and future threat environments. Among these best practices are:

- Consider the target audience and take non-coalition actors into account.
- Strike a balance between the speed of potentially inaccurate information flow and a reactive posture; speed is important so decision-makers need to aim to control risk, while individuals aggregating information should be held responsible for its content.
- Do not discount having an experienced communicator versus one who might not appreciate the subtleties of effective communications within each command.
- Conduct assessments to evaluate the impacts and effects of StratCom efforts.
- Counter the propaganda of our enemies and present evidence that discredits countering views.
- Employ branding strategies, particularly when working with NGOs.
- Extend StratCom training beyond the boundaries of the professional Public Affairs Officer.

Ideally, these best practices would be embedded and 'socialised' throughout NATO and the nations to improve effectiveness of operations. Empowerment is essential to that effort, striking a balance between giving authority to send messages while

avoiding inadvertent and unintentional messaging.

The syndicate discussion on this subject centred on two areas: various governments' willingness to implement these strategies and ideas to be considered when employing these practices. It was reiterated that the Chiefs of Defence (CHODs) have expressed their support for upgrading Alliance StratCom, but that often the Secretaries of Defence control the press staffs rather than the CHODs; those staffs often have different or conflicting priorities.

CONCLUSIONS

- There is a unanimous verdict from all the CHODs responding to ACT's letter that both NATO and the nations need to incorporate these best practices into their StratCom efforts.
- There is a disparity between what the CHODs have expressed and what the nations are able to employ.
- It is often important to calculate the best messenger to deliver the messages to a certain target audience and to have a consistent messenger so the audience can connect the message with a trusted face.

RECOMMENDATION

- Incorporate the identified best practices into StratCom plans, strategies, and actions for NATO and, where appropriate, the nations.



StratCom Works in Progress

There are three major, concurrent, but unsynchronised initiatives underway regarding StratCom:

- US-Specific StratCom Development: This is a broad-based effort with extensive scope and reflects a third generation level of effort. It is generating a great deal of material and has already confronted many of the issues that NATO is just beginning to address.
- Multi-National Experiment Six (MNE-6): Lead by Germany, this initiative uses a theoretical Concept Development and Experimentation approach. It currently includes six participating countries, private companies, academics, and other civilian expertise. MNE-6 is

starting with a blank sheet and building from the ground up.

- The NATO StratCom Project: This is considered a pragmatic, multi-national, concept-based work that is starting from an existing foundation. This effort will use the forthcoming concept to develop the implementation plan for submission to the Nations for review.

Syndicate members agreed that a hybrid approach, wherein the work of one is informed by the work of the other two, would be beneficial to all three efforts.

CONCLUSION

- The three currently independent efforts to enable StratCom are complimentary to each other and each effort has a high potential to inform the other two.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Establish an extensive information sharing campaign that provides opportunities for feedback, shared analysis, and synergy among the three StratCom efforts (US-specific StratCom development, Multi-National Experiment Six (MNE-6), and the NATO StratCom project).

DEFINING EDUCATION AND INDIVIDUAL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

An urgent and compelling need exists for a common understanding, standards, doctrine and training to prepare properly operational forces for the challenges of counterinsurgency (COIN).



INTRODUCTION

The breakout session focused on defining education and individual training requirements as related to counterinsurgency (COIN) training. The intent was to summarise the current status of COIN doctrine, standards and training, and for nations to make recommendations for the way ahead to support commanders in the field.

The status of COIN training was considered within the five components of the NATO training spectrum:

- Policy, doctrines & standards
- National training
- Education & Individual Training (E&IT)
- Collective training & exercises
- Operational training

Nations have been engaged in national-level COIN training and NATO billets have been established at the COIN Academy in Kabul, Afghanistan. The Initial Assessment, published in August

2009, and the COIN guidance and tactical direction given by Commander International Security and Assistance Force (COMISAF) serves as the basis for E&IT as well as the key source for collective training & exercises.

Other policy, doctrine and standards include terms of reference for the establishment of the COIN Task Force (15JAN2010), Allied Joint Publications (AJP) 3.4.4., Allied Command Operations (ACO) Forces Standards Addendum, and COMISAF COIN Training Guidance.

Looking forward, NATO must enhance, adjust and standardise COIN training, continuously reviewing curricula based on theatre feedback. Actions and activities across the entire training continuum include:

- Creating a COIN operational culture
- Enhancing Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL) solutions
- Deploying Mobile Advisory Teams
- Revising ACO Forces Standards & NATO Standardised Agreements (STANAGs)
- Addressing the issues involving interagency collaboration

Following the fast track procedure for the adoption of AJP 3.4.4 will address nations' comments, interoperability, doctrine operational relevance and lessons learned, best practices, and

deficiencies from the theatre. NATO will serve as lead to the nations in several key areas including Cultural/Religion understanding; Basic language skills in Dari/Pashtu; capabilities/limitations of enablers; Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) partnership; interagency coordination and information management centres.

National training enhancement should include: expanding collective training and deployment of Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (OMLT); establishment of liaisons and partnerships between NATO Centres of Excellence (CoEs) and COIN Training Centre; and filling billets in the NATO Training Mission for Afghanistan (NTM-A). Nations will be expected to take the lead, with NATO in support, for fire support, detainee operations and Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) training.

Pre-deployment training should cover several key areas, be based on COMISAF training guidance, and occur at the tactical level with each contributor becoming an expert in their own field. Key areas include

- ISAF Tactical Driving Directive training
- Focus on Escalation of force training
- Area Structures Capabilities Organisations People and Events (ASCOPE) knowledge
- "Auftragstaktik" (mission tactics)
- Civilian and military decision making structures management (district level & up)
- Use of quick impact funds
- Development of learning organisations

DISCUSSION

Participants commented on the status of Alliance Education and Training: An action plan generated by a recently completed ACT study on NATO training was approved in principle by the Military

Committee. A NATO Training Group has been stood up and has been a good forum to discuss issues of policy and training; however, policy and standards are often inter-mingled, and the results are being produced too slowly.

CONCLUSION

- The lack of training doctrine must be addressed by first drafting guidance regarding education, individual training and exercises based on information received from SHAPE.

RECOMMENDATION

- Write up the requirements that SHAPE issued on education and training.



Pre-Deployment Training

There is a lack of a common understanding of what pre-deployment training is necessary for troops. NATO has not defined skill sets that are required or desired for billets assigned to deploying personnel. A NATO Training Standardisation Group has been set up to address this issue.

CONCLUSION:

- There is no common system shared by all NATO facilities and training providers accessible and visible to all designating required skill sets.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Define mandatory and desired training by billet.

- Track training accomplished by individuals in a system shared and accessible by all.
- Develop one integrated NATO training system for use across all facilities.
- Integrate exercise participation into training requirements and training management system.
- Support establishment of Education and Individual Training (E&IT) database for deploying personnel training requirements.



ACT Training Division Focus

Three priority items were highlighted to the nations:

- COIN in support of the operational structure in Afghanistan
- Preparing for women in the military on operations and the role of women in COIN
- The Comprehensive Approach

CONCLUSIONS

- COMISAF is using COIN-based operations in Afghanistan, which require NATO and the nations to develop a COIN doctrine and deliver COIN training to deploying forces
- NATO must be prepared to work with non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international organisations and governmental agencies, and be prepared to incorporate them into planning and training
- ACT is not the lead agency for comprehensive approach development

RECOMMENDATION

- Accept the priorities as defined by ACT Education and Individual Training (E&IT).

COIN Common Understanding

COMISAF issued a strategic assessment outlining ISAF's reconfiguration for COIN in population centres. COMISAF also issued very specific COIN training guidance. The challenge is to implement this guidance. COIN goals can only be achieved with a CA. It is a pre-requisite for success at all levels from the General Officer/Flag Officer level all the way down. The Alliance needs to institutionalise doctrine to reach all levels. Ambitions can only be attained if nations are willing to support a CA, which requires agreement on standards of how we do things.

CONCLUSIONS

- Nations do not have a common understanding of what COIN consists of.
- Some nations have included COIN-relevant training within some pre-deployment cycles; however, it has not been carried out to a common standard.
- Nations have developed, or are starting to develop, COIN doctrine.
- Significant progress will come through standardised military training requirements based on a common doctrine.
- STANAG must be fast-tracked. Most members thought a COIN Standardised Agreement (STANAG) was the right approach and agreed that this was the first job for the Training Task Force (TF).

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Address the lack of training doctrine with first draft guidance on education, individual training and exercises based on information received from SHAPE.
- Document Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) promulgated requirements on education and training.

- Develop one integrated NATO training system for use across all facilities to track training required and accomplished by individuals.
- Integrate exercise participation into training requirements and a training management system.



Developing COIN Doctrine

Concerns were raised regarding NATO's ability to develop successfully a credible standard COIN doctrine. This stems from the reluctance of some nations to change procedures already in place as well as national policy caveats in theatre, such as the basing of forces in protected bases versus amongst the population. COMISAF has, however, issued a strategic assessment outlining ISAF's reconfiguration for COIN in population centres and provided specific COIN training guidance.

CONCLUSIONS

- A Comprehensive Approach is a prerequisite for successful implementation of this guidance at all levels, which is why we need to institutionalise doctrine, requiring agreement on execution standards.
- Progress will come through standardised military training requirements based on a common doctrine.
- Some nations are starting to develop COIN doctrine, yet not all have a common understanding of COIN. At the end of the day, SACT is responsible for doctrine; training is a national responsibility.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Initiate parallel development of NATO COIN doctrine and a COIN Standardisation Agreement (STANAG), based on what has already been developed from the nations and other troop contributing nations and through Allied Command Operations (ACO) best practice and deficiencies.
- Ensure that COIN publications are available for a common understanding and for use as standards for training.

NATO COIN Task Force:

ACT has proposed establishment of the COIN Task Force (TF) focused on COIN training, with expansive participation beyond NATO, including troop contributing nations. Composition of the TF will include experts from international military forces, SHAPE, ISAF, etc. and will be led by ACT. Establishment of the TF is in progress. Effectiveness will be dependent on rapid feedback from the field, a broad range of participants, regular meetings and the delivery of tangible products.

CONCLUSIONS

- For the COIN Task Force to be effective, it must meet frequently and produce deliverables.
- Set up to get rapid feedback from the field.

- Include broad range of participants.

RECOMMENDATION

- Solicit nations' input for a COIN Task Force (TF), to include by name COIN Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to serve as participants.



COIN Training

Many nations and NATO activities have developed or are developing COIN training. The challenge to the Alliance is to move everyone to the same standard with regards to COIN training. While NATO training traditionally focused on the brigade or battalion level, COIN training focuses on company or platoon level, leading to a possible situation where the number of potential students may overwhelm the existing training capabilities.

CONCLUSIONS

- Not all nations have a capability to conduct training to expected standards, and they can't afford to send all soldiers to other countries in the numbers required.
- Investment is needed for NATO to standardise procedures and training objectives, and make better use of the knowledge base of re-deploying soldiers.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Focus limited resources beyond the establishment of new facilities; rather focus on connecting those with training requirements with those who have training assets.
- Compile information on individual nation's training needs and capabilities to share among nations in order to pool COIN training resources.
- Use existing investments, enhance existing exercises and courses wherever possible, and modify existing training and exercises to include NATO COIN training standard requirements when defined.
- Advertise COIN distance learning capabilities available through NATO as well as national capabilities if they are willing to share.
- Encourage incorporation of Commander International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF) COIN training guidance into national training regimen as a pragmatic method of achieving standardisation in the short term.
- Develop a NATO COIN Academy to train the trainers to get sufficient Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to train operators down to the corporal level.
- Make training transportable, or at least the trainers transportable, and use re-deploying troops to provide pre-deployment training.



