# 2009 Concept Development and Experimentation Conference Report

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The ninth annual multinational Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) conference cosponsored by Headquarters Supreme Allied Command Transformation (HQ SACT) and United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Joint Concept Development and Experimentation (JCD&E), and hosted by the Italian Defence General Staff concluded after four days on 19 November 2009. Thirty nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were represented by more than 260 participants. Representatives from the Republic of Korea and Armenia participated for the first time.

The conference focus has changed over the years from information push to product focused. The conference structure has been adapted as well to better support generating tangible outcomes. In this respect, this was far and away the most focused and productive of the nine CD&E conferences conducted to date. Unlike past years, the majority of the conference was spent in four workshops, which included a solid mix of subject matter and CD&E experts. Extensive preparation was conducted for each workshop and the problem statements, outcomes and objectives were well defined. For the first time in the conference's history, topic specific read-ahead materials were sent to all participants in advance of each workshop's execution and this contributed to their success.

Another first during the conference was cosponsor and host nation senior leader interaction with the workshops in the form of an In Progress Review. Midway through each workshop, the senior leaders analyzed the workshop's progress and provided guidance as necessary. Throughout the three days of workshops, both senior and workshop leaders noted the impact the other workshops had on each other e.g., the use of Strategic Communications in Deterring Non-State Actors. Although some cross-pollination between workshops transpired, more was desired. Conference planners will need to design future conferences to create greater interaction among sessions.

Also noted were the strong similarities and interaction between the workshops and ongoing work in Multinational Experiment (MNE) 6. Not only did the CD&E conference benefit from the work already done in MNE 6, but also the results of the CD&E conference are being applied to upcoming MNE 6 work.

This transition of products does not stop with MNE 6. Each workshop has identified transition partners who will receive the final product(s) for use in concept, doctrine and policy development. These partners are identified in the following summary of the workshop insights, recommendations and way ahead and in the individual workshop reports that follow.

## ***Conference Workshop Summaries***

### ***Countering Hybrid Threats (CHT)***

Insights:

- CHT as a Capstone Concept has links to many other concepts being developed in nations and NATO, e.g. Distributed Operations and Strategic Communications.
- Development of a NATO CHT concept should progress in parallel with ongoing national efforts.
- The proposed hybrid threat definition and description was generally accepted by participants.
- There is a need to do a true mission analysis before specific gaps can be identified in Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, Interoperability (DOTMLPFI).
- Be careful how the Battle of the Narrative/Perception is used, some nations will view this as propaganda.
- Key to success is to engage the problem early, before it becomes a force on force military confrontation.
- More emphasis is needed on a non-sequential solution that directly relates to the environment and the specific threat posed.

Recommendations:

- Further develop the conceptual model of Hybrid Threats (HT) and strengthen the description of the challenges it brings nations and NATO.
- After developing a clear conceptual model, develop requirements and a problem statement to address other concept areas.
- Use more of the basic elements in Allied Joint Publication 3.4.4 (counterinsurgency operations) for CHT concept development.
- Determine if this should be a NATO Capstone Concept.
- NATO should determine if the framework is drafted at too high a level.
- NATO should reconsider elements other than population as the Centre of Gravity.
- Elements of the framework must interface with elements of the Comprehensive Approach.

Way Ahead:

- Test the validity of the CHT concept in Joint Distributed Operations and Joint Irregular Warfare 10 in 2010.
- ACT leadership and staff elements must endorse the CHT concept at every possible opportunity (continuous).
- National centers of transformation must be engaged. Initial contact was made at the Chiefs of Transformation Conference on 14-16 December 2009 and follow up contact will be sought.
- The Military Committee Working Group was briefed in December 2009 and we will maintain close coordination with the Military Committee.

- The CHT IPT will continue close coordination with the Allied Command Transformation National Liaison Representatives and request their socialization efforts with their respective nations (continuous).
- Increased emphasis will be placed on coordination with the Allied Command Operations (ACO) staff (continuous).
- Emphasis will be placed on a series of experiments to test the concept before publication of the draft in July 2010.
- Efforts will continue to integrate the CHT concept into the NATO Defence Planning cycle.

***Deterring Non-State Actors (DNSA)***

Insights:

- Ensure that deterrence operations strategy supports a broader and comprehensive strategy.
- The Narrative and Counter Narrative are critical components in deterrence planning.
- Non-State Actors can be deterred, but doing so requires tailored frameworks for understanding their nature, methods and composition.
- Participants agreed that the Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (DO JOC) framework was valid and useful.
- The conflict prevention nature of deterrence is unifying, specifically when focus is on capabilities to influence vice capabilities to impose costs.
- By the end of the conference, most participants concluded that non-state actors (NSAs) can be deterred.
- The key to effective deterrence is a robust understanding of the adversary and a mechanism for planning and conducting whole-of-government operations to achieve the deterrence objectives.
- Deterrence is not guaranteed and planners must hedge for deterrence failure.
- Preconceived notions of what constitutes "fear of consequence" must be overcome to apply all elements of power to deterrence challenges.

Recommendations:

- The military, as an extension of the political arm, must be better integrated with national efforts; for deterrence, United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) plans offer a solid link for whole-of-government unity of effort.
- The DO JOC rewrite must address:
  - Long-term deterrence ideas specific to NSAs and rogue actors.
  - The NSA problem - where state actors and NSA's cross/mix during Hybrid Threat scenarios.
  - An appendix specific to explaining the strategic profile concept.
  - More on motivations for adversary actions (perhaps a 4$^{th}$ factor to $X$ $Y$ $Z$ formula: deter actor $X$ from doing $Y$ under conditions $Z$ and add "why is $X$ doing $Y$."
- NATO ACT should consider a DO Concept and evaluate the need for a NATO Deterrence Center of Excellence or Knowledge Center. This reinforces the idea that the

Alliance projects strength and unity, especially for situational understanding, and is critical to dealing with NSAs.
- For future experimentation efforts, use the DO JOC framework (analysis, planning, operations, and assessments) when dealing with state actors and NSA scenarios to determine common linkages.

Way Ahead: Application of Deterrence Operations concepts and capabilities toward non-state actors will be incorporated into the next revision of the United States DOD's DO JOC. The document will be available to interested national organizations who are working deterrence issues. The current version is available at:
www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/do_joc_v20.doc
The update to this document is currently in work and expected to be released in Fall 2010.

***Security Force Assistance (SFA)***

Insights:
- SFA is not solely a military activity.
- SFA contributes to a broader Security Sector Reform.
- Ideally, SFA activities are part of an overarching comprehensive approach strategy across security, governance and development sectors.
- There are fundamental differences between training defense, police and para-military forces.
- Train the security force you need to address the security situation while keeping in mind that the threat will change over time.
- The quality of donor nation SFA forces matters and this translates directly to the credibility of the effort as perceived by the recipient nation.
- SFA training is short-term, education is long-term, and they are not sequential. When conducted in parallel they provide the greatest potential for success.

Recommendations: Incorporate planning framework developed during the conference and insights into ongoing policy and doctrine development efforts.
- SFA training must be comprehensive (language ability, ability to mentor and unique skill sets training).
- Individuals serving in advisor roles must have experience and rank commensurate with their assigned mentor role, and they must be assigned for a sufficient duration to have the desired impact.

Way Ahead:
- The USJFCOM JCD&E Directorate will revise the SFA Planning Framework and provide it to workshop participants for incorporation into appropriate documentation. (The draft framework was provided to conference attendees, requesting comments by 10 Mar 10, framework; the US Fiscal Year 11 Warfighter Challenges include #21 from US Special Operations Command (SOCOM), which asks for SFA experimentation. It may

become a portion of Multinational Experiment 7 or possibly a stand-alone JFCOM J9 project. This evaluation will continue throughout 2010).

- USJFCOM JCD&E will also provide findings and recommendations in a summary to all participants (on going).
- Transition products to US and NATO organizations currently developing SFA policy and doctrine.
    - Draft report provided to the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) and SOCOM (completed), JCISFA incorporated the results (recommendations and learning they did during the conference) into the SFA handbook -- already published and SOCOM is using the results in ongoing work as the US Department of Defense lead for SFA.
    - The draft has been submitted to NATO of the report but they are awaiting the final. They begin their SFA concept work in 2010.

***Strategic Communications (StratCom)***

Insights:

- Words and deeds equal credibility referred to as the "say-do" gap.
- Use of an "orchestra" metaphor - the selection, timing and emphasis of StratCom instruments helps orchestrate the message to stakeholders consistent with a desired effect of the commander's intent. The Conductor must continuously adapt the music score base on the stakeholder feedback.
- The information environment has to be thoroughly and continuously assessed, which involves active engagement and listening of local actors' needs and views.
- Leadership must coordinate and assure consistency of messages, senior leaders must be aware of the importance of the information dimension, and assume direct responsibility.
- Communication objectives have to be constantly integrated and coordinated with operational plans, of which they are a fundamental enabler and, possibly, driver.