Cultural/Language Training

COIN success is dependent on cultural awareness and working with the population. In addition to C-IED and other combat related capabilities, each soldier must be trained as a sensor and an ambassador, sensitive to the attitudes and culture of the local population.

Language barriers are a significant barrier to COIN success. NATO's inability to connect to local populations in their native tongue, and to coalition partners, reduces mission effectiveness. Reliance on poorly-screened interpreters increases mission risk.

CONCLUSIONS

- COIN training for Afghanistan must include Afghans.
- Practical versus academic training on COIN is the imperative.
- Logistics of each nation supporting Afghans at their training facilities is significant burden.
- Every person must have strong English skills and basic Pashtu/Dari skills.
- Every unit must have at least one higher skilled Pashtu/Dari speaker; at least one soldier with knowledge of 500 to 1000 words.
- Battalion/Brigade must have skill to evaluate efficacy of interpreters.
- Each soldier is a sensor and an ambassador. He must be sensitive to the attitudes and culture of the local population as well as countering IED's.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Capitalise on NATO assets for support and access to Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) assets to deliver training and train the trainer programs that include ANSF.
- Integrate COIN into existing training and exercises such as how to engage an enemy who is not in uniform, including women, children and the elderly.
- Ensure every unit has at least one higher skilled Pashtu/Dari speaker.
- Leverage, enhance and publicise NATO and Nations' Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL) for language training.

Operational Feedback into Training

Owing to the rapid nature of evolving threats, it is critical to get feedback quickly from the field integrated into pre-deployment COIN training. Maximising the impact of the limited number and availability of SMEs is paramount. Lines of communication must be established between operators and in-theatre experts, and between with NATO and nations' trainers to speed identification, dissemination and codification of key lessons learned.

CONCLUSION

- Lines of communication must be established between operators and in-theatre experts with NATO and nations' trainers to speed identification and codification of key lessons.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Send nations' trainers to ISAF COIN Academy in Kabul as students and observers.
- Fill billets at the Kabul Centre and ensure that training at the facility is consistent.
- Network and integrate training with NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A) and Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A).
- Use Mobile Advisory Teams (MATs) to train the trainers in and outside the theatre.

- Utilise social networking type systems to expand the reach and impact of SMEs.



Integration of Non-Military Organisations into Training

COIN and CA success depends upon both coordination and cooperation with non-military organisations. Training

efficacy depends upon comprehensive inter-agency knowledge, which should include their identity, operating models, optimal engagement methods. Exercises and training must include coordination and cooperation with non-military organisations.

CONCLUSION

- It is necessary to work with and to better non-military organisations to achieve success in both COIN and CA.

RECOMMENDATION

- Invite non-military organisations to participate in training and exercises.

DEFINING CAPABILITIES

Defining requisite NATO capabilities through the maturing Defence Planning Process will provide a viable path to delivering attribute-based military and non-military requirements across multiple time horizons.



INTRODUCTION

The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) has five steps:

- Establish political guidance
- Determine requirements
- Apportion requirements & set targets
- Facilitate implementation
- Review results

The Defining Capabilities breakout focused on the second step (requirements determination) with the two primary outputs of Priority Shortfall Areas (PSAs) and Minimum Capability Requirements (MCRs).

The PSAs provide the Alliance with a single compilation of capability shortfalls, identifying those that the Strategic Commands believe offer the greatest potential to improve Alliance mission effectiveness and interoperability in the near-, mid- and long-terms. The collective capability shortfalls of the 2009 Bi-Strategic Command (Bi-SC) PSAs were derived

from the 2007 Defence Requirements Review and other sources such as Lessons Learned, Crisis Response Operations Urgent Requirements, and the findings of the Multiple Futures Project. The Bi-SC 2009 PSAs conclude that the greatest potential exists in the High Level Capability Requirements (HLCRs) areas of Command and Control, Education and Training, and Awareness and Understanding for the following prioritised mission sets:

- Countering Hybrid Threats
- WMD detection and consequence management
- Adaptable command structures and Expeditionary C²
- StratCom

DISCUSSION

An overview of the NDPP and the development method for the 2009 PSAs was followed by a significant discussion on the need to transition from a Cold War-based quantitative approach to capabilities to a more flexible qualitative or attribute-based approach. Participants concluded with a discussion on the development of planning situations, clarifying planning time horizons, and accounting for non-military capabilities.

NATO Defence Planning Process Overview

Breakout session participants stated that there has always been a Defence Planning Process (DPP), but the new

NDPP will be more capability-based and inclusive.

The NDPP should facilitate the timely identification, development and delivery of the necessary range of forces, both military and non-military capabilities, that are interoperable and adequately prepared, equipped, trained and supported to undertake the Alliance's full spectrum of missions. These planning activities should be 'harmonised' across the domain working groups to meet agreed targets in the most effective way.

Session leaders emphasised that Step 1 of the NDPP is the analysis of political guidance. National guidance enters the process from multiple sources, such as Executive Working Group (EWG) multilateral meetings and the drafting process of the new Strategic Concept. ACT addresses the MC at various stages of the NDPP, providing the nations other opportunities to comment and engage with the process.



2009 Priority Shortfall Areas (PSAs) Overview – Key Insights Brief

Breakout session leaders presented an overview of the 2009 list. The 2009 PSAs are organised in three different levels to meet the needs of different audiences:

- High Level Capability Requirements (HLCRs) indicate in broad terms a Capability Areas and are aimed at senior policy level
- Each HLCR contains several Tier 2 Capability Areas, aimed at senior expert level, such as the Military Committee
- Tier 1 Capability Areas are broken down into a number of Tier 2 Capabilities, which together with supporting summaries are aimed at technical and subject-matter experts

The PSA list provides the context and necessary details, which should be used as a reference document. It does not presume political decisions that will determine which capabilities NATO and nations will develop. That will remain a national decision.

NATO and national efforts in alleviating capability shortfalls need to be harmonised in order to avoid duplication and to enable interoperability. In theory, there should be no unfulfilled requirements.

After deriving Minimum Capability Requirement (MCR), the Strategic Commands, with ACT in the lead, conduct a comparison between the MCR and existing and planned national, multinational and NATO-owned capabilities available for Alliance operations, and then identifies unfilled requirements that prevent the Alliance from meeting its Level of Ambition.

This set of unfilled requirements will be used by the Strategic Commands to derive the PSAs, taking into account the risks associated with each shortfall and identifying surpluses against the Minimum Capability Requirement. A synopsis of the Minimum Capability Requirement will be presented and discussed at the EWG (Reinforced) and

used subsequently to assist in the mutual development of action items.

Based on this portion of the Implementation and Transition Plan, four capability areas have been agreed upon by the nations:

- Countering Improvised Explosive Devices
- Military Medical
- Network Enabled Capability
- Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.



Shift in Capability Focus from Quantity to Quality

Participants stated that NATO must provide transparency to the nations by describing better both requirements and the associated capabilities to the nations. Many felt that the Alliance must move from the old Cold War quantity-based to a post-Cold War attribute-based approach

There was general agreement that the NDPP should contain mechanisms to identify surpluses. A suggestion made was that some capabilities could be met by Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations instead of Alliance members. Another recommended approach was to outsource some capabilities via periodic contracts instead of purchasing rapidly obsolete equipment.

Session leaders stated that the new planning emphasis on capability can be summed up as “what do we need to fix,” versus the old system of “how many artillery pieces do I need?” The primary emphasis is now on fixing interoperability and mission effectiveness, versus providing physical equipment in specified numbers.

In conclusion, the three questions to answer through the planning process are:

- What are you learning today?
- What will be different in the future?
- How do you build them?

Answers must be attribute (characteristics) based. The future force structure will not have more ‘stuff,’ just a different way to organise and use what is available.

Future Security Environment – Generic Planning Solutions

The entire capability requirement process stems from generic planning scenarios, which lead to task decomposition, and then to capability requirements. Participants expressed that the key to get planning scenarios correct is to establish a common, understandable baseline, and that transparency is critical to enable tracing how capability requirements are derived.

The nations must find the MCR credible if they are to buy in. Various participants expressed a desire for a better balance between current state and future aspirations, more detailed knowledge of scenarios, applicability to ‘generic’ situations, and improved traceability and transparency. Some recommended execution of a test case that would be compared to the results from the Multiple Futures Project, and

predicting that if they align, there will be acceptance. To ensure compatibility both the NATO and national planning processes will work towards integrating themselves in order to have the nations' force structure already compatible with NATO requirements.

Multiple Planning Horizons

There was general agreement that multiple planning horizons are important. Short-term capabilities are more tangible, but longer-term time horizons provide more flexibility in determining which types of forces are optimal to deliver that capability.

A more exhaustive and quality-oriented planning process is necessary to meet national expectations. The linkage between planning horizons and planning situations is dependent on the lead time required to adjust the efforts.



Non-Military Capabilities (NMC)

Participants felt that the Comprehensive Approach to meeting mission goals must address both military and non-military requirements across the full spectrum of Alliance nations. Minimum Capabilities Requirements will be arrived at by all defence planning entities and by drawing upon all available military and non-military planning expertise.

Participants expressed a desire to develop active engagement communities in order to support the interaction and interface between military and non-military actors. The political guidance factor that occurs in Step 1 of the NDPP will help with this process and incorporate possible legal considerations.

Some members opined that when it comes to developing capability, the real value is in the targets expressed in five to fifteen year timeframe. This is the window in which NATO can affect the targets within its planning ability; targets should therefore be specific in that period. This focus could also produce short-term results useful to force generators within NATO.

Participants noted that NATO's support to a Comprehensive Approach may require providing capabilities in new areas that have traditionally not been its concern. Examples included police functions, prison management, and the provision of essential civil services.

It was noted that civilian entities may be better able to provide training and support in such areas as Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) and Cyber defence. It was generally agreed that when NATO sends out its capability requirement list, nations should have the ability to answer requirements with non-military as well as military assets.

One example of national ownership of the NMC issue presented was the UK's Joint Operational Planning Group, which was primarily staffed by civilians. The UK uses its Cabinet Office to act as a clearing house when decisions need to be made regarding the transfer of

national assets between government ministries and the MoD.

ability to contribute to this aspect of capability definition.

CONCLUSIONS

- The NDPP supports a shift from a cold-war era quantity based to a more agile attribute-based approach to capability definition
- Opportunities for engagement in the development of the planning situations would be appropriate for nations with a desire to participate to a greater degree.
- Multiple Planning Horizons are generally acceptable as proposed.
- Nations' ability and subject matter expertise to manage non-military capability requirements will affect their

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Organise a workshop that gives nations the opportunity to be engaged in the development of the NATO Defence Planning Process's (NDPP) generic planning situations.
- Support Alliance nations in addressing emerging needs to account for non-military capability requirements.
- Track and fully leverage results of Military Capabilities Surveys going to nations in the spring of 2010, to be returned to NATO in the summer of 2010.

ANNEX A: COTC READ-AHEAD PACKAGES

SESSION 1: COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH (CA)

Key Actors/Stakeholders

Nations, NATO, Partner Nations, IOs (most important are UN, EU, AU), NGOs (i.e. ICRC, IOM).

Key Milestones

NATO Summits, ForMins, Common Declarations and MOUs.

Key Documents

- C-M(2008)0029-COR1 (NR), Way Ahead on CA, ref to as CA Action Plan (AP), 2 Apr 08.
- AC/119-N(2009)0133 (SPC(R)), CA Task Force (CATF) Action Matrix, 16 Sep 09.
- NATO Summit Declarations, Riga (06), Bucharest (08), Strasbourg/Kehl (09).
- PO(2008)0145 (INV), Progress Reports on the AP by the SPC(R) to the NAC, 27 Nov 08.
- AC/119-N(2009)0163 (SPC(R)), Progress Reports on the AP by the SPC(R), 17 Nov 09.
- SecGen/ASG PASP Letters to/from Nations, Partners, IO/NGOs and other Non-NATO Actors.
- JALLCCG/09/141, JALLC Report on NATO's Military Contribution to a CA top Operations, 4 Aug 09.

Aim

This read ahead is intended to inform a common understanding of what CA means to NATO, what NATO's role is in support of CA, and to support the development of a model for NATO's contribution to CA at the COTC in Norfolk, 15/16 Dec 09.

Scope

To achieve a tangible outcome from a relatively short CA breakout session at the COTC and to maximise the contribution of participants, it is hoped that a model of 'NATO's contribution to CA' can be developed.³ The COTC offers the opportunity to exchange and gather knowledge and ideas on both NATO's and nations' view of how to contribute to CA. In some member states models may not exist or not be well defined but the question remains; how can we increase the chance for CA to become a successful concept? In the interests of promoting frank, open discussion and to encourage innovative thinking, Chatham House Rules will apply during the breakout.

What is CA to NATO?

In spite of the fact that the initiatives to pursue a CA started several years before it came to the agenda of the NATO Summits, these very Summits might be considered as the first formal reference of the concept or idea of CA. This is important, since nothing is an accepted fact within the Alliance if not agreed upon by all NATO nations. Initial references to CA in the 2006 Riga Summit Declaration were limited to the statement that:

³ In this case, a model means a simplified representation of a reality or system that guides and sets an example how a complex problem should be solved, a model therefore is a future reality to pursue or strive for.

“Experience in Afghanistan and Kosovo demonstrates that today’s challenges require a comprehensive approach by the international community involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments, while fully respecting mandates and autonomy of decisions of all actors, and provides precedents for this approach”.

This does not provide substantive clarity of what a CA exactly comprises. To that end the Council in Permanent Session was tasked to develop pragmatic proposals how the Alliance should best support that CA. The result was the document as agreed upon in the 2008 Bucharest Summit by Heads of State and Government (HoSG), commonly referred to as the [CA] Action Plan (AP). The Bucharest Summit Declaration stated that:

“Meeting today’s security challenges can best be achieved through a broad partnership with the wider IC, based on a shared sense of openness and cooperation as well as determination on all sides. To this end, it is essential for all major international actors to act in a coordinated way, and to apply a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments in a concerted effort that takes into account their respective strengths and mandates”.

The Alliance, striving not to be perceived as the owner of CA and seeking to move from a ‘supported’ to a ‘supporting’ position, calls on the IC to take ownership.

NATO’s Way Ahead on CA – The Action Plan (AP)

The endorsed AP comprises a set of pragmatic proposals to develop and implement NATO’s contribution to a CA. These proposals aim to improve the coherent application of NATO’s own crisis management instruments and enhance practical cooperation at all levels with other actors, wherever appropriate, including provisions for support to Stabilisation and Reconstruction (S&R). They relate to areas such as:

- Planning and conduct of operations (to include S&R and Crisis Management)
- Lessons learned, training, education and exercises
- Enhancing cooperation with external actors
- Coherent public messaging

The AP is the basis for the current and ongoing work on developing and implementing NATO’s Contribution to a CA by the IC. It shows the focus areas and the intent but it does not provide a model of how to get there. Within days of the Bucharest Summit, the then NATO SecGen, Jaap de Hoop-Scheffer, appointed a CA Task Force (CATF) to develop further and implement the AP. NATO HQ emphasises that CA is not owned by NATO, which is also witnessed in the following paragraph of the 2009 Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration:

Figure1- Pillars of NATO HQ’s CA Action Plan

public messaging.




Figure 1 - Pillars of NATO HQ's CA Action Plan

“Its effective implementation requires all international actors to contribute in a concerted effort, in a shared sense of openness and determination, taking into account their respective strengths and mandates.”

In addition to this statement, NATO’s commitment is restated as follows:

“As part of the international community’s efforts, we reaffirm our commitment to enhancing NATO’s intrinsic contribution to a civil-military approach [...], and to improve the delivery of stabilisation and reconstruction effects. We also encourage other actors to intensify their efforts in the same spirit.”

One can say that words are only the start, knowing that real progress can only be achieved by action to have new realities implemented. The AP does mention several activities in this regard and the SPC(R) reports on progress to Summits, as tasked by the NAC. The AP does not provide any more of a model than is depicted above; it describes how several activities should result in reflecting the requirements of a CA. It does not describe what exactly is needed to make understanding, interaction and maybe even cooperation, work, and make these efforts successful in the long term. It also leaves open the matter of the actions necessary to sustain these relationships and efforts on an ongoing basis, not an insignificant issue as all stakeholders need to see returns on their investments. Design, implementation and maintenance of appropriate mechanisms must be undertaken together with all potential participants.

Strategic Assessment and CA

In the AP, pre-operational planning conferences and actively promoting dialogue regularly are mentioned as ways to enhance NATO’s ability to understand the context of its possible or actual involvement and operations, and to create enduring mutual understanding, trust, confidence, respect and better co-operation with external actors. An adequate involvement of Non-NATO Actors (NNAs) in pre-planning stages and their

assessment, advice or inputs on issues of all sort, require thorough preparation and consideration of long term consequences. It also requires meticulous scrutiny - and education - at all military levels to maximise NNA contributions.

We need to make every effort to get relationships with IOs and NGOs right first time when rolling out a new model as there may not be a second chance for years afterwards if it is done badly. In this light, NATO's informal structures and procedures, including the allocation of tasks and responsibilities between the IS, IMS, and Strategic Commanders and their subordinate entities, might need a more formal approach. Clear direction is needed to achieve effectiveness and convergence of purpose in managing relationships among Allied and partner nations and NNAs . A model would support this and inform the way ahead, providing the architecture and subsequent mechanisms to make the Civil Military Approach happen, as referred to in the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration. This is necessary both in the military domain, at the theatre, operational and tactical level, and at the political level. Given the interdependence of security and development, the military domain is inextricably linked to the political, civil, and economic domains and all the domains are mutually supporting the overall objectives. Where appropriate, interaction mechanisms should link NNAs to the NATO Crisis Response System and the Operational Planning Process.

CA & C2

In NATO's future security missions and operations, the Alliance may be required to adopt a coordination role or even to be coordinated by others in its supporting role. The Alliance needs seriously to consider its ability to change and show flexibility in this respect. It is important to recognise also that optimising resources in this way with other organisations will reduce the military requirement. To achieve a return for both the Alliance and NNA, we need to envisage future C2 and how they get engaged in assessing, planning and managing their own capabilities, in case NATO plays a more supporting role and NNAs are supported by NATO assets. In spite of CA being a challenge at the political level, between IOs such as the UN and the EU, and between and within Nations, NATO military structures and processes need to get aligned to operate in a CA environment. The realignment to CA structures is likely to be difficult but is necessary and the military should lead by example. This can be done by explaining and promoting good practise such as offering a concept (or a platform to create a concept) and subsequently by developing an engagement plan and thereby defining a clear strategy of how to proceed. The military needs to be clear what can be done, in other words, define the role and level of ambition in future security environments (during peace and during crisis). Further -or concurrent- steps may be to develop flexible policy and/or arrangements in which NATO roles are defined, expectations towards burden sharing and planning can more easily be met and education and training opportunities created.

Defence Planning and CA

NATO's defence planning process is not excluded from NATO's contribution to a CA. To evidence this, the 2009 Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration states the process must:

“Enable Allies to deliver capabilities needed to deal with current and future challenges within a comprehensive approach. We therefore also welcome agreement on a new, defence planning process which puts the emphasis squarely on delivery of capabilities we need”.

This would help in selecting the various instruments that should be used in collaborating with others, provide opportunities better to define capabilities needed to deploy/sustain and opportunities to design suitably adapted C2 mechanisms. This should receive priority in order to reflect a comprehensive application effectively in the planning and execution phase. We need also better awareness throughout the Alliance of changing military requirements in order better to use increasingly scarce resources. Therefore, nations need to review capability packages. If we are able to find commonality of purpose with NNAs, we will be able better to apply comprehensive, unified efforts to crises.

Looking Forward

The Alliance requires a clear approach to confront the new and evolving challenges of the 21st century. As illustrated with paraphrases from the recent Summit Declarations, CA is where we want to go; a CA AP describes part of the how but NATO’s contribution could be a more practical, employable model of how to get there. There are many stakeholders but the effort must start with NATO nations and all will have to shift their focus from how business was done during the Cold War. Civilian and military cultures, even within our military headquarters are different and won’t be changed quickly or easily. The challenge is to do better, to improve NATO adaptability to new environments and to working with new partners and for that we need a model to guide us forward.

SESSION 2: COUNTERING HYBRID THREATS CONCEPT – INITIAL INPUT

PART I –Introduction

Concept Aim

To articulate the importance of the recurring Hybrid Threat and provide BI-SC guidance for the development of current and future concepts and doctrine. The concept will also inform higher level political authorities and lower level military commands of the potential implications within their own domains.

Scope

This paper provides a description of the recurring Hybrid Threat examines new military and political challenges and then discusses a framework under which the main threats will be addressed. It also indicates how the NATO military component will need to adapt and which agencies and actors it will need to work with in future operations.

Part II –Definition and Description of Hybrid Threats

Hybrid Threats result from an orchestration of conventional and/or non conventional methods and activities, employed by an opponent or a number of opponents that may include the use of Military force.

Hybrid Threats do not constitute a new problem. They are the ability of one or more state or non-state actors to employ a blend of actions (both conventional and non conventional) across and beyond the battle space, adversely affecting an opponent's decision cycle in order to achieve their aims; it includes the fusion of conventional weaponry, WMD, terrorism, cyber attack and criminality, supported by maliciously designed information operations.

What makes the current (and future) Hybrid threat far more potent is its increased tempo, complexity, diversity, wider orchestration and trans-nationality; it is also exacerbated by the ease with which actors can now communicate, access international resources (including funding) and acquire lethal weaponry.⁴

We are likely to witness NATO's opponents utilising the political, economic, social and information domains to compound the effect of conventional and non conventional armed tactics as well as non military activities. NATO's opponents will not have an easily discernible command structure or Centre of Gravity (COG) and will neither consider themselves bound by, nor coherently respect legal or international constraints; they may also reject any sentiment of settlement or negotiated peace. Against a global backdrop of resource scarcity, extreme climate change, economic migration, vulnerability of energy supplies, sustained population growth and ideological extremism, Hybrid Threats will be more challenging than at any previous juncture.

⁴ Includes; emerging links between Criminal and Terrorist groups.