Recommendations:

- Adopt an agreed to working definition - general common understanding with appreciation of different points of view (national, NATO and experimentation).
- Create an acknowledged list of common elements and solutions.
- Identify a comprehensive list of "Best Practices."
- Consider an Alliance policy as a possible model/synchronizing bridge between political and military actors.
- Coalitions should develop a corporate identity, and a Master Narrative to explain their aims and *raison d'être*.
- A senior and experienced communicator should be in the lead for StratCom; this figure would authoritatively stand up with the chain of command to make sure that communication considerations are taken into account, and would coordinate all efforts like an orchestra maestro.
- For consistency, have the same troops deployed to the same place after rotation.

- While developing a proactive communication strategy, some attention should be dedicated to analyzing and countering the enemy's propaganda, both in theatre and within nations.
- Member states' populations should be protected against deliberate negative information activities, in order to preserve the coalition's cohesion and solidarity.
- Develop metrics for communication activities.
- All communication tools should be employed. This includes traditional and new/social media, but also non-media products such as social events, games, etc. A premium is put on products of high visual impact.
- All personnel deployed in communication posts should receive adequate training in the basic disciplines (PD, PA, InfoOps, PsyOps), whereas senior leadership should receive general StratCom training to make sure they understand the importance of integrating communication activities at all stages of the operation and throughout the chain of command.
- Strategic Communications must be properly resourced.

Way Ahead:

- The draft NATO Concept on Strategic Communications was submitted to Director, International Military Staff in January 2010. The Concept incorporated the findings and observations of the CD&E Conference workshop. The Concept was been distributed to the NATO Nations for comment and responses were received from a number of Nations, the NATO Public Diplomacy Division and the International Military Staff. The Concept is being revised in preparation for distribution of an updated version to the Nations, expected in late March 2010. Concept approval and development of a Capability Implementation Plan is project for 3rd Qtr 2010.
- The ACT StratCom Working Group will increase its involvement with the MNE 6 during the remaining part of the experiment (ongoing through 2012). The DEU MNE 6 representative made experimentation documentation available to the ACT StratCom Working Group for review.
- MNE 6 members will consider the workshop outcomes and ongoing NATO initiatives in the experiment, as they deem appropriate.
- National representatives will consider workshop outcomes in their national policy and ongoing capability development efforts.
- ACT will consider a follow-on workshop on StratCom tools (to be planned for 2010). This follow up workshop has not been scheduled pending clarification of the 2010 ACT Budget.

# COUNTERING HYBRID THREATS

Workshop Overview: Allied Command Transformation (ACT) led the planning and execution of the Countering Hybrid Threats (CHT) workshop as part of the 2009 Concept Development & Experimentation (CD&E) Conference. The participants of the CHT workshop included 87 attendees from 26 nations including two Flag and/or General Officers. This workshop focused on refining their conceptual model, rescoping the CHT concept and how it relates to the Comprehensive Approach (CA) and conducting further research on the CHT framework.

Problem Statement: A key future security challenge identified in the Multiple Futures Project (MFP) will be the Alliance's ability to face hybrid threats where determined adversaries use conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal elements in mixed modes of operations. Nations need to understand the hybrid threat environment, and define a coherent military strategy and identify the capabilities to counter it.

Key Objectives:

- Refine and expand challenges of Hybrid Threats (HT).
- Begin risk evaluation.
- Identify capabilities required.
- Identify policy and strategy implications.

Key outcomes:

- Improved understanding of HT.
- Understanding of CHT Framework.
- Move towards agreement of terms and definition.
- Expand knowledge of capability gaps.

***Scene Setter***

As an introduction to this subject, conference attendees learned of the genesis of this concept development requirement, the status of its development, key outcomes expected from the workshop, and linkages with the other three workshops. One of the focus areas of the Multiple Futures Project identified adapting to the demands of hybrid threats. The conceptual and doctrinal framework gap analysis (phase 1, Feb-May 09) led to the Bi-Strategic Commanders (Bi-SC) recommendation and an International Military Staff tasking (Jul 09) for this concept. Key outcomes from this workshop will be used to inform this product. With subject matter experts participating in the workshop, an improved understanding of the hybrid threat and a conceptual model of hybrid threats can be initiated. Additionally, limitations of current policy, strategic and operational framework and capability gaps can be identified. Countering Hybrid Threats will be a Capstone Concept.

***Baseline Assessment***

A panel of experts presented a more in depth background of CHT; and Dr. Glenn presented "Thoughts on Hybrid Conflicts." In Dr. Glenn's presentation, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ACT working definition "Hybrid Threats result from a simultaneous orchestration of conventional and/or non-conventional methods and activities employed by an opponent or a number of opponents that may include the use of military force," was highlighted. Discussion points with findings, insights and recommendations were:

- Reconsider the use of the words "simultaneous" and "orchestration" in the definition.
- The Spectrum of Conflict contains non-military actions such as economic and political actions.
- Is there a need to address "state actors" in the definition? Alliance concepts, doctrine and capabilities are in place and adequately address state actors. The concept should be a blend of both actors and address the grey area of surrogates. Do not go full right or left, but achieve the middle ground.
- The combination of definition and description must foster the development of a new mind set within the Alliance.
- Establishing boundaries to limit countering a hybrid threat is not possible and violates the basic idea of a comprehensive approach.

In general, the definition and description presented were favorably received, and the definition was viewed as broad and open enough to contain expectations of a hybrid threat.

***Gap Analysis***

A panel and two guest speakers presented their analysis of gaps in the current NATO approach to Hybrid Threats. Discussion points with findings, insights and recommendations were:

- Be mindful of the legal ramifications as the concept develops.
- Use more of the basic elements in Allied Joint Publication 3.4.4 (counterinsurgency operations) for CHT concept development.
- There is a need to do a true mission analysis before specific gaps can be identified in Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, Interoperability (DOTMLPFI). The concept could benefit from in depth research of historical data.
- Determine if this should be a NATO Capstone Concept. The environment as described is clear; and the idea of engaging early is key to its success. Ensure that the concept addresses all domains.
- Be careful how the Battle of the Narrative/Perception is used, some nations will view this as propaganda.

There was some acceptance of the identified challenges, but it raises the question on how these were derived without a mission analysis.

***Solution Development***

A possible solution was briefed using the framework and areas of impact listed below.

FRAMEWORK ELEMENTS

- I – Build
  - Political Intent
  - Military Contribution
- II – Deter
- III – Engage
- IV – Stabilize

AREAS OF IMPACT

- Command
- Education and Training
- Communication
- Intelligence and Information
- Flexibility and Interoperability
- Protection and Consequence Management
- Network Systems
- (Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) / Weapons of Mass Effect (WME))

Discussion points with findings, insights and recommendations were:

- NATO should determine if the framework is drafted at too high a level.
- NATO should reconsider elements other than population as the Centre of Gravity.
- The framework is missing a discussion of how the different elements address the environment previously presented.
- Elements of the framework must interface with elements of the CA. These two concepts must complement each other. The framework must directly address the challenges presented.
- Key to success is to engage the problem early, before it becomes a force on force military confrontation.

The general view was that framework did not adequately relate to the challenges. More emphasis is needed on a non-sequential solution that directly relates to the environment and the specific threat posed.

Impact Areas

Command

- Commander's Intent is critical in decentralized operations.
- Look at command culture versus command structure.
- In an insurgency, the military is only 20% of the solution and other agencies are the remaining 80%. The concept must take a holistic approach and address the 80%. "Not the military's job," needs to be relooked to determine the roles and responsibilities. The concept must address one layer up for an overarching command and control.
- Unity of command is impossible; unity of effort is the answer. Again, CA is a possible solution. Some Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have civilian directors. Look at

NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (forward) work and the STEADFAST series.

- For many of the solutions there is no command impact, they require Alliance policy changes.
- There is conflict between national and NATO guidance; look at work Canada did in this area for a possible way ahead.

Education and Training

- MNE 6 can inform us in this area.
- Nations are not submitting input to Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC). The Alliance needs a quicker and more responsive lessons learned process.
- A need exists for all nations to train for this environment; a core requirement for officers and NCOs is agility. Training and education is needed from the top down.
- A standardization agreement (STANAG) is needed.
- There needs to be a better balance between Special Operations Forces (SOF) and General Purpose Forces (GPF) skills; it is not a matter of force generation or increasing the number of specific type units.