Part III – Key Challenges Posed by Hybrid Threats

Environmental Understanding

Hybrid Threats will be diverse, adaptive and encountered in a complex (including urban) environment. The failing or failed states likely to harbour NATO's opponents will encompass a wide range of ethnic groups and cultures that must be fully understood. The local population may be sympathetic to NATO's opponents but at the same time they will be the Alliance's COG. The actors within a Hybrid Threat will orchestrate their actions based on perceived common objectives creating an opposition that is both complex and adaptive over time. The operating environment will most likely transcend geography and national borders and may enter the domains of cyberspace, finance, criminality, local governance, security and WME/WMD. Creating and maintaining a common understanding of this environment will be greatly challenging but will be critical in order for NATO to work alongside, and in partnership with law enforcement and other non-military actors to provide an effective response.

Winning the Battle of Perception

Both state and non-state opponents with regional/international media access will seek to discredit NATO's role, credibility and conduct.⁵ They will be able to exploit the legal complexity of situations where hostilities and criminal activities overlap or complement each other and have mutually reinforcing effects. The Alliance will be portrayed as a foreign and primarily Western intervention force with no regional understanding. Orchestrated attacks on NATO's credibility will come from multiple sources making them difficult to counter. The high tempo at which adversaries will conduct information operations will demand a more coherent and swifter response.

Increasing Access to High End Technology for Non State Actors

The increasing availability of specialist, off the shelf and high-end technology will allow NATO's opponents to develop their capabilities across a wider domain than the conventional battle space.⁶ A state's ability to sponsor and supply surrogate organisations (through international financial channels and porous national borders) will also enable smaller actors to conduct precision (and potentially devastating) attacks against NATO and its partners using high technology systems (and at the same time evade effective military response). High value targets (senior personnel, C2 nodes, computer networks, GPS, radio operating frequencies, capital platforms, social and energy infrastructures) are now well within the scope of multiple opponents. NATO faces a growing demand for expensive force and infrastructure protection whilst combating an increasingly sophisticated and elusive opponent.

Adaptability and Agility of Actors

Hybrid Threats demand a more agile response. The ability to engage a conventional adversary remains critical, but whose concurrency with smaller (potentially ad hoc), well orchestrated and resourced non conventional opponents will present a new challenge.

⁵ This includes regular media channels and web based enablers.

⁶ Includes; Electronic Warfare (EW), Laser Technology, Bio Technology, Electro Magnetic Pulse Technology (EMP), Cryptographic systems.

Opponents may be hardly distinguishable from Host Nation (HN) populations and lack any discernable force structure. They may not consider themselves restrained by international law and will be ready to choose from the full range of terrorist, criminal, conventional and irregular methods available to them. They will adapt their methodology and tactics rapidly, unhindered or probably even encouraged by an overarching command chain. The potential availability to such organisations of portable WME/WMD will also add a critical dimension. Crucially, their minimalist decision/action cycles will drive a substantially increased tempo.

Part IV – A Framework to Countering Hybrid Threats

An effective response to Hybrid Threats cannot be achieved in the short term. The Alliance must partner with others to deliver early and robust measures with an understanding of the need for a long term comprehensive commitment. NATO must use a combination of all political, diplomatic, economic, social, information and military tools available; security can only be maintained through consultation, deterrence, defence, crisis management and partnership with law enforcement agencies, local authorities and other relevant stakeholders.

Hybrid Threats necessitate a framework from which NATO can deliver an effective, unified political and military response on the basis of a sustainable consensus concerning the legitimacy and legality of Alliance action. Implementing a comprehensive approach is critical as the Alliance will be unable to react in the required timescales if the political and military framework is not consistent. The framework contains four inter-related elements, but all four may not always be applicable or in the outlined sequential order.⁷ Elements of all four may also be in use simultaneously once military forces have been deployed.

Framework Element I - Building

POLITICAL INTENT:⁸ Reduced potential for conflict; in conjunction with other relevant stakeholders, NATO identifies problematic regions and actors (state and non state) that will potentially present a threat in the event of destabilisation; it builds on the existing or non-existing regional diplomatic footprint and informs the HN of NATO's (as well as the nations) concerns and objectives. The Alliance would seek to identify and engage prominent actors that may be either in support of or opposition to NATO interests (include IOs, PO and NGOs).

EXAMPLE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION: A cultural and intelligence as well as military-legal assessment of the region (engagement with regional intelligence services); detection and monitoring of likely opponent groups, their leadership and broader orchestration (particularly regarding WMD/WME proliferation); visible support to diplomatic effort by increased military cooperation programmes; facilitation of regional infrastructure and humanitarian programmes with combat support capability; covert support to HN SOF;

⁷ The tasks would be completed by NATO independently or by other actors which NATO would support.

⁸ Combination of all political, diplomatic, economic, social, information and military activities

support for capacity enhancement and consolidation of HN Security Sector activities. Monitoring of critical energy supply security.⁹

Framework Element II – Deterrence

POLITICAL INTENT: Deter opponents from aggression; to communicate to the region, local populations and international audience, NATO's intent, in close partnership with others, is to provide a unified, balanced (and if necessary) military response to any threat to the Alliance or its supporters' territories, populations and forces.¹⁰

EXAMPLE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION: Visible large scale military exercises with HN and wider operational 'posturing'; strategic communication to coerce opponent leadership and alert them to their international vulnerability; detailed intelligence assessment of all potential aggressors and their courses of action; visible effort to track and locate WMD; deployment of expeditionary military infrastructure into HN; developing close partnerships with other security providers and relevant stakeholders, support preparations for economic blockade; monitoring of NATO networks and financial assets; activation of 'Consequence Management' assets.¹¹

Framework Element III – Engagement

POLITICAL INTENT: Use of NATO military component to force a solution; in addition to active military and security force engagement, NATO in cooperation with other actors, would seek a continued diplomatic solution by applying increased political and economic pressure on all regional and local actors.

EXAMPLE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION: Military options include but are not limited to; deployment of full combat capable forces in destabilised region; operations as required to stop or contain use of force in support of law enforcement agencies; comprehensive information operations campaign (to inform and protect local population and influence the adversary); neutralisation of potential tactical and strategic WMD/WME threats; interdiction of border violations; non kinetic and kinetic measures against opponent key personnel as well as leadership; imposing of selective air and sea blockade; freezing of financial assets; disruption of opponent networked systems; further support for capacity enhancement and consolidation of HN Security Sector activities.¹²

Framework Element IV – Stabilisation

POLITICAL INTENT: Stabilise the conflict area and build peace; with international and regional support, NATO would implement a sustainable settlement; a comprehensive military and political approach with continued engagement of UN and other non-NATO civilian actors.

EXAMPLE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION: Reconstruction and stability operations; increased emphasis on regional infrastructure support; monitoring and closure of borders; support to Demobilisation, Disarmament, Reintegration and Reconciliation (DDR2)

⁹ This would inform and support an internal NATO Cultural Training and Education programme.

¹⁰ May include deterrence by reward.

¹¹ Risk of criminal prosecution outside one's own country.

¹² Includes; Detainee Operations; kinetic operations will, as a rule, primarily be directed against opponent personnel exercising command and control functions as well as other combat functions.

programmes; continued consolidation of HN Security Sector activities and support to indigenous security forces; upon request, capture of adversary leadership to facilitate extra theatre or international criminal proceedings; strategic communication to inform international audience of NATO's mission transition; partnering and increased co-operation with regional/local authorities, agencies and International Organisations.¹³

Part V – Potential New Military Implications

NATO's current structure and capabilities will not facilitate an effective and comprehensive response to the Hybrid Threat. The construct offers a new approach to identify within an overall framework of action what military forces and command and control structures will need to be able to do and with which actors and stakeholders they will need to work.

Initial national findings have indicated that the following areas must be addressed if the Alliance is to adapt to meet the increasing challenge:

COMMAND: Greater coordination and tempo in military planning and execution; operational and tactical planning coherent with comprehensive Political/Strategic Campaign Plan; a more integrated (but decentralised) command system that works with other actors and stakeholders as appropriate.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING: Comprehensive education programme (for both political and military components) focusing on operating in support of a Comprehensive Approach in Countering Hybrid Threats. Theatre specific programmes; detailed cultural assessments and language skills training for relevant personnel.

COMMUNICATION: A robust, Political/Military strategic, operational and tactical communication process, with increased capacity to influence opinions of all actors and stakeholders.¹⁴

INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION: A substantially enhanced intelligence collection and information sharing process between nations but also with NATO non-military actors and non NATO military partners.¹⁵ Strengthened information superiority through interoperable systems, high value and real time environmental situational awareness and delivery of quality JISR capabilities. This should also contribute to effective operational assessment architecture.

FLEXIBILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY: New and imaginative use of existing interoperable conventional forces to achieve rapid tactical superiority, potentially by being able to fight as the enemy chooses. The military component must be able to deploy with a 'toolbox of capabilities' to meet conventional and/or nonconventional threats and conduct dispersed, small unit, and agile operations. More capacity to integrate with, train and

¹³ Encompassing Indigenous Capacity Building and Population Protection.

¹⁴ The Alliance's intentions should be transparent whilst its communication plan must project unity and confidence.

¹⁵ Current NATO data collection process lacks sufficient doctrine, training or assets, as well as in some cases the willingness and/or legal and technical frameworks for sharing collected data.

advise foreign military forces and operate in support of non-governmental and law enforcement organisations.

Protection and Consequence Management

Enhanced force protection options for military and civilian components most at risk; tempered by the critical requirement for tactical forces to be able to achieve the trust of local populations. Consequence Management Assets to cover vulnerable civilian and military systems (includes enhanced survivability of military bases, energy supply nodes, related networks and troop concentrations).

WMD: Strategic defence, which includes both detection and engagement. Superior CBRN forensics and passive capability to protect civilian and military targets. Ability to rapidly enforce nuclear material export control and international safeguards.

NETWORKS SYSTEMS: Superior network systems which can provide comprehensive cyber protection and target adversary networks; cyber forensics capabilities which support identifying attackers and the route of any attacks.¹⁶

¹⁶ Includes; protection of Financial, Business, Transport, Energy Supply nodes and Communication networks.

SESSION 3: ENABLING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION CONCEPT

Aim

Provide read ahead for Strategic Communication outbreak at Chiefs of Transformation Conference (COTC).

Background

In 2008 SACEUR requested SACT help to improve Strategic Communications (StratCom) capability in support of ISAF. SACT responded with support program including training coordination, in-theatre assessment, concept development, experimentation, and engagement with CHODs to provide resources: manpower, training courses, Centre of Excellence, compliance with existing doctrine.

-HQ SACT COS established ACT Strategic Communications Capability Development WG in Feb 2009 to guide evolutionary development of StratCom capability for NATO and the Nations. To date WG has established close ties to SHAPE and NATO HQ StratCom offices, co-sponsored conferences, and collaborated on directives and guidance.

Multiple Futures identifies StratCom as a key enabler.

NATO Strategic Communications Policy approved in Nov 2009 calls on ACT to lead submission of Concept. ACT represented at initial StratCom Policy Board (ASG-level).

Key points/Discussion

Draft NATO Military StratCom Concept planned for submission to Director International Military Staff in Jan 2010 followed by Capability Implementation Plan development. Concept addresses key factors:

- Embedding StratCom into operational processes-beginning at the top. Addressing the need for commanders' to be educated on the importance of winning the information battle, particularly in counter-insurgency and hybrid threat scenarios. Viewing the commander as maestro of a strategic communication orchestra.
- Empowering units and staffs with delegated authority to communicate based on clear, simple guidelines. Taking advantage of social media tools to reach out and engage a wide range of audiences.
- Developing a strategic narrative to serve as a common point of reference for each level of command and across coalition members. An essential information tool for non-kinetic operations.

SESSION 4: DEFINING EDUCATION & INDIVIDUAL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

Background

Identifying Education and Individual Training (E&IT) Requirements using Counter Insurgency as a practical example.

Key points/Discussion

- Training Spectrum
- Approaches to identifying E&IT prerequisites
- Counter Insurgency (COIN)
- COIN imperatives
- COMISAF's COIN Guidance and near/mid term influence on NATO E&IT
- SAGE
- Identification of SMEs/OPRs
- NETFs
- COEs
- PTCs
- National opportunities and offers
- ITEP
- Integration into existing E&IT programs vs new programs
- Facilitation and Coordination

Recommendations/Line to Take

- Rapid front end analysis will shed light over the most obvious training requirements
- Training needs analysis will further specify the detailed training prerequisites
- COIN TF will constitute focal node for all DOTMLPFI aspects of COIN
- SAGE instrumental to set the stage for 2 year out training programs
- Networking of ETFs and nations willing and capable of providing complete courses or modules of COIN E&IT increases in importance
- Networking of SMEs required to assure rapid feedback for update of curricula
- All COIN efforts to be conducted under the auspices of increasing training *effectiveness, efficiency and affordability* for NATO and Nations.

Expected Outcomes

- Nations recommendations on way ahead to support commanders in the field as far as doctrine, standards and training plans are concerned
- Agreed common platform on doctrine status, key areas of ISAF COIN Training Guidance, ACT's point of view on training possibilities and requirements for nation's support.

SESSION 5: DEFINING CAPABILITIES

Background

In preparation of the upcoming requirements identification and target setting phases of the new NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), a series of workshops were held at NATO HQ in the OCT, NOV and DEC 2009 timeframe with the aim of developing conceptual proposals to steer the implementation of the new process in a coherent and efficient manner, whilst at the same time continuing to improve a capability based approach towards defence planning. Some conceptual parameters bear the potential to contribute to the creation of a road map within the NDPP implementation related to a Capability Requirements Review. A commonly shared understanding will facilitate harmonisation and synchronisation of effort of all planning domains and stake holders involved and contribute to the iterative development of a final product to be presented to the relevant NATO bodies. Mature conceptual parameters should, inter alia, lead to the agreement of common terminology. Preparing the analytical steps will be responsive to the new Strategic Concept and political guidance.

Key points/Discussion

In Annex you will find further information on the following subjects:

- Capability Based Planning Approach
- Capability / Target
- Minimum Capability Requirement
- Capture the future Security Environment
- Capability Hierarchy – Level of Granularity
- Capability Codes & Statements
- Multiple Planning Horizons
- Strategic Enablers
- Informed by Resources – Consistency and Affordability

Background and Intent

In preparation of the upcoming requirements identification and target setting phases of the new NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), a series of workshops were held at NATO HQ in the OCT and DEC 2009 timeframe with the aim of developing conceptual proposals to steer the implementation of the new process in a coherent and efficient manner whilst at the same time continuing to improve a capability based approach towards defence planning. Some conceptual parameters as described below bear the potential to contribute to the creation of a road map within the NDPP implementation related to a Capability Requirements Review. A commonly shared understanding will facilitate harmonisation and synchronisation of effort of all planning domains and stake holders involved and contribute to the iterative development of a final product to be presented to the relevant NATO bodies. Mature conceptual parameters should, inter alia, lead to the agreement of common terminology. Preparing the analytical steps will be responsive to the new Strategic Concept and political guidance. It is intended to further refine elements after the Chiefs of Transformation Conference in Norfolk during the break out session when participants will have another opportunity to provide suggestions and advice related to “Defining Capabilities”.

Capability Based Planning Approach

ACT will continue to incrementally implement a capability based planning process and, to this end, adjust its Capability Requirements Review-process to take full account of the NDPP. This would be done in an evolutionary way not reinventing what we already have. But there is a need to improve and identify areas which were not sufficiently covered so far.

This way of planning will be translated into very practical, manageable and transparent terms throughout the analysis. There is probably not “the solution” which we could just adopt as the NATO approach.

Capability / Target

ACT will adopt a planning approach which is meant to be exhaustive and more quality oriented. ACT intends to work on the basis of definitions on the understanding that the broader description of objectives and effects, in combination with a convincing rationale for requesting a capability, will lead to better results in transformation and quality improvement.

Definition of Capability

“Capability” is the ability to perform action(s) to achieve objective(s) / effect(s).

It will most likely consist of a complex combination of Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Material, Personnel, Leadership, Facilities and Interoperability (DOTMPLFI).

Definition of Target

“Target” is an objective for the delivery of the required capabilities for the mitigation of shortfalls, which can be addressed through national, multinational or collective efforts, while respecting the principles of fair burden sharing and reasonable challenge.

Minimum Capability Requirement (MCR)

Definition of MCR

The single set of capabilities needed by the Alliance to meet its Level of Ambition and other agreed objectives set out in political guidance.

Related Aspects

- MCR should include all capability requirements, sought to meet the specific demands in the shorter, medium and longer term taking into account the ability of nations to adjust their prioritisation in allocating resources to new requirements.
- MCR should be derived in a holistic manner and with the participation and contribution of all relevant stakeholders, from NATO staffs and nations, in order to ensure a synchronised approach to defence planning and capability development efforts.
- MCR should be linked or make reference to capability requirements of current operations, the lessons learnt from operations, exercises and other activities, as well as capability improvements programmes and other efforts for solution development.
- The MCR derivation process should not be constrained but informed by resources aspects.
- MCR should be expressed in quality and/or quantity and interoperability terms, which could be broken down in a suitable capability hierarchy that offers an adequate level of granularity. MCR should focus on joint, mission-oriented and functionally integrated approaches and, for the medium and longer term avoid being too specific in number and platforms. They should,

however, indicate envisaged capability development/improvement timelines, but leaving some flexibility to nations as to how these requirements will be met.

- MCR should include military and non-military capabilities needed to:
- Achieve the desired end states with related benchmarks/critical milestones for the full spectrum of Alliance missions,
- Accomplish military tasks to be executed in a supporting and/or supported role dependant on the nature of future operations,
- Enable interaction and achieve the necessary interface with diverse non-military actors/communities in order to support/facilitate the execution of the mission in the context of a comprehensive approach,
- Perform non-military tasks in the absence of non-military expertise/capabilities/actors, notably essential tasks related to governance, police and rule of law,
- Render services to military units or to provide the same effect as military capabilities and thus replacing military units,
- Enable the delivery of services, in compliance with military/non-military interoperability requirements.
- MCR will be derived in a joint effort by all defence planning domains respecting the very nature of their work in support of the NDPP and by drawing on available military and non-military expertise.
- Due to the variety of non-military capability requirements a balanced approach should be applied how those requirements can be realistically translated into targets. A prudent way to address such non-military capability requirement may be the description of a function in terms of expertise and knowledge which may be needed in planning for and conducting operations. This may facilitate to the availability of non-military capabilities for operations on a case by case basis and as the mission requires.
- As the Alliance implements its NDPP, it must be cognisant of and work as closely as possible with other international and regional organisations that are also addressing broader defence planning issues. Our goal should be to share information on common issues and to keep our process as open as possible to relevant actors.
- The validity and relevance of each emerging requirement which potentially creates a to be a shortfall must be fully tested against the assumptions that triggered the requirement - so called sensitivity testing. We might also wish to consider whether there would be merit in conducting so called "risk mitigating analysis" on various combinations of requirements.

Capturing the Future Security Environment

The use of Generic Planning Situations (GPS) will help to capture the full capability requirements - both from a mission-based and a functional perspective. Each GPS will have to cover a number of essential elements (missions, strategic end states with related benchmarks/critical milestones, size of operation, distances, austerity, intensity), which will have to be further developed and analysed. All relevant stakeholders from planning domains, NATO commands and other NATO entities should be involved in this. The set GPS is to be kept alive, not developed from scratch every cycle, but reviewed as appropriate, with any changes traceably recorded. As such it could become a kind of reference tool for defence planning activities and available whenever needed (e.g. mid-term or out-of-cycle actions). Planners also need to be aware of ongoing and planned real world changes in the non-military/civil environment.

Capability Hierarchy - Level of Granularity

The development of a "capability hierarchy" is essential for the implementation of a properly structured capability based defence planning process. This highly complex work is ongoing with a view to keeping the number of targets manageable whilst at the same time being able to provide more detailed information to those who want it. This work will be maturing over the whole NDPP transition period.

Capability Codes and Statements

Capability codes and statements will remain indispensable tools for providing nations with additional information on a Capability sought and maintaining the linkage between defence and operations planning.

Multiple Planning Horizon(s)

Suggested subdivision of the continuum of the planning horizons which could/will overlap:

- Shorter Term (0-5 years). What is existing/ available and what should be maintained in national inventories;
- Medium Term (5-15 years). Driving new capabilities;
- Longer Term (0-30 years). Driving R&D.

Strategic Enablers

Consideration should be given to various non-military aspects which are relevant to any expeditionary operation, including the strategic capability to effectively and rapidly negotiate agreements that enable the timely deployment and employment of NATO forces. Any initiatives to improve our practices in this respect should not wait until the results of the upcoming CRR are known. It could be addressed through a dedicated out of cycle capability improvement programme and directly feed into the development of GPS.

Informed by Resources – Consistency and Affordability

An objective of the NDPP is to re-establish the links between the resources community and NATO defence planners. Most planning communities developing requirements or new concepts and policies do not address the resource implications. This does not only lead to a situation where we are unable to judge whether we get the best value for the money that has to be invested, but also an unaffordable wish list. The resource issue is exacerbated by the increasing demands stemming from current operations and missions and related concern that solutions to solve short term requirements are not always validated against the background of medium and longer term defence planning which may result in a situation that the acquired solution is only usable for a specific operation.

The NDPP must provide an opportunity to prioritise competing requirements on the basis of cost indications so that nations can review and take the necessary decisions. If choices have to be made, this should be done in light of defence planning priorities. It should not be left to the resource community to decide on priorities.

Consideration should be given to including affordability assessments within the NDPP analytic tool to allow traceable cost-effectiveness assessments. In this context it is suggested that the requirements identification process should be informed by resource implications without being constrained by the resource aspect. This practice is also applied in many nations.

SESSION 5: DEFINING CAPABILITIES

Background

In preparation of the upcoming requirements identification and target setting phases of the new NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), a series of workshops were held at NATO HQ in the OCT and DEC 2009 timeframe with the aim of developing conceptual proposals to steer the implementation of the new process in a coherent and efficient manner whilst at the same time continuing to improve a capability based approach towards defence planning.

Aim

This food-for-thought paper aims at describing some conceptual parameters which bear the potential to contribute to the creation of a road map within the NDPP implementation related to a Capability Requirements Review. A commonly shared understanding will facilitate harmonisation and synchronisation of effort of all planning domains and stake holders involved and contribute to the iterative development of a final product to be presented to the relevant NATO bodies. Mature conceptual parameters should, inter alia, lead to the agreement of common terminology. Preparing the analytical steps will be responsive to the new Strategic Concept and political guidance.

Capability Based Planning Approach

ACT will continue to incrementally implement a capability based planning process and, to this end, adjust its Capability Requirements Review-process to take full account of the NDPP. This would be done in an evolutionary way not reinventing what NATO already has. There is no common approach to capability based planning.

“Capability” / “Target”

Definition of Capability

“Capability” is the ability to perform action(s) to achieve objective(s) / effect(s). It will most likely consist of a complex combination of Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Material, Personnel, Leadership, Facilities and Interoperability (DOTMLPFI).