Communication

- More attention needs to be paid to cyber and space operations. An Alliance concept is needed.
- The opinions were split on using the term "influence opinion." We do not want to cross over into propaganda.
- NATO has the technical ability to do this, but is lacking the will and policy.
- Command and staff do not know how to use Psychological Operations (PsyOps). Subject matter experts need to be involved in the decision making process.
- Population is not a homogeneous element--one message will not fit all groups.

Intelligence and information

- Many answers can be found in the Maritime Situational Awareness Concept.
- A Knowledge Development Center could provide solutions.
- Sharing analysis is more important than sharing intelligence. Sharing must include non-military organizations.
- We need to rethink what type of intelligence needs to be gathered.

Flexibility and Interoperability

- The HT concept must clearly define the military role. How far do we go? There is little doubt the military must expand its role.
- There needs to be a better balance between SOF skills/capabilities and GPF (see Education & Training).
    - The issue of force design was discussed. Distributed operations are a key element of success in HT environment.

- The idea of “bridging capabilities” to civilian organizations is good and it is needed.
- There is a need to push enablers down to the lowest level possible.
- There was general agreement that flexibility is a key element of successful CHT operations and this is more of a force structure issue. National concerns will always come first.

Protection and Consequence Management

- We need forensic capability for counter improvised explosive devices and cyber.
- Homeland defense will play a factor in this area.
- Requirement for coordination with civilian agencies is critical. Reemphasized the point of using a “bridging” approach to capabilities.

Network Systems

- The problem statement used is too technically oriented; the real problem is cooperation between nations. We have the technical capability; we need to resolve the legal framework.
- We need to develop STANAGs for storing and protecting data.
- Rogue states are the greatest challenge.

***Summary***

- The CHT Integrated Project Team (IPT) will re-evaluate the scope of the concept and how it relates to CA.
    - The framework must relate directly to hybrid threats and the key challenges posed by this threat.
- We must align the CHT framework with CA and other emerging concepts. Areas that require immediate attention are Strategic Communications; Countering Non-State Actors and Security Force Assistance.
- The CHT problem is shared by only a few nations. The basic requirement to accept a cultural and mindset change is lacking in many Alliance nations. For progress to be made in solving the HT challenge, support must be gained and developed at the mid to senior officer level.
- The initial Bi-SC input will benefit from the socialization done during the Vienna workshop and this CD&E Conference.

***Way Ahead***

- Test the validity of the CHT concept in Joint Distributed Operations and Joint Irregular Warfare 10 in 2010.
- ACT leadership and staff elements must endorse the CHT concept at every possible opportunity (continuous).
- National centers of transformation must be engaged. Initial contact was made at the Chiefs of Transformation Conference on 14-16 December 2009 and follow up contact will be sought.

- The Military Committee Working Group was briefed in December 2009 and we will maintain close coordination with the Military Committee.
- The CHT IPT will continue close coordination with the Allied Command Transformation National Liaison Representatives and request their socialization efforts with their respective nations (continuous).
- Increased emphasis will be placed on coordination with the Allied Command Operations (ACO) staff (continuous).
- Emphasis will be placed on a series of experiments to test the concept before publication of the draft in July 2010.
- Efforts will continue to integrate the CHT concept into the NATO Defence Planning cycle.

## DETERRING NON-STATE ACTORS

Workshop Overview: USJFCOM JCD&E, assisted by United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) J55, led the planning and execution of the Deterring Non-State Actors (DNSA) workshop as part of the 2009 CD&E Conference. The participants of the DNSA workshop included 44 attendees from 14 nations including two Flag and/or General Officers.

The workshop evaluated and validated the deterrence operations (DO) framework being developed by USSTRATCOM for the new Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (DO JOC). The DO JOC construct will also be adjusted based on feedback from the workshop, with emphasis on understanding the adversary and environment. The primary product, an outline describing how DO concepts and capabilities can applied to non-state actors, is being developed from the workshop and will be provided to participants and USSTRATCOM for their continued use. Key recommendations for NATO include development of a DO concept and experimentation for testing, and to evaluate the need for a Deterrence Center of Excellence.

Problem Statement: The joint-coalition force requires alternative capabilities to deter or dissuade Non-State Actors who pursue their objectives regardless of cost and are not deterred by the threat of retaliation.

- Deterrence must be rethought and rebalanced to take into account a new range of actors and to address unintended provocation by acts or messages intended to deter others.

Key Objectives:

- To explore the utility of deterrence concepts in today's warfare paradigm.
- To define and scope deterrence problems associated with Non-State Actors within a CA.
- To identify how and when Non-State Actors (NSAs) might be deterred.
- To explore the combination of direct and indirect approaches to achieving deterrence objectives.

Key Outcome: An outline addressing how DO concepts can be applied to NSAs.

***Scene Setter***

Deterrence is among the institutional implications of adopting the United States (US) Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) version 3.0. The CCJO states that we must "Renew emphasis on and understanding of strategic deterrence, including nuclear deterrence. In the future, multiple states and NSAs will possess the capabilities to threaten US vital interests in a variety of ways, often on a catastrophic scale. Deterrence in this environment will be a much more complicated challenge than was deterrence of a very small number of states during the Cold War."

The DO JOC, dated Dec 2006, states that "Deterrence convinces adversaries not to take actions that threaten US vital interests by means of decisive influence over their decision making. Decisive influence is achieved by credibly threatening to deny benefits and/or impose costs, while encouraging restraint by convincing the actor that restraint will result in an acceptable outcome."

The NSA definition used during the workshop discussion was derived from the Multinational Experiment 6 Draft Report 0.1, Oct 09.

- Non-sovereign actors refer to a heterogeneous group of non-state actors.
- This category comprises terrorists, insurgents, paramilitaries, and criminals, but also NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) or Multinational enterprises that dictate or govern business in their understanding. This category of actors is rather varied. This is a key reason for their unpredictability.
- Informality characterizes intra/action and interaction.
- They are less bureaucratic and faster in decision-making and in implementing their aims.

In dealing with actors and compliance in Intervention Operations in a non-permissive hybrid environment, NSAs need to be addressed by their unique characteristics: organization, interests, impact on states and state's activities, and responsibility.

***Baseline Assessment***

A subject matter expert panel provided three independent and complementary presentations addressing deterrence and NSAs.

Presentation One identified three main points: 1) Deterring NSAs is a difficult problem because it centers on the human domain, 2) Deterrence is going to fail sometimes, and 3) We must try to deter and complement deterrence strategy with other strategies including defeat.

Presentation Two introduced an open system model to help explain the complexity of understanding consequences of deterrent actions in a hybrid threat environment. They addressed the need to view actors as members of multiple "orders" with overlapping interests where each actor wears multiple hats (meaning different responsibilities to different orders). Each actor must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. One conclusion of the study was that deterrence needs a permissive environment to be effective in the long-term.

Presentation Three provided an ecological approach to understanding how Non-State Actors are susceptible to deterrence efforts. Deterrence strategies for Non-State Actors must address the position of a NSA in its lifecycle (Gestation, Growth, Maturity, and Transformation/Decline). Deterrent actions must focus on changing the roots/environmental factors that enabled their aggressive decision-making/nature. Deterrence strategies can impact an NSA in its transformation/maturity so as to affect its identity away from violence to become a "legitimate" actor (e.g., Palestine Liberation Organization and Irish Republican Army and policies to disarm or turn from violence).

USSTRATCOM, J55, presented the baseline concept of deterrence as outlined by the DO JOC to include: deterrence analysis, planning, operations, and assessments.

***Gap Analysis and Solution Development***

A representative from USSTRATCOM's Strategic Deterrence Assessment Lab led facilitated discussions to examine gaps and solutions associated with the four areas (deterrence analysis, planning, operations, and assessments) as applied to NSAs.

Deterrence Analysis (Situational Understanding)
Deterrence will neither rid our world of evil people nor prevent organizations of people from plotting against us; however, with an understanding of potential adversaries, we have an improved chance of deterring hostile attacks. The key is developing that understanding and how it applies to deterrence. This requires more than that provided by current intelligence/situational awareness. A "Strategic Profile" tries to capture insights into the filters, processes and various other adversary specific stimuli that likely shape decision-making. At its core, the document lays out the key factors and historical developments that help explain the bases of adversary decisions, and how he might ultimately weigh costs and benefits of action as well as costs and benefits of restraint (or inaction) in certain circumstances. Taking this approach helps avoid "mirror-imaging," that is, the tendency to project one's own political, cultural and religious beliefs, as well as one's own situational assessment and understanding on to the adversary being profiled. One participant indicated that NSAs are over emphasized and that they are unable to effect vital interests. A second participant countered that NSAs seek to defeat by the summation of 2$^{nd}$ and 3$^{rd}$ order effects that impact stability. A recurring theme of comments during this portion of the workshop included the need to shape societies, dissuade radicalization, and identify key indicators for the development of new NSAs. Additionally, participants felt a strong need to focus more on the "why"/motivations for adversary actions rather than simply *who*, *what*, and *when*.