Definition of Target

“Target” is an objective for the delivery of the required capabilities for the mitigation of shortfalls, which can be addressed through national, multinational or collective efforts, while respecting the principles of fair burden sharing and reasonable challenge.

Related Aspects

Targets are expressed in capability terms with the adequate level of granularity, including their priority and timelines and the objective(s)/effect(s) to be achieved, and with an indication of different time perspectives at which a capability is expected / planned to be available with a certain status of readiness.

It should be underlined that some requirements for capabilities would have to be expressed in platform terms, even as a requirement for the medium or longer term (e.g. an aircraft carrier), but, conversely, others cannot be expressed in terms of units or platforms but by effects, as results of applying a combination of DOTMLPFI (e.g. within

“stabilisation & reconstruction” for professional skills of key personnel; strategic communications).

“Minimum Capability Requirement (MCR)”

Definition of MCR

The single set of capabilities needed by the Alliance to meet its Level of Ambition and other agreed objectives set out in political guidance.

Related Aspects

The MCR should include all capability requirements, sought to meet the specific demands of the multiple planning horizons aimed at establishing a continuum of consistent capability improvement and development in the shorter, medium and longer term taking into account the ability of nations to adjust their prioritisation in locating resources to new requirements.

MCR should be derived in a holistic manner and with the participation and contribution of all relevant stake holders, from NATO staffs and nations, in order to ensure a synchronised approach to defence planning and capability development efforts.

MCR will not be derived in isolation and should be linked or make reference to capability requirements of current operations, the lessons learnt from operations, exercises and other activities, as well as capability improvement programmes and other efforts for solution development.

The MCR derivation process should not be constrained but informed by resources aspects.

MCR should be expressed in quality and/or quantity and interoperability terms which could be broken down in a suitable “capability hierarchy” which offers an adequate level of granularity. MCR should focus on joint, mission-oriented, and functionally integrated approaches and, for the medium and longer term avoid being too specific in number and platforms. They should, however, indicate envisaged capability development/improvement timelines, and at the same time leaving some flexibility to nations how these requirements will be met.

The MCR should include military and non-military capabilities needed to:

- Achieve the desired end states with related benchmarks/critical milestones in the full spectrum of Alliance missions,
- Accomplish military tasks to be executed in a supporting and/or supported role dependant on the nature of future operations,
- Enable interaction and achieve the necessary interface with diverse non-military actors/communities in order to support/facilitate the execution of the mission in support of a comprehensive approach,
- Perform non-military tasks in the absence of non-military expertise/ capabilities/actors, notably essential tasks related to governance, police and rule of law,
- Render services to military units or to provide the same effect as military capabilities and thus replace military units,
- Enable the delivery of services, in compliance with military/non-military interoperability requirements.

MCR will be derived by all defence planning domains respecting the very nature of their work in support of the NDPP and by drawing on available military and non-military expertise.¹⁷

Due to the variety of non-military capability requirements a balanced approach should be applied in how those requirements can be realistically translated into targets. A prudent way to address such non-military capability requirements may be the description of a function in terms of expertise and knowledge which may be needed in planning for and conducting operations. This in operations has the potential to facilitate the access to available non-military capabilities on a case by case basis and as the mission requires.

As the Alliance implements its NDPP, it must be cognisant of and work as closely as possible with other international and regional organisations that are also addressing broader defence planning issues. Our goal should be to share information on common issues and to keep our process as open as possible to relevant actors.

The value of each emerging requirement for which there is expected to be a shortfall must be fully tested against the assumptions that gave rise to the requirement - so called sensitivity testing. We might also wish to consider whether there would be merit in conducting so called “risk mitigating analysis” on various combinations of requirements.

Capability Codes and Statements

To keep the text of a target as short and punchy as possible and to allow some flexibility in solution development on the requirement, MCR should be expressed, as appropriate, as “capability to ...” and be complemented by Capability Codes and Statements. These statements will remain indispensable tools for providing nations additional information on a Capability sought and maintaining the linkage between defence and operations planning.

This specification applies to all MCR related to the different multiple planning horizons though to a varying degree of detail. The level of detail in targets will need to be adapted to the demands of the various stake holders. It is currently anticipated that targets for the shorter term will be specific as they refer to existing or planned capabilities, targets for the longer term will generally be expressed in broader capability terms indicating objectives and effects to be achieved, and targets for the medium term will include both specific targets (described using capability codes and statements) when referring to existing and/or planned capabilities and more generic targets for capabilities that are not yet planned.

Multiple Planning Horizons

Discussions concluded it may be useful to adapt to the planning horizons as per diagram:

¹⁷ Example: “Initial Stabilisation and Reconstruction” includes the effort to transition to military and non-military “ownership”, through the transfer of specific skills (training, mentoring, and coaching).

Capturing the Future Security Environment – Generic Planning Situations

All efforts dedicated to the future CRR need to be driven by the ambition to be credible, reliable and transparent in describing, to the extent possible, the way of how we envisage that NATO would conduct its operation in the future, and deriving from that description the functions that would have to be performed and a Capabilities needed to support these functions. Unless nations understand the rationale why we would have to operate in a different way they will continue to question why they should transform their forces and capabilities and develop new capabilities. Examples are related to countering hybrid threats or multinational small unit operations as conducted in Afghanistan, hence what needs to change in HQ organisation, how do we get C2 down to the tactical level, how do we sustain forces with logistic support, provide medical support, etc.? The current process of developing concepts followed by supporting concepts and further doctrine working groups is too linear and too time consuming. The requirements for change exist now - not 20 years from now.

Shorter Term

What is existing/ available and what should be maintained in national inventories. 0-5 years.

Medium Term

Driving new capabilities. 5-15 years.

Longer Term

Driving R&D. 0-30 years.

The use of Generic Planning Situations (GPS) is relevant in this context. They will help to capture the full capability requirements - both from a mission based and a functional perspective. It has to be ensured that capabilities requested from nations and NATO can be traced back to a credible foundation. It is important that requirements are not based on fictitious premises.

Planners expect that the Strategic Concept and the subsequent political guidance, in combination with other relevant analytical studies such as Multiple Futures, will provide sufficient parameters for a set of plausible future security and operating environments leading to the development of a limited though sufficient number of GPS.¹⁸ The number of GPS will be kept as low as possible and have ultimately to be sufficient to represent correctly the relevant planning factors and such as, the LoA, intensity, distance, environment, austerity, etc.

¹⁸ The outcome of the discussions on the new NATO Strategic Concept may influence the LoA, mission types and GPS, including the numbers to be considered. Studies are ongoing to reduce the number significantly. A possible mission type (if defined in the new NATO Strategic Concept and derived Political Guidance) “Stabilisation, reconstruction and military assistance to third countries” could cover the following missions: peacekeeping, election monitoring, institution building, security sector reform, and support in fight against terrorism. Another mission type “Conflict Prevention” could cover missions like preventive engagement, preventive deployment, disarmament missions, embargo missions, counter proliferation.

There is a need to ensure that all the details (planning factors) required to conduct a Capability analysis are adequately captured within the GPS and reflect real-world situations. Each GPS will have to cover a number of essential elements (missions, strategic end states with related benchmarks / critical milestones, size of operation, distances, austerity, intensity), which will have to be further developed and analysed.

The set GPS is to be kept alive, not developed from scratch every cycle, but reviewed as appropriate, with any changes traceably recorded. The aim should be to create a baseline which allows for further development of branches (case studies) investigating specific aspects. As such it could become a kind of reference tool for defence planning activities and available whenever needed (e.g. out-of-cycle actions).

The workshops discussed the integration of all Planning Domains into GPS development, recognising that ACO is fully involved already. Despite varying degrees of domain contribution it is concluded that this important phase will call for the set up of a fledged operations core planning structure; this should be able to call upon all relevant expertise (military, i.e. from the HQs, staffs in the NATO Command Structure, Joint Warfare Centre, Centres of Excellence, national capacities, R&T (studies and simulation) and non-military expertise; knowledge development within the context of concept development and experimentation/CD&E). The tools to be used in this part of defence planning should be the same as those are used in

operations planning (TOPFAS based on the new Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive/COPD) while recognising the different scopes of planning.

Even in this early phase of the analysis it is important to capture inputs from all domains, notably those which do not derive requirements but are related to solution development. It is essential that requirements are developed with a sight on possible future solutions keeping the awareness on the future/longer term aspects.

Within this context advice and knowledge from the R&T domain can be explored, including the latest Intelligence assessments concerning R&T developments. The SAS panel (Systems Analysis and Studies) is very much into scenarios and analysis. It produced a disruptive technology assessment game (DTAG) - assess potential disruptive effect of technologies. Through this sharing of expertise and knowledge the active involvement of nations might be foreseen, although some nations more than others use operational research.

The following input is considered to develop a set of plausible future security and operating environments:

- MC-161 series (NATO agreed intelligence documents);
- ACT Future Security Environment (FSE) 2025;
- Multiple Futures Project (MFP) results;
- ACO advance & contingency planning;
- Lessons learnt from operations

- Input from planning domains and nations.¹⁹

Planners also need to be aware of ongoing real world changes in the non-military/civil environment, e.g. Air Traffic Management Arrangements from 2012 onwards with the aim to place any generic in theatre view into a concrete framework in which forces can in the future be deployed to the theatre of operations.

“Capability Hierarchy” / Level of Granularity

The development of a “capability hierarchy” is envisaged to be one of the key instruments in moving towards the implementation of a properly structured capability based defence planning process. This highly complex work is ongoing with a view to keep the number of targets manageable whilst at the same time being able to provide more detailed information to those who request it. A realistic and fair expectation is that this work will be maturing over the whole NDPP transition period.

Such a “Capability Hierarchy” (or Capability Architecture, or Capability Breakdown Structure, or Capability Pyramid) will also help coordinating planning activities across multiple planning domains in a consistent and cohesive manner. The underlying analysis will combine joint- and mission-orientation and functional aspects. This should also allow for the necessary cross checking of all requirements identified by the various experts’ communities.

Several arguments have highlighted the need to avoid to be too system specific and too service specific too early in the process. On the other hand – requirements may be derived which can/must be expressed in specified systems and units allocated as targets – some domains indicated clearly the need for precision and detail.

There is a need to be aware of an essential distinction in planning logic leading to differing perspectives linked to different “Capability Hierarchies”:

- ‘Capability oriented planning’ (the *what* and the *how*) [*this is tasks, effects etc*] and...
- ‘Structural oriented planning’ (the ‘with what’) [this reflects functional areas which can be further broken down into specific platforms, systems etc]

The subject of architectures has to be scrutinised in more depth. Defence planners usually sit on the user’s side representing the user’s view. In some cases the lack of using architecture products stems from the lack of linkages to the business, i.e. conduct of operations in this case. When looking at all views within the Overarching Architecture (OA), there is potential for synergy between what architectures are trying to achieve and the MCR. Progress is being made in this direction.

It is worthy to stress that although requirements may be derived in capability terms and belong to a “Capability Hierarchy” or framework; they should be capable of being expressed in terms of assets to enable short term requirements to be addressed in a

¹⁹ National assessments will provide political, economic and climatic considerations, along with their military implications.

clear unambiguous fashion, thereby preventing the need for nugatory work, constant translation and potential misunderstanding.

It is apparent that numbers must be attached to the shorter term planning horizon, but that more flexibility should be applied to the medium and the longer term.

Strategic Enablers

30. Realistic discussion of minimum capability requirements for some planning domains, notably NATO Logistics, calls for consideration of various non-military aspects which are relevant to any expeditionary operation. These include strategic and operational enablers such as:

- Transit agreements;
- Host nation support agreements;
- Status of visiting forces agreements (SOFAs);
- Status of mission agreements (SOMAs);
- very tactical but essential agreements arising from customs regimes, border controls, and the treatment of very important environmental issues such as inspection of equipment for invasive species, the handling of hazardous materials and/or hazardous waste.

NATO presently lacks the strategic capability to effectively coordinate the process of these many negotiations with the speed of operational planning realities. As an Alliance we need, but presently do not have, a Capability to rapidly negotiate agreements that enable the timely deployment and employment of NATO forces. It is expected that the CRR using GPSs template of which areas should be covered in such arrangements and thus assist in the ability to quickly negotiate such arrangements.

NATO approved AJP 4.5 may serve as an example, a pre-approved Host Nation Support Agreement for exercises. NATO needs more of these pre-approved template agreements for logistic and support agreements and to develop the institutional capability to rapidly negotiate and implement the standards these agreements contain.

Currently we tend not to work out how we are going to cooperate until we all have arrived in theatre. A similar observation is related to the lack of a sufficient number of pre-defined Forward Mounting Bases dedicated to NATO use for any deployment. Results of such deficiencies are improvisation and ad hoc arrangements on the spot.

Any initiatives to improve our practices in this respect should not wait until the results of the upcoming CRR are known. It could be addressed as an out of cycle activity by a dedicated DPST Task Force.

Results stemming from a capability improvement programme reflecting real world geography and arrangements in this area could directly feed into the development of GPS. This interrelationship needs to be scrutinised with the aim of improving strategic/operational effectiveness.

Informed by Resources – Consistency and Affordability

An objective of the NDPP is to re-establish link between the resources community and NATO defence planners. Most planning disciplines developing requirements or new concepts and policies ignore to address the resource implications. This does not only

lead to a situation that we are unable to judge whether we get the best value for the money that has to be invested, but also an unaffordable wish list where other communities have to prioritise as is illustrated by the current balancing resources and requirements initiative.

Resources are no longer automatic- in terms of both money and people. A big problem rests with increasing demands stemming from current operations and missions and related concern that short term requirements are not always addressed against the context of medium and longer term defence planning and that the acquired solution is only usable for a specific operation. This goes along side the observation that a high percentage of funds flow into maintaining capabilities which are operating already.

Interoperability is a key issue, but there is a lack of finances to cover both immediate needs and medium-term requirements and a need to have a link or continuum between current requirements and future capability needs, i.e. to try integrating current architectures with future needs. Current procurements should be usable and interoperable to support current as well as future operations.

New requirements must be compatible with existing programs. However, there is a tendency that common funding, in particular the NSIP funds become the default option for the lack of sufficient capabilities in the theatre of operations.

Lifecycle costs are also identified as an important aspect to be taken into account in solution development and acquisition. The initial investment cost may be very modest compared to huge cost associated with maintaining such a capability. Manning is another important aspect for resources as it is a recurring cost. Hence manpower requirements associated to new acquisitions must be taken into consideration and calculated.

Most planning domains rely on common funding to deliver some key capabilities although the large majority of capabilities are implemented under national funding arrangements. It should be considered, if common funding is the appropriate way in striking the balance between common and national funding. There is a need for a high degree of harmonisation between national and NATO plans. Common funding is but one of the resourcing methods, with national and multinational funding being other methods.

Resource planning has been aligned to a Capability-based planning via the CP process since 1993. CP is not about common funded requirements- it is about providing a capability. Common funding is an integrating force multiplier for capability development.

Resource planning concentrates on NDPP Step 3 and Step 4. But Resources also want to be involved in MCR derivation (Step 2) and in target setting (Step 3).

Consideration should be given to treating the common funded resources community similar to a nation in the target setting process. This would enable the necessary discussions and dialogue on reasonable challenge. There is a need to set up mechanisms to trigger discussions with nations and planners in this area at an early stage. This would allow an analysis whether requirements to be satisfied by common

funds are beyond reasonable challenge due to affordability. This is likely to result in non-apportioned shortfalls, similar to the packages addressed to nations. The challenge is to ensure that the results of dropping requirements from packages will not result in a situation that essential parts of an overall capability will not be delivered and investments in other parts were in vain. Logistics – resources coordination and pre-organisation is important in order to avoid stockpiling capabilities unless there is a need.

The NDPP must expose resources to the challenges; hence nations can review and take the necessary decisions. If choices have to be made, this should be done in light of defence planning priorities. It should not be left to the resource community to decide on priorities.

Consideration should be given to including affordability assessments within the NDPP analytic tool to allow traceable cost-effectiveness assessments. In this context it was suggested to be informed by resource implications without being constrained by the resource aspect. This practice is also applied in many nations.

Prioritisation is repeatedly highlighted as the key element in current funding decisions. For prioritisation of capability requirements, sky is no longer the limit. Both nations and common funding are constrained by affordability. A solid single current priority list would make it much easier for nations to make judgments. It was recognised as being vital that the prioritisation of current Capability Package requirements is coherent with medium term requirements in the Priority Shortfall Areas (PSA). Also, there is agreement in the staffs that all projects within a CP need not have the same priority. Although prioritisation is identified as the key issue, it is recognised as being prone to political pressures.

Harmonisation with Planning Domains

The contributions of three specific planning domains in their diversity are described below in order underline the shift towards the NDPP with major implications, opportunities and challenges, for the future Capability Requirements Review: Research and Technology, Armaments and Air Traffic Management.

Research & Technology

Research & Technology (R&T) is one of the new Planning Domains identified for the NDPP. It will comprise the existing NATO R&T Community, which in itself is a diverse network of NATO bodies, both agencies and committees. As such, it is predominantly resourced by voluntary contributions provided by nations, both in terms of experts and of funding.²⁰

²⁰ The Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) with its three Main Armaments Groups, i.e. the NATO Air Force Armaments Groups (NAFAG), NATO Army Armaments Group (NAAG), and NATO Naval Armaments Group (NNAG), the NATO Industrial Armaments Group (NIAG), the NATO Research & Technology Organisation (RTO), the NATO Consultation, Command & Control Organisation (NC3O) comprising the NC3Agency and the NC3Board with its Subcommittees, NATO Undersea Research Centre (NURC), the NATO Science for Peace and Security Committee (SPSC), the Committee of the Chiefs of Military Medical Services (COMEDS) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT).

As a Planning Domain within the NDPP, R&T intersects with a number of other domains, including Armaments, C3, and Military Medical. Links with further domains (such as Logistics) are foreseen to be established soon. However, despite these interrelations, R&T is not cutting across all domains as Resources or Interoperability do.

R&T in NATO is guided at the policy level by the NAC-approved NATO R&T Strategy. The implementation of this strategy as well as the coordination across the R&T Community is delegated to the Research & Technology Organisation (RTO).

Military guidance is provided through the Long-Term Capability Requirements (LTCRs) and the long-term aspects of the Priority Shortfall Areas (PSAs). LTCRs are described in broad, capability terms, which need to be translated into science and technology goals – this translation is identified as a key challenge. The R&T Community have developed an approach to apportion these requirements across the existing committee structure, and have gained excellent insight into issues around performing the translation as well. This experience can be fed into NDPP implementation.

The NAC tasked the RTO to identify ways to further improve the coordination across the R&T Community, specifically addressing the agencies involved in R&T. This R&T Coordination Study, which actually reinforces the mandate of the R&T Strategy, will deliver its final report on options for improved coordination in October 2010.

The RTO launched an initiative to systematically derive R&T Priorities from a comprehensive reference framework, which will include three complementary, mutually reinforcing drivers for R&T:

- military needs (e.g. the LTCRs and PSAs);
- global challenges (such as resource scarcity);
- Technology opportunities (e.g. disruptive effects of technologies).

This approach is developed and implemented in close coordination with the stake holders within the NATO R&T Community.

The implementation of the NDPP, the R&T Coordination Study, and the derivation of R&T Priorities all coincide, addressing complementary aspects of intensifying the R&T collaboration across the Alliance and the timely exploitation of its results.

Traditionally, R&T addresses the long-term planning horizon, focusing on preparing and shaping the future, avoiding risk, and minimising regret. While this is still true, the R&T Community as a knowledge network can make vital contributions in the medium- and even shorter term as well.

Accelerating the exploitation of R&T, i.e. integrating the resulting knowledge into solutions at the earliest possible stage, can be achieved not by doing research work faster, but by applying results stemming from previous work to new situations and questions.

Over the years, the scope of R&T has become significantly broader than the conventional hardware technologies. It clearly comprises information technologies as

well as medical research, and is increasingly including soft sciences such as psychology, sociology, and anthropology as well.

In general, the R&T Community is a knowledge network that can provide advice at any stage of capability development, across all steps of the NDPP. This network spans the entire range of defence and security science and technology required to support capability development for the full spectrum of Alliance missions.

In specific, the R&T Community can offer its analytical methodologies and rigor, which can be of value in requirements derivation (NDPP Step 2) and setting targets (NDPP Step 3).

The Long-Term Scientific Study on Joint Operations 20305 (JO2030) broadly addressed the question of how progress in science and technology might impact joint military operations on the 2030 horizon.²¹ This study was executed in close coordination with ACT's Long-Term Requirement Study (LTRS), which delivered the current set of LTCRs. In that sense, both studies addressed opposite sides of the same coin, i.e. the same horizon. While the LTCRs looked at the military needs, JO2030 addressed the threats and opportunities arising from emerging technologies. The results of JO2030 will help to inform future science and technology programmes with the effect that risks are minimised while opportunities are exploited to the maximum possible extent.

The Disruptive Technology Assessment Game6 (DTAG) more specifically looks at individual technologies and their potential to "change the game".²² This methodology uses a mission oriented approach (scenario) in a table top exercise, and provides a red and a blue team with a set of means (e.g. technologies or systems). Re-playing the same scenario with the same teams, but different means, provides insight into the impact that specific means have on mission effectiveness. The benefit of this approach relates to the fact that technologies or systems do not have to physically exist, nor do they need to be mature. Rather, they can be tested for their effectiveness and game change potential already at basic maturity levels. This methodology could be applied during the development of generic planning situations as well.

The R&T Community might provide analytical support to Concept Development & Experimentation (CD&E), both in terms of general competence and of specific methodology.

The R&T Community largely is a network of national subject matter experts. As such, its expertise is not instantaneously available at any given time. However, small groups of experts may be gathered at comparatively short notice in order to address specific tasks or requests, providing experts advice within limited time.

ACT's Multiple Futures Project (MFP) looked into plausible futures we might face in 2030, intending to stimulate thinking about our ways of preparing for the future. In this project, "The Use of Technology" was identified as one out of seven drivers for change. Though this statement is not at all concrete about which technologies might be relevant,

²¹ RTO, Systems Analysis & Studies Panel (SAS), reference SAS-066, details at <http://www.rto.nato.int>

²² RTO, SAS, reference SAS-082, details at <http://www.rto.nato.int>

it clearly points at how a society's further development is influenced by its approach towards technology: Are new technologies considered risky, or are they embraced as opportunities? Can a society afford all relevant new technologies, or are there constraints? It is in this context, that the potential impact of R&T should be analysed.