Deterrence Planning
Deterrence is twofold: 1) long term to influence values or motives, and 2) short term actions to change perception of immediate success. In the military, we "train for certainty, and educate for uncertainty." This led participants to conclude that we train for missions but educate on how those missions can be synchronized for deterrence effects. The idea of having a Deterrence Centre of Excellence was suggested as a means for developing formal military/civilian deterrence education programs.

Participants explored the many means of communicating deterrence credibility: Information Operations (InfoOps), Strategic Communications, and targeted diplomacy. These activities bridge other arms of national power leading participants to the conclusion that the political establishment has not clearly identified the role of the military in deterrence, which is primarily a political function.

Deterrence Operations
The framework for deterrence planning provided by the DO JOC is valid, but difficulties remain linking the capabilities of various nations, as well as governmental and non-governmental organizations in order to construct a truly whole-of-nation and whole-of-alliance deterrence effort. Most of these shortcomings stem from the lack of consensus on who poses threats, why

they harbor ill will, and how to best confront such challenges from a deterrence perspective. This is a reality of coordinating multiple organizations, with different perspectives and motives, to agree on the nature of, and then confront a common threat. The orchestration of activities designed to encourage restraint, deny benefits and impose costs to decisively influence a decision calculus was accepted as logical and a viable mechanism for synchronizing otherwise disjointed activities.

Deterrence Assessment

Indicators of deterrence failure exist, however, in the eyes of most participants indicators of deterrence success do not exist. How does one prove a negative or non-event? Real and tangible measures can be applied to how the physical environment of the adversary changes. These tangible measures must still be assessed subjectively for correlation to deterrent actions or other causal factors. Ultimately, assessments must balance qualitative and quantitative elements. Regardless, assessments must be based on a baseline assessment (prior to your engagement) and they must be continuously updated.

***Summary***

- Participants agreed that the DO JOC framework was valid and useful and recommended NATO consider developing a similar deterrence concept. They also recommended evaluating the need for a NATO Deterrence Center of Excellence.
- The conflict prevention nature of deterrence is unifying, specifically when focus is on capabilities to influence vice capabilities to impose costs.
- The military, as an extension of the political arm, must be better integrated with national efforts; for deterrence, USSTRATCOM plans offer a solid link for whole-of-government unity of effort.
- By the end of the conference, most participants concluded that NSAs can be deterred.
- The key to effective deterrence is a robust understanding of the adversary and a mechanism for planning and conducting whole-of-government operations to achieve the deterrence objectives.
- Deterrence is not guaranteed and planners must hedge for deterrence failure.
- Preconceived notions of what constitutes “fear of consequence” must be overcome to apply all elements of power to deterrence challenges.
- The DO JOC rewrite must address:
  - Long-term deterrence ideas specific to NSAs and rogue actors.
  - The NSA problem - where state actors and NSA’s cross/mix during Hybrid Threat scenarios.
  - An appendix specific to explaining the strategic profile concept.
  - More on motivations for adversary actions (perhaps a 4$^{th}$ factor to *X Y Z* formula: deter actor *X* from doing *Y* under conditions *Z* and add “why is *X* doing *Y*.”
- NATO ACT should consider a DO Concept and evaluate the need for a NATO Deterrence Center of Excellence or Knowledge Center. This reinforces the idea that the Alliance projects strength and unity, especially for situational understanding, and is critical to dealing with NSAs.
- For future experimentation efforts, use the DO JOC framework (analysis, planning, operations, and assessments) when dealing with state actors and NSA scenarios to determine common linkages.

***Way Ahead*.** Application of Deterrence Operations concepts and capabilities toward non-state actors will be incorporated into the next revision of the United States DOD's DO JOC. The document will be available to interested national organizations who are working deterrence issues. The current version is available at:
www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/do_joc_v20.doc
The update to this document is currently in work and expected to be released in Fall 2010.

## SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

Workshop Overview: USJFCOM JCD&E led the planning and execution of the Security Force Assistance (SFA) workshop as part of the 2009 CD&E Conference. The participants of the SFA workshop included 43 attendees from 16 nations including two Flag and/or General Officers.

While a consensus definition was not achieved, the workshop reached common ground on SFA and the military role within the broader security sector reform effort. Key planning considerations, potential coordinating methods and a planning framework were evaluated during the workshop. These products will be refined, distributed to workshop participants and be provided to US Special Operations Command, US European Command, the Army Proponent for SFA, the Joint Center for International SFA, and to HQ SACT to support Security Assistance concept work.

Problem Statement: Coalition commanders lack an understanding of what constitutes SFA and the role of the military contribution to SFA as it relates to broader coalition security sector assistance efforts. A planning framework to support campaign planning is required to synchronize SFA efforts with broader Security Sector Reform initiatives.

Key Objectives:

- Agreement upon a proposed common lexicon for military support to SFA.
- Identify the intersections between military SFA activities and those of the broader security sector assistance efforts.
- Identify key planning considerations and coordinating mechanisms with mission partners.

Key Outcomes:

- Identify the role of the military in SFA as a contribution to security sector assistance efforts.
- Identify key planning considerations, potential coordination mechanisms and planning frameworks to better synchronize civilian-military sector assistance.

***Scene Setter***

SFA is not a new idea but a new term for a concept that has been around for as long as there have been militaries. It is a way to deter, prevent or address conflict by enabling host governments to provide their own security. SFA is focused on building the capacity and capability of traditional security sector institutions including law enforcement, defense, border security, etc. as part of broader security sector assistance nested in Rule of Law. The military contributes to it but often is not the lead and sometimes has no role at all. In conducting SFA, the military's primary interaction is with the host nation's defense sector for the following reasons:

- Defense sector plays a central role in external security and may play a key role in internal security.
- It is usually the most powerful security institution.
- Civilian control of the military is central to the host nation government exercising political power.
- Defense sector often has significant economic impact.

- Defense sector can be a driver of instability and conflict (repression, human rights violations, political influence, etc.).

However, the defense sector does not function in isolation and therefore a systems-wide approach is the proper way to proceed.

The aim of the workshop was to achieve a level of agreement on a working outline of the main elements of SFA, identify the role of the military in SFA as a contribution to security sector assistance efforts, identify key planning considerations, explore potential coordination mechanisms and develop a planning framework to better synchronize civilian-military security sector assistance.

***Baseline Assessment***

The workshop established a baseline for SFA using facilitated discussion and a written questionnaire distributed to the participants containing four questions:

1. What is SFA?
2. What is not SFA?
3. Why do SFA? (What is the desired outcome?)
4. What makes your country's approach to SFA unique?

The responses were synthesized overnight and briefed to the workshop the following morning. The intent was to develop a consensus on the bounds of SFA without trying to craft the "perfect" definition. It was decided that SFA consists of: *Activities taken to directly develop capability and capacity of another nation's security forces and institutions that are sustainable, responsive to recognized authority, commensurate with the security situation and that progress is assessed by local (perceptions) standards as part of a broader security sector assistance or rule of law strategy. It was also decided that SFA does not include direct military action or routine interactions (port calls, exercises, etc.), is not a stand alone activity and is not a military only activity.*

The desired outcomes developed for SFA were:

- Effective, self-sufficient, sustainable and accountable host nation security forces.
- Secure environment – The public secured continuously with freedom of lawful movement throughout the country (no safe havens).
- Effective law enforcement and military institutions presence is established or restored.
- Essential security services are developed, restored or refurbished.
- Protection of critical economic activities is re-established with the freedom to conduct lawful commerce.
- There are safe and secure borders.
- The recipient nation has a stabilizing regional influence that is balanced with respect to its neighbors.

***Gap Analysis***

The workshop discussion highlighted several areas where SFA challenges continue to exist. These were broadly grouped into categories of political, training, and coalition issues.

Political

SFA is a political activity that legitimizes and sustains the recipient nation's political authority – authority that is often tenuous or under attack. As such, SFA must form a supporting element of a comprehensive inter-disciplinary strategy of international engagement. Attainment of SFA objectives is generally the key pre-condition for extraction of international forces and acceleration of governance and development activities. The lack of an over-arching civil-military strategy that shapes activities across the security-governance-development spectrum can result in an incoherent and often ineffective approach. While security is the fundamental precursor to successful governance and development, it is not the sole objective. Focusing on security alone risks strategic failure. To frame a SFA strategy several questions must be asked and answered by national policy makers to include:

- What are the national objectives? What is SFA to achieve?
- Is the SFA recipient the legitimate and accepted authority? Does it enjoy popular support?
- What is the host nation's assessment of its security requirements? What is *their* plan? What is *their* desired outcome?
- Are these perspectives in conflict? How do you align the two?
- Does the result enhance the capability of the host nation (HN) to provide security for its populace? Does it facilitate improved governance and development?

Training

The discussion on training revealed two elements. First was the training of those tasked to perform SFA. The challenge of conducting SFA requires a focused, high quality effort, and is not the work for the less capable. Individuals and units selected for SFA must have the skills to establish immediate credibility and the personal traits to deftly shift from doing to instructing to mentoring as the situation dictates. Some of the errors identified during the discussion included not matching the rank and experience with the position being trained (e.g., a Colonel mentoring the Minister of Defense), and using contractors inappropriately.

The second issue was the training of the recipient nation's security forces. Many of the problems discussed could be prevented by conducting a thorough assessment at the outset. This would include evaluating the potential of the existing HN security in order to tailor programs to what will be sustainable. SFA planning should begin with transition to the HN in mind and balancing short term (training) with long term (education). Fully understanding the "threat" as perceived by the population is necessary so that SFA can be focused on countering that threat. SFA must be balanced between military, para-military and police while nested in a greater rule of law strategy. In non-permissive environments, consideration should be given to training units as a whole vice individuals.

Coalition

While the benefits of working as a coalition are many (shared costs, unique capabilities, cultural and language advantages, etc.), several gaps were discussed concerning multi-national SFA efforts. For Afghanistan, the Bonn Accord assigned responsibilities for individual sectors to separate countries as opposed to taking a comprehensive approach to develop shared objectives and desired outcomes. Further, it was pointed out that this was a NATO effort under Article 5 and without that, multinational SFA becomes an individual national decision with internal politics dictating the level and type of support. Additional issues identified include the lack of codified common doctrine and standards, no source of common funding, lack of centralized pre-deployment training and the complexity of coordinating a multi-national, multi-agency effort.

## ***Solution Development***

This was accomplished by introducing the concept of a SFA Planning Framework developed by the USJFCOM JCD&E participants, which was contrasted with a different approach introduced by participants from the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance. The workshop was then split into three groups to discuss the two frameworks and develop recommendations for improvements working with three bins – Generating Force, Operating Force and Executive Oversight. Results from the three groups were briefed back to the workshop and those results provided additional ideas and way aheads for the remainder of the workshop.

A discussion of the coordinating mechanisms was conducted to include internal national, bi-lateral with HN, and coalition. Each increases in difficulty. Consensus was that there will never be direct authority to coordinate or have complete unity of command. The best hope is for unity of purpose vice unity of effort or perhaps coincidence of purpose at best. While NATO has a relatively mature military command structure, the civilian side is not as clear and is more diplomatic. Responsibility without authority is what is happening on the civilian side. The "Comprehensive Approach" states the need to plan together but the authority is not there. Afghanistan is an example where coordination at the Provisional Reconstruction Team level and below is working, but above that, there is no optimal structure in place. The consequence is that SFA is reactive and not pro-active. No solution for the interagency coordination challenge was developed.

## ***Summary***

All the Workshop objectives were addressed, and progress was made on each of them, although a consensus was not always reached. The participants discussed different approaches to a SFA definition, and found some agreement on the main elements that it should include. A number of best practices were identified, ranging from policy requirements to practical implementation with consideration given to current NATO operations. Key findings included:

- From the tactical to strategic level, SFA is not solely a military activity. However, SFA contributes to broader Security Sector Reform. A comprehensive approach is necessary for long term success. SFA activities must form a supporting element of an overarching

comprehensive interdisciplinary strategy across security, governance and development sectors. An estimate of the situation or an assessment is a prerequisite for SFA planning. The more comprehensive the assessment is, the better the chance for success. However, no assessment or analysis that is conducted will be perfect; therefore forces assigned SFA missions must be dynamic and adaptive throughout the process.

- There are fundamental differences between training defense, police and para-military forces. Training police officers to be police is achievable, but then expecting them to conduct para-military functions does not work. Train the security force you need to address the security situation while keeping in mind that the threat will change over time.
- The quality of donor nation SFA forces matters and this translates directly to the credibility of the effort as perceived by the recipient nation. Forces need to be adequately trained to conduct SFA missions (language ability, ability to mentor and unique skill sets training). Individuals serving in advisor roles must have experience and rank commensurate with their assigned mentor role, and they must be assigned for a sufficient duration to have the desired impact.
- SFA training is short-term, education is long-term, and they are not sequential. When conducted in parallel they provide the greatest potential for success.

The Workshop provided a significant contribution towards the development of a SFA Planning Framework. At the same time, the output will prove useful for every nation's efforts, as well as for ongoing international initiatives such as MNE 6.

***Way Ahead***

The planned follow-on actions are:

- The USJFCOM JCD&E Directorate will revise the SFA Planning Framework and provide it to workshop participants for incorporation into appropriate documentation (in progress).
- USJFCOM JCD&E will also provide findings and recommendations in a summary to all participants (on going).

- Refine planning framework for SFA (draft framework was provided to conference attendees, requesting comments by 10 Mar 10, framework; the US Fiscal Year 11 Warfighter Challenges include #21 from US Special Operations Command (SOCOM), which asks for SFA experimentation. It may become a portion of Multinational Experiment 7 or possibly a stand-alone JFCOM J9 project. This evaluation will continue throughout 2010).
- Transition products to US and NATO organizations currently developing SFA policy and doctrine.
    - Draft report provided to the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) and SOCOM (completed), JCISFA incorporated the results (recommendations and learning they did during the conference) into the SFA

handbook -- already published and SOCOM is using the results in ongoing work as the DOD lead for SFA.

- The draft has been submitted to NATO of the report but they are awaiting the final. They begin their SFA concept work in 2010.

## STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

Workshop Overview: ACT led the planning and execution of the Strategic Communications (StratCom) workshop as part of the 2009 Concept Development & Experimentation Conference. The participants of the StratCom workshop included 58 attendees from 14 nations including three Flag and/or General Officers.

Agreement was achieved on a working definition for StratCom and on the main elements for StratCom in a coalition/alliance environment (Afghanistan used as the backdrop). A comprehensive list of best practices from current operations was drafted and recommendations generated for policy and doctrine changes needed to employ new techniques and technologies in the information arena.

Problem Statement: Coalition partners lack a capability to synchronise military operations with the disciplines of public diplomacy (PD), public affairs (PA), InfoOps, and PsyOps to achieve strategic impact.

Key Objectives:

- An agreed to working definition for StratCom.
- A general consensus on main elements of StratCom in a coalition/alliance environment. Use the Afghanistan case study to exemplify challenges and potential solutions.
- Identify means and methods to improve the national application of StratCom in an operational environment.
- Participants' appreciation of the policy and doctrine transformation necessary to employ these new techniques and technology in the information arena.

Key Outcome: Guidelines and methods for achieving coordinated operations within a coalition through synchronization of themes and messages across each discipline. This will include consideration of restraints and constraints imposed by national policy.

***Scene Setter***

NATO's interest in StratCom is deeply rooted in the Multiple Futures Program, which clearly states the need for the Alliance to make a more effective use of communication to build support for its missions and achieve strategic goals. At the same time, StratCom is a very practical and urgent requirement of Commanders in the field. This is especially true in the Afghanistan theatre, where the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is suffering from the Taliban's ability and flexibility to exploiting information its objective achievement. StratCom is also part of the Comprehensive Approach, and may be an enabler for Counter Insurgency operations.

The aim of the workshop was to achieve a level of agreement on a working definition, the main elements of StratCom, and on best practices for its implementation, in order to inform the NATO Concept on Strategic Communications, as well as other national and international efforts.

***Baseline Assessment***

The workshop tried to obtain a common definition of Strategic Communications. However, a certain level of disagreement emerged on the use of the term "strategic" and on the main elements of such definition. For example, is it only limited to the disciplines of PD, PA, InfoOps, and PsyOps? Are all these elements always present in a coalition? There were also discussions whether StratCom was to be understood as a coordinating process or a function that requires dedicated personnel. There was general agreement that StratCom can be considered both a process and a function.

It was also suggested that a definition need not be perfect, although that would be desirable. When dealing with political and multinational constraints, the fundamental feature of a definition is that it does not prevent the legitimate users from doing what they deem necessary. Even though words are important, small details (such as the difference between "communication" and "communications") should not absorb the major focus when capabilities are urgently required on the field – as is the case for NATO.