The R&T Community specifically addresses disruptive effects of technologies. Though technologies are not disruptive per se, they may well be used in creative and unforeseen ways to produce disruption. This is true for both, already existing as well as emerging technologies. This impact analysis for technologies is one of the key contributions the R&T Community can offer to defence planning, specifically to Step 2 of the NDPP: advising on which technologies are likely to have the greatest impact, in terms of both threats and opportunities. This approach is included in the derivation of R&T Priorities.

In general, the R&T Community is a broad knowledge network of subject matter experts, covering a broad range of defence and security science and technology disciplines, reaching out across all Alliance nations, and involving Partners where ever possible. It represents a source of creative, innovative, and unconstrained forward thinking, and it is determined to mitigate risks and avoid that the Alliance is taken by surprise.

Armaments

Armaments have been building a Capability Based approach to work through implementation of a capability based culture, and educating personnel on this. Lesson learnt was for the need to be careful how quickly change is implemented – vital success criteria are to bring the Nations along.

There is considerable discussion on the nature of multi-national targets for nations, and recognition that further co-ordination with CNAD is required here. A key decision is whether these targets-should be similar to old Force Goals, or rather more of a recommendation to nations or to responsible committees.

A single prioritised list of requirements was identified as the a element of successful integration. The most important criteria for this list is that it needs to be supported by nations. Armaments require PSAs that are clearly formulated, and supported by nations. A structured common capability hierarchy would be a useful facilitator for this. Very helpful for the CNAD groups to have this visibility. Robust documentation is identified as key to managing staff rotation and ensuring traceability.

There is the need to show solid Operational Analysis to provide rigour to assessments. Relying on military judgement alone will not give the objectivity and traceability required to be accepted by nations. Scenarios should cover longer term aspects; there is a need to show the links between requirements and targets. The planning horizon is an important aspect. While recognising that some short term quick wins could be made if solutions were available, acquisition horizons should be taken into account to provide opportunities for multinational cooperation or to develop solutions through R&T. This is no longer Force Planning - may be a place for targets to NATO groups and committees.

The main role of Armaments/CNAD in NDPP Step 2 should be to provide reality / sanity checks on Armaments assumptions in various timeframes, along with advice on R&T and industrial aspects.

The vital component of integration is identified as dialogue. Integration should be through tailored requests for information that Armaments can provide, and the involvement at key milestones in the process. ACT should be strongly represented in all CNAD groups.

Awareness of the solution side must be brought to planners in NDPP Step 2 ensuring a realistic indication of potential future solutions. It is important that those stake holders addressing the solutions are able to indicate the status on solution development and inform those who are involved in the requirements derivation.

Air Traffic Management

The priority given to both interoperability and the incorporation of military and non-military capabilities aligns directly with on-going ATM initiatives.

It is important to understand the nature of ATM. ATM cannot be labelled as either a military or civilian responsibility. Rather, ATM is a capability requirement that can be provided by either military or civilian organisations.

ATM is both an on-going, peacetime necessity and a important component of NATO operations. Even within the peacetime requirement, military mission needs are essential inputs to enable activities such as training and air policing. The majority of NATO assets in Europe are all located in the Core European Area, which is the most congested airspace in the world. It is thus vital that the NDPP reflects this demanding peacetime requirement. The GPS set must be constructed to include ATM peacetime operation.

The NATO Air Traffic Management Committee has already considered the impact of the NDPP, and reviewed proposals for key interaction points. Furthermore, within the ATM domain, important work has been conducted to draft important NDPP products, specifically:

- Formulation of proposed ATM capability hierarchy;
- Consideration of levels of granularity for target setting.

Responsibility for ATM is split between NATO, international organisations such as the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and nations. NATO is operating ATM directly, as if it was a nation, in Afghanistan.

The international community is evolving towards a common civil and military approach to ATM. Civil administration uses airways and segregated areas that are activated to allow specific military operations. In the future, it is anticipated that employment of airways will be discontinued and use of segregated areas minimised. Military and civil users will be required to operate within the same airspace, and the number of waivers reduced as much as possible. The NDPP needs to reflect these developments, and

effort is required to review and update Capability Codes and Statements and to ensure emerging requirements are captured.

SESSION 5: DEFINING CAPABILITIES, STATUS AND THE WAY AHEAD FOR PRIORITY SHORTFALL AREAS

Background

Bi-SC PSA 2009 provides the Alliance with a single compilation of capability shortfalls, identifying those the SCs recommend as offering the greatest potential to improve Alliance mission effectiveness and interoperability in the near, mid and long terms. These collective capability shortfalls are derived from DRR 2007 and other sources across the Alliance.

Key Points

CURRENT STATUS OF PSA (Bi-SC PSA 2009):

- The outcome of Bi-SC PSA work was briefed to MC/PS and EWG(R) in March-April 2009.
- Bi-SC PSA 2009 was signed by the SCs on 29 May 2009.
- Classified version has been distributed widely to NATO committees, bodies and Nations.
- PSA declassified in October 2009, in order to distribute it to wider audience, such as partners and defence industries.

THE USE OF PSA IN TRANSITION CYCLE OF NDPP: The role of PSA in the transition period for NDPP has been clearly defined in Implementation and Transition Plan for NDPP, approved by the nations.

Para 10 of the Plan states: "...“Facilitate Implementation”-function will be implemented from autumn 2009 onwards. A first selection by the EWG(R) of specific capability development efforts to be supported through this function, will be based on persistent shortfalls set out in the General Report 2009 and the MC Suitability and Risk Assessment and informed by the 2009 Bi-SC Priority Shortfall Areas. Proposals will be developed by the Defence Planning Staff Team (DPST), coordinated through the Internal Coordination Mechanism, and be forwarded to the EWG(R) in Autumn 2009.”

Based on this, four capability areas have been identified to be used in the transition cycle: Counter Improvised Explosive Devices, Military Medical, Network Enabled Capability and Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.

PROPOSED PROCESS FOR PSA IN “STEADY-STATE” NDPP (as the last, 6th Phase of Step 2): After the comparison of MCR against available capabilities, including national, multinational and NATO-owned, following steps are proposed:

- Shortfalls will be aggregated in capability terms within a capability hierarchy.
- A Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) will be employed by a Bi-SC senior-level group to prioritise shortfall areas with observers from IS, IMS, planning domains and nations.
- PSA will feed into Step 3 – Target Setting.

Bi-SC PSA is important reference document to be used in Step 4 of NDPP. PSA provides the context and necessary details of capability shortfalls. It is essential that NATO and national alleviate capability shortfalls by harmonisation to avoid duplication and enable interoperability.

PSA is a key product of Step 2 of NDPP in the future.

ANNEX B: ABBREVIATION AND ACRONYM LIST

A

ABP – Afghan Border Police

ACO – Allied Command Operations

ACT – Allied Command Transformation

ADL – Advanced Distributed Learning

AJP – Allied Joint Publication

ANA – Afghan National Army

ANP – Afghan National Policy

ANSF – Afghan National Security Forces

ASCOPE – Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organisations, People and Events

B

Bi-SC – Bi-Strategic Command

C

C2 – Command and Control

C4I – Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence

CA – Comprehensive Approach

CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear

CC – Contact Country

CD – Concept Development

CD&E – Concept, Development & Experimentation

CE – Crisis Establishment

CHOD – Chief of Defence

C-IED – Counter-Improvised Explosive Device

CIMIC – Civil-Military Cooperation

CIVAD – Civilian Advisor

CJSOR – Combined Joint Statement of Requirements

CMC – Chairman of the NATO Military Committee

CMO – Civil-Military Operation

CMX – Crisis Management Exercise

COE – Centre of Excellence

COIN -- Counterinsurgency

COMISAF – Commander, International Security Assistance Force

COTC – Chiefs of Transformation Conference

CSTC-A – Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan

D

DAT – Defence against Terrorism

DCOS-T – Deputy Chief of Staff for Transformation

DJSE – Deployable Joint Support Element

DOTMLPFI – Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Interoperability

DPP – Defence Planning Process

DRR – Defence Requirements Review

E

EBAO – Effect-Based Approach to Operations

EBO – Effect-Based Operations

E&IT – Education and Individual Training

EWG – Executive Working Group

EWG(R) – Executive Working Group (Reinforced)

G

GO – Governmental Organisation

H

HLCR – High-Level Capability Requirement

HQ SACT – Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Transformation

I

IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency

ICI – Istanbul Cooperation Initiative

IO – International Organisation or Information Operations

IMS – International Military Staff

ISAF – International Security Assistance Force

L

LL – Lessons Learned

M

MAT – Mobile Advisory Team

MC – Military Committee

MCR – Minimum Capability Requirement

MD – Mediterranean Dialogue

MFP – Multiple Futures Project

MoD – Ministry of Defence

MNE – Multinational Experiment

N

NAC – North Atlantic Council

NATO SECGEN – NATO Secretary General

NCCAT – NATO Contribution to Countering Asymmetric Threats

NCS – NATO Command Structure

NDPP – NATO Defence Planning Process

NEC – Network-Enabled Capability

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation

NMC – Non-Military Capability

NTM-A – NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan

NRF – NATO Response Force

NSA – Non-State Actors

O

OMLT – Operational Mentoring Liaison Team

OGO – Other Governmental Organisation

P

PA – Public Affairs

PE – Peacetime Establishment

PfP – Partnership for Peace

PMC – Private Military Company

PRT – Provincial Reconstruction Team

PSA – Priority Shortfall Area

R

ROE – Rules of Engagement

S

SACEUR – Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SACT – Supreme Allied Commander Transformation

SCD – Senior Concept Developers

SHAPE – Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe

SME – Subject Matter Expert

S&R – Stabilisation and Reconstruction

STANAG – Standardised Agreement

STAR-TIDES – Sustainable Technologies, Accelerated Research – Transformative Innovation for Development and Emergency Support

StratCom – Strategic Communications

T

TBM – Theatre Ballistic Missile

TF – Task Force

TNCC – Transformation Network Coordination Cell

U

UN – United Nations

UK – United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

W

WMD/E – Weapons of Mass Destruction / Effect

ANNEX C: BEST QUOTES

“It’s hard to provide a strategic message without a strategy.”

“We should attack this problem like a mound of ants.”

“You need a new concept only if your current doctrine doesn’t adequately address the problem.”



“I have many frustrations in NATO. Let’s call it scar tissue. One of them is that we approach things in a linear fashion...In 134 years we’ll have a useful product.”

“One of the paralyzing aspects of NATO is that we think we need consensus [on everything]. But, best military advice doesn’t need consensus. One of the best tools we have is the ‘non-paper’.”

“I’m not commenting on the carbon dioxide that was made to bring us here.”

“It really is a good help to NATO if the nations are not stopping an idea.”

“The group was not totally quiet, but there were low voices.”

“The first one to the chalkboard wins!” [On Strategic Communications.]

“You cannot sprinkle Strategic Communications on a base plan.”

“What about parking a battleship in somebody’s back yard as a form of Strategic Communications?”

“I must say, there was a high level of enthusiasm. I say that because at 5 o’clock, nobody wanted to go.”

“While we all know what we want to do; we don’t do a good job of explaining it to the nations.”

“There’s nothing wrong with developing doctrine, as long as the doctrine outlives its writer.”

“We’re all married, which means we’re doing PsyOps every day when we come back home.”

“I can’t claim that we’ve solved world hunger or global warming, but we did have useful discussions...”

“I must say that I felt very embarrassed this morning when our chairman asked us, ‘So what?’ and nobody was able to raise his hand.”

“The finish line of one transformation is the starting point of the next one.”