An agreement was reached on the nature of the information environment. Coalitions' actions are monitored 24/7 by an increasing number of actors, and information is exchanged dynamically at high speed. The communications sphere has no geographical boundaries and continuously evolves, which produces tangible effects on the theatre of operations. This can immediately impact human relations and security conditions, thus facilitating or hindering the achievement of the mission objectives.

***Gap Analysis***

There is a widely shared understanding of the main deficiencies of StratCom in a coalition environment. Coalitions usually lack a corporate identity and *esprit de corps*, and therefore struggle to produce a common vision and effective strategic-political guidance. This lack of a coherent narrative encompassing all messages and actions creates the so called "say-do gap." National interests and cultural differences further undermine consistency, engagement and the availability of properly trained personnel. Coalitions typically lack the ability to properly understand and assess the information environment, and communication and opinion processes in general. A final problem is the insufficient coordination with other actors in theatre.

The NATO JALLC prepared a report on ISAF-related influence and communications activities. The project started in January 2009 and consisted of interviews with members of ISAF in Afghanistan and officers at the Joint Forces Command (JFC) Brunssum, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), and NATO Headquarters (NATO HQ) Brussels. The aim was to provide both long term contributions to the StratCom concept development, and short term improvements in theatre. The JALLC team found that the absence of a common NATO definition, before the approval of the policy in late September 2009, caused substantial confusion and fragmentation of efforts in theatre. A predisposition toward lethal means was recognized in ISAF, and there was little integration of non-kinetic means in the operational planning. Training was found to be another major issue. Few nations have communications career fields within their military structures; as a result, posts are often filled with untrained personnel. Training in the basic communications disciplines (PA, InfoOps, and PsyOps) is required for all personnel who are deployed, and senior leadership must be able to coordinate communications efforts and integrate them within the operational framework.

Communication is important at all levels (strategic, operational, tactical), both within a coalition and externally toward target audiences. The workshop underlined the fundamental role of internal communication to maintain the coalition's cohesion and to ensure a consistent message is delivered. Not all available communication means are currently exploited on a regular basis due to a lack of policy, legal framework, resources and/or training. The evolving nature of the information environment requires that new methods be implemented. Social media is proving to be a very useful tool to expand the outreach of an organization and to provide information and education in an innovative way, both internally and externally. To be effective, information must be widely available, interactive, easily accessible and targeted to the user's interests. There is no doubt that using new forms of media and the delegation of authority that it entails create new, potential security risks. However, not having a presence in this field also presents problems. Failing to address the issue might undermine communication efforts over the long term. Social media connects people, facilitates problem solving, and attracts expertise creating and connecting communities of interest. A number of agencies/organizations, including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the US Department of Defense, has already implemented this use of social media.

***Solution Development***

There are several initiatives where further solutions can be developed and evaluated in order to improve Strategic Communications in a coalition environment:

Multinational Experiment (MNE) 6 . Members of the MNE 6 Objectives 2.1 and 2.2 explained their approach to the problem, which is based on the concept of "disruptive innovation" and borrows practices from the civilian business management and marketing communication. The

experiment identified the problems and formulated some hypothesis, and is now moving into the phase of solution development. The overall process is a long-term effort aimed at finding radically new and more efficient solutions with very positive contributions expected from the official product in the future.

Lessons Learned from ISAF. This stresses the importance of the recently approved NATO Strategic Communications Policy, which provides a much needed link between the political and military actors within the Alliance. The policy must be supported at the strategic level by the creation of a Master Narrative to inform and help coordinate all messages along the chain of command. Communication considerations must permeate all levels of operational planning, with the right mix of kinetic and non-kinetic tools, in order to achieve the different political and military objectives of a multinational coalition, which operates among other actors.

The NATO Concept on Strategic Communications. This concept was presented during the workshop. It builds on NATO Strategic Communications Policy and elaborates its vision for the military chain of command. After identifying the main deficiencies in NATO StratCom, it explains the principles, which must guide the Alliance's actions in this field: collaboration, comprehensiveness, credibility, agility, deliberation, leadership, continuity, understanding, creativity, and empowerment. It then analyzes the relevant target audiences for NATO and the importance of coordination between different actors within the organization. Finally, it acknowledges the need to develop measures of effectiveness/measures of performance to assess the progress in the communication field, although such assessment might prove difficult. It was suggested that StratCom effects measurement should be integrated with the measurement of the rest of the operation's objectives, in a comprehensive, systemic framework. Discussion in the workshop emphasized that the Concept should include an overview of the capabilities required aligned to a DOTMLPFI structure.

Developments in Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) offer the potential for reciprocal support with StratCom. On the one hand, effective communication with the civilian actors is required to make such cooperation successful; on the other hand, CIMIC can become a multiplier for a coalition's communication efforts, especially towards local population. Furthermore, CIMIC provides situational awareness in both directions. Recent experiments, such as the Civil-Military Fusion Center and Civil-Military Overview, based at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia proved extremely successful in bringing together civilian actors to cooperate with NATO. However, there are still unresolved issues concerning the processing, exchange and release of information, especially on NATO side.

***Summary***

Every one of the workshop objectives was addressed, and steps forward were made on each of them, although a consensus was not always reached. The participants discussed different approaches to a StratCom definition, and found some agreement on the main elements. A number of best practices identified include:

- First, the information environment has to be thoroughly and continuously assessed, which involves active engagement and listening of local actors' needs and views.

- Coalitions should develop a corporate identity, and a Master Narrative to explain their aims and *raison d'être*. They need to be credible, which means quickly providing accurate and substantiated information. It also requires that actions and words be consistent, and do not contradict each other. At the same time, the need to have a proactive stance puts a premium on speed and empowerment at the lower levels of the hierarchy. This may sometime increase the risk of mistakes and require correcting imprecise information. To mitigate this risk, operational narratives and an information strategy, constantly adapted and updated, should be developed to provide guidance and inform behavior in the area of operations.
- To coordinate and assure consistency of messages, the role of the leadership cannot be underestimated. Senior leaders must be aware of the importance of the information dimension, and assume direct responsibility. A senior and experienced communicator should be in the lead for StratCom; this figure would authoritatively stand up with the chain of command to make sure that communication considerations are taken into account, and would coordinate all efforts like an orchestra maestro. Another proposed way to achieve consistency is to have the same troops deployed to the same place after rotation.
- Communication objectives have to be constantly integrated and coordinated with operational plans, of which they are a fundamental enabler and, possibly, driver.
- While developing a proactive communication strategy, some attention should be dedicated to analyzing and countering the enemy's propaganda, both in theatre and within nations.
- Member states' populations should be protected against deliberate negative information activities, in order to preserve the coalition's cohesion and solidarity. This does not mean directing PsyOps towards national audiences.
- Communication activities need to be measured. Although it is not always easy to observe and analyze attitude and behavioral changes, measures of effectiveness/performance must be established to validate the courses of action. Another reason to do this is the need to show tangible achievements and results to obtain required resources and personnel. In assessing a communication strategy's outcome, the Commander's judgment, although not a scientific tool, should not be disregarded.
- All communication tools should be employed. This includes traditional and new/social media, but also non-media products such as social events, games, etc. A premium is put on products of high visual impact.
- All personnel deployed in communication posts should receive adequate training in the basic disciplines (PD, PA, InfoOps, PsyOps), whereas senior leadership should receive general StratCom training to make sure they understand the importance of integrating communication activities at all stages of the operation and throughout the chain of command.
- Strategic Communications cannot be successfully implemented without resources.

Overall, the workshop provided a significant contribution towards the development of a NATO Concept on Strategic Communications with an emphasis on addressing the development of capabilities. At the same time, the output will prove useful for every nation's efforts, as well as for ongoing international initiatives such as the MNE 6.

***Way Ahead***

The follow-on actions resulting from the workshop are:

- The draft NATO Concept on Strategic Communications was submitted to Director, International Military Staff in January 2010. The Concept incorporated the findings and observations of the CD&E Conference workshop. The Concept was been distributed to the NATO Nations for comment and responses were received from a number of Nations, the NATO Public Diplomacy Division and the International Military Staff. The Concept is being revised in preparation for distribution of an updated version to the Nations, expected in late March 2010. Concept approval and development of a Capability Implementation Plan is project for 3rd Qtr 2010.
- The ACT StratCom Working Group will increase its involvement with the MNE 6 during the remaining part of the experiment (ongoing through 2012). The DEU MNE 6 representative made experimentation documentation available to the ACT StratCom Working Group for review.
- MNE 6 members will consider the workshop outcomes and ongoing NATO initiatives in the experiment, as they deem appropriate.
- National representatives will consider workshop outcomes in their national policy and ongoing capability development efforts.
- ACT will consider a follow-on workshop on StratCom tools (to be planned for 2010). This follow up workshop has not been scheduled pending clarification of the 2010 ACT Budget.

## QUESTIONS, ANSWERS, AND COMMENTS FROM THE WORKSHOP PLENARY

*Q1: In the Hybrid Threats domain, we witness risks coming not only from terrorist activities but also from organized crime. Given that these threats cannot only be addressed with military means, what could be the role of Gendarmerie and Carabinieri types of police units?*
A1: The issue has not been specifically addressed in the HT workshop. However, Supreme Allied Command Powers Europe military police is supporting the development of these capabilities. Since these units already exist in different nations one can build much faster on their experience.

*Q2: How do the workshop leaders see a link between the activities of the workshops?*
A2: Some of the workshops had team members in the other workshops. There are clear similarities between CHT and NSA with definite linkages and the are interlocking subjects. StratCom was a crosscutting theme in the other workshops.

C1: As an organizer, we discussed the complimentary and distinctions of NSA and CHT. We considered this as we sharpened the focus of the workgroups that there may be an expectation of blending workshops. There was no formal coordination mechanism, and it is something which may be considered in future editions.

*Q3: We are trying to define our portion in the comprehensive approach. We are more orderly than our civilian counterparts, there are inconsistencies and we cannot control everything. How much can we accept?*
A3: By focusing on our own efforts exclusively we will fail. We need to respect their approaches. The comprehensive approach has a balance between the two approaches.

C2: Sometimes we can do informal analysis and planning. Just because something is informal does not mean it cannot be structured.

## 2009 CD&E RESULTS

***HQ SACT – Rear Admiral Christian Canova***

ACT uses CD&E as one of the tools to drive transformation. Concepts provide a framework and rationale for solution development and experimentation provides the feedback and lessons learned to refine that concept. While ACT is in charge of transformation within NATO, it is also in partnership with others, working as the process manger for good ideas. ACT partners include industry, academic, ACO, Alliance Nations, USJFCOM, NATO Research & Technology, Centres of Excellence, and the NATO/Partnership for Peace Education and Training Network.

ACT Concepts completed in 2009 include:

- Operations Logistics Chain Management (to improve coordination and prioritization)
- Information & Knowledge Management
- Friendly Force Tracking of Ground Troops
- NATO Joint Sea Based Logistics
- Civilian Actors Advisor (interaction with other actors)
- Deployable Air Traffic Management

ACT Concepts in progress are:

- Air Command and Control (final draft due Dec 09)
- Advanced Distributed Learning (due Dec 09)
- Strategic Communications (2nd Draft for discussion at CD&E Conference)
- Maritime Security Operations (completed and forwarded to International Military Staff)
- Advanced Maritime Strategy (due to Military Committee (MC) by Jan 10)
- Military Contribution to NATO Defence against Terrorism (final draft due Spring 10)

In 2009, over 40 experiments have been conducted, including:

- Civil Military Fusion Centre/Civil Military Overview (CFC/CMO)
- Tools for Operational Planning Functional Area Services (TOPFAS)
- Information Exchange Gateway
- MEDICS Series (including the medical input into Common Operating Picture)
- Operations Logistics Chain Management (the follow on refinement of operating procedures from 2008)

In 2009, Joint Experimentation Exercises & Assessment conducted CD&E Engagements to assist new member nations in setting up their CD&E structures, and to exchange ideas and receive feed back from the nations. This engagement involved national representatives visiting ACT and ACT delegates visiting nations. Other areas of engagement include this conference, the CD&E Working Group and the NATO CD&E Course.

The 2009 CD&E Documents produced were:

- 2008 ACT Annual Report and 2010 ACT Action Plan
- ACT Input to the MC Policy on NATO CD&E
- CD&E Annex to Comprehensive Campaign Plan (CCPlan) 2010-2012

Potential ACT concepts for 2010 and beyond:

- Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Detection during Maritime Operations
- Countering Hybrid Threats
- Security Assistance
- Deployable Forces
- Legal Interoperability
- Combat Identification
- Space Dimension of NATO

ACT Experimentation for 2010 will include over 40 distinct experiments:

- Strategic Communication (explore understanding mechanisms and prioritization schemes for StratCom)
- Medical Support (follow on medical experimentation from previous year's effort)
- Civil Military Interaction (explore military benefits from specific interaction between Civil and Military organizations)
- TOPFAS (planning and analysis tool suite)

In March 2010 a new Peacetime Establishment will be implemented. CD&E will then fall under Assistant Chief Of Staff Capability Engineering. This is a significant juncture for ACT. We have been here for five years and we have many lessons from current operations. Resources are allocated to capabilities rather than to functional domains. We are striving for improving clarity and transparency with and emphasis on cooperation collaboration. CD&E addresses current demands and prepares us for future challenges. Transformation is vital in any military organization but especially for NATO.

***USJFCOM JCD&E – Rear Admiral Dan Davenport***

We have an important partnership between ACT and JFCOM and both bosses are committed to working closer together. In the US approach to CD&E we define the most important problem by listening to the warfighters who provide us with the problem statement. The warfighters also provide subject matter expertise for our experiments to find solutions. Finally, the solutions are implemented. This transition piece takes a lot of work. We work through an enterprise approach in partnership with a plethora of different actors. That is why events such as this conference are so important.

Examples of our experiments include:

- Comprehensive Approach
- Persistent Surveillance
- Combating WMD
- Joint Distributed Operations (JDO)
- Many projects on hybrid threats

We provide solutions to the Joint Force Commander such as the Joint Operational Environment (JOE) and the CCJO. Specific areas we are working include Persistent Surveillance, combating WMD-N, CA, and JDO.

The CCJO was signed out by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff last January. It defines how US forces will interact with other forces and provides our leadership's view on this. It will lead to changes in US joint doctrine and, a very important and a first, to service doctrine.

We conducted a one week seminar war game experiment on CCJO to validate the concept. Three scenarios were played (state competitor, failed state, non-state actor). Through this we were able to identify key risk areas. The results will be included in the Quadrennial Defense Review.

We are looking at ways to improve the CA and Interagency Approach. We will always have partners, we will be involved in Stability Operations, and we must work within the Rule of Law. We are working towards developing solutions, planning frameworks, and architectures for sharing information. We will plug this in to future works such as MNE 6.

***<u>Questions, Answers, and Comments</u>***

*Q1: There have been many organizational changes at ACT. We have also heard about changes in the CCPlan. Who makes the decision for these changes?*
A1: ACT's organization has changed three times in five years, and the new management methods which we are now implementing seems to be working. The previous management style was more intellectual. Management by deliverable product provides better coherence. The CCPlan now has over 300 pages, which allows more transparency to the nations. We need to better articulate through the CD&E Working Group.

*Q2: The CFC/CMO at Old Dominion University(ODU) should be highlighted as a great success. . But there are concerns that it will move to become an academic institution away from NATO. For the CA, the challenge is dealing with others that do not have the planning skills and capabilities that we have. How do you develop this working and trust level?*
A2: CFC/CMO is an experiment within ACT, which is a mix of military, NGOs and academics. It is at ODU in Norfolk VA to allow non-military and non-NATO actors to access it and futher encourages their participation. Many people are interest in our work, such as General McChrystal. More political control is needed. We need to look at transition of this capability to SHAPE or JFC Brunssum. We need to do it in an academic environment and pass it on. Developing a working and trust level remains one of our biggest challenges. We often work with the State Department and experimentation seems to be less threatening to our partners so we are able to see some successes. It is a difficult process and the Department of Defense is often perceived viewed as the more powerful interagency element. Next year we are working on Cooperative Security and we will be working with a different group at the State Department. We will try to work constructively; asking for their assistance in helping us improve how we work with them. We need to look at the situation and do our best to build trust.

*Q3: All nations are under financial constraint. How can the CD&E Community use the battle of the narrative to tell our story?*
A3: When I talk about CA it is something people know and understand. We don't build things and we put in a lot of effort to let people know how we are contributing to the warfighter. General Mattis was actively involved in the CCJO wargame. When the leaders are not actively involved, it is more challenging. We continue to work hard to explain the value. For NATO, there is good news, a CD&E policy was approved by the 28 nations. Internally ACT needs to work better with ACO at the lower levels.

*Q4: Will we have access to the results of the CCJO experiment and will it influence the CCJO?*
A4: The results are classified, but there were risk areas identified. We need a better CA, actions need to take place at national (political and congressional) levels; we have identified a reliance on networks and need to be able to operate without these networks. We have learned the CCJO is sufficient and it does not have to be rewritten; areas that need expansion will be done by subordinate concepts.

*Q5: For JDO, how do you go from concepts to solutions?*
A5: For the US, we don't have a JDO concept yet and that is a shortcoming we are going to resolve. It is time to develop a concept for how we will do this in the future. We will then need to transfer it to doctrine and policy; but before it becomes doctrine, we need to test it.

*Q6: Will ACT use the findings from the MFP to bring this work to the next level?*
A6: The MFP and JOE were directed by General Mattis who was looking for possible futures for ACT and JFCOM. How we deal with the future may not be the same. JOE mentions the US because it is a national document. The Multiple Futures is not an approved paper, which is a weakness but it does provide a perspective. At ACT we are looking at what concepts to pursue. We are looking beyond Multiple Futures.

## KEYNOTE SPEAKER – ADMIRAL GIAMPAOLO DI PAOLA, CHAIRMAN OF THE NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE

What is NATO doing? NATO is changing dramatically. NATO at 60, we are setting the navigational chart for the future. What has changed? There is a new US administration, which comes with a certain expectation or perception. We are a much bigger alliance now at 28 nations, and we have an open door policy. Afghanistan and General McChrystal shape our expectations. We also now have a new self-confident Russia. President Obama was in China and Brazil. The rising Asia. World financial crisis. The importance of globalization. All of this tells us we are in a much different place. The pace and speed of changing, transformation, can be called revolution. Across the change of the century a discontinuity, globalization affects all of society. Globalization is here to stay and so is the technological revolution. This has changed our security environment. Everyday 17,000 children die of hunger. There is a profound sense of instability. President Obama talked about climate change, we can be part of building the awareness and this affects the instability of how we operate. The icecap melting, it is an event we do not control as an organization. This will affect commerce and security.

The Alliance cannot continue to be what it has been. The old way was comfortable. This is no longer relevant. The new strategic concept for the ground war, the threat is no longer the same. NATO must chart its own way to be relevant. We can no longer be looking at a strategic concept because it was tasked. We need an open process to enlarge the scope of thinking, a reflection phase. We need an engagement process with the allies to stimulate new ideas. The concept needs to be hybrid document.

We need to have an understanding of the new NATO role. No one questions Article 5, it is enshrined. Several nations perceive there is a border threat. Article 5 is the bedrock cornerstone. It will still continue to be relevant. What does it mean in the new security environment? What is the meaning now? That is the question. The value and the link between the Alliance: Europe and US and Canada. We are in Afghanistan which is far away, but it really is not far away. The physical distance is becoming less relevant.

We need to work together, using the comprehensive approach, and we need to work in a structured way. Outreach is becoming a fundamental feature of the Alliance. You are a young community and you can help force change. Don't look to the past, don't be afraid of the future. Work within the framework.

***<u>Questions and Answers</u>***

*Q1: What are the implications of borders being less significant?*
A1: You cannot rule out the possibility of an invasion, but it is less likely. Article 5 needs to be interpreted in more flexible ways.

*Q2: With regard to Article 5 and borders, how to interpret borders and attacks?*
A2: I don't know if cyber would be equal to armored attack. I don't know if we can define a list of what we consider an attack. If there is an armed attack, we will proceed and react. I don't know if that would be true if there was a threat to energy security, an attack on oil pipelines or

blockade. In some areas we would collectively defend, others we would not. It is difficult to say. We need to keep our options open, and determine the response based on the size and scope.

*Q3: Is the High North related to Article 5?*
A3. As the ice cap melts in the northern cap, it will allow new sea lanes to open. There will be a great savings in distance. There will be many mineral resources to be exploited. There might be competition between Russia and Canada. If you put yourself in an old mentality you might say lets build up. Looking at this with a new mentality, focusing on multilateral and collaborative efforts we should look toward free trade and working together in search and rescue. This presents problems in which we will want to work together with others.

*Q4. NATO's raison d'être is a military alliance. Could use of a CA threaten this military alliance?*
A4. The military is a tool among the many you need to use in a crisis and it is a tool in of CA; it does not question the military tool, but defines how we use it.

*Q5. What will the military look like in the CA?*
A5. We need a fresh look at the military command structure. There needs to be a much closer working relationship and integration between the military and political structures.

*Q6: You have challenged us to think without limits of borders and thoughts. What are the limits for NATO?*
A6. A dog has four legs, but not every animal with four legs is a dog. There are no predetermined geographical limits. This does not mean that NATO must intervene everywhere. It will happen when and where a collective threat is perceived. In 1995, who would have guessed NATO would have been in Afghanistan?

*Q7. You talk about military and political transformation, when will we come up with a Strategic Concept?*
A7: Consensus is paramount for NATO, the decision making mechanism will probably not change. Each Nation should try to facilitate the reaching of consensus, and we need to be flexible.

## NNEC CONSIDERATIONS FOR CD&E – MR. ED WHALEN

There are two terms that are used interchangeably but have differences: Network Enabled Capability (NEC), which refers national work and NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC), which refers to both NEC developments within the NATO Command Structure as well as NATO's efforts to integrate across all national NEC capabilities.

Network Enabled is much more than technology. It is about people and how they interact, the processes they use to do their jobs and then the technology that enables them. Networks include social, political, economic and communities of interest therefore Network Enabled means multiple networks working together to solve issues. (N)NEC resides where people, process and technology intersect.

Concept papers should address what the concept is, why it is needed, how it might be done, and identify some high level capabilities required to succeed. Concept developers should address NNEC when they begin developing the last two items.

There are three basis principles of NNEC:

- Information Sharing – What do I know? Who needs this information? Have I told them?
- Collaboration – Both table discussions/brainstorming as well as social media capabilities.
- Sense-Making – situational awareness, both a common operating picture and something like influence diagrams to be aware of the whys and potential 2$^{nd}$ and 3$^{rd}$ order effects.

The NNEC attribute classes that can be used by both concept developers to develop concepts as well as analysts to determine the level of achievement of NNEC were outlined. They include: behaviors – information sharing, collaboration, trust; time; agility; sense-making; and quality.

NATO has identified a need to assist concept developers in incorporating NNEC principles and have chartered the Operational Concepts & Requirements Implications Coherence Area to conduct this work. This team is lead by COL John Koivisto, USA and Mr. Ed Whalen, both of ACT. COL Koivisto's team is available to all to review and comment on both draft concepts and experimentation plans as requested.

# ACRONYMS

| | |
|---|---|
| ACO | Allied Command Operations |
| ACT | Allied Command Transformation |
| Bi-SC | Bi-Strategic Commanders |
| CA | Comprehensive Approach |
| CCJO | (US) Capstone Concept for Joint Operations |
| CCPlan | Comprehensive Campaign Plan |
| CD&E | Concept Development and Experimentation<br>Concept Development & Experimentation |
| CFC/CMO | Civil Military Fusion Centre/Civil Military Overview |
| CHT | Countering Hybrid Threats |
| CIMIC | Civil-Military Cooperation |
| DNSA | Deterring Non-State Actors |
| DO JOC | Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept |
| DOTMLPFI | Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, Interoperability |
| GPF | General Purpose Forces |
| HN | Host Nation |
| HQ SACT | Headquarters Supreme Allied Command Transformation |
| HT | Hybrid Threats |
| InfoOps | Information Operations |
| IPT | Integrated Project Team |
| JALLC | Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre |
| JCISFA | Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance |

| | |
|---|---|
| JDO | Joint Distributed Operations |
| JFC | Joint Forces Command |
| JFCOM | (US) Joint Forces Command |
| JOE | Joint Operational Environment |
| MC | (NATO) Military Committee |
| MFP | (NATO) Multiple Futures Project |
| MNE | Multinational Experiment |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NATO HQ | NATO Headquarters (Brussels) |
| NEC | Network Enabled Capability |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organization |
| NNEC | NATO Network Enabled Capability |
| NSA | Non-State Actors |
| ODU | Old Dominion University |
| PRT | Provincial Reconstruction Team |
| PsyOps | Psychological Operations |
| SFA | Security Force Assistance |
| SHAPE | Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe |
| SOCOM | US Special Operations Command |
| SOF | Special Operations Forces |
| STANAG | (NATO) Standardization Agreement |
| StratCom | Strategic Communications |
| TOPFAS | Tools for Operational Planning Functional Area Services |

| | |
|---|---|
| US | United States |
| USJFCOM | United States Joint Forces Command |
| USSTRATCOM | United States Strategic Command |
| WMD | Weapons of Mass Destruction |
| WMD-N | Weapons of Mass Destruction – Nuclear |
| WME | Weapons of Mass Effect